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 Abstract 
Making judgments is an essential part of everyday life and how people form a 
judgment has instigated a plethora of research. Research in judgment and categorization has 
particularly contrasted two types of judgment strategies: rule-based and similarity-based 
strategies. Recent research suggests that people can make use of both rule- and similarity-
based strategies and frequently shift between these strategies. To select between strategies, 
contingency approaches propose that people trade off the strategies’ accuracy against the 
effort needed to execute strategy so that the selected strategy matches the demands of the task 
environment and the capabilities of the decision maker. This dissertation presents three papers 
investigating how accuracy-effort trade-offs between rule-based and similarity-based 
judgment strategies change strategy selection in judgment and categorization tasks. 
The first paper studies how reducing working memory by imposing a cognitive load 
may foster shifts to a less demanding similarity-based strategy and, in turn, enhances 
judgment performance in tasks well solved by a similarity-based strategy, but not in tasks for 
which rules are better suited. The second paper compares judgment strategies to strategies 
people apply in categorization. It shows that the same task characteristics, namely the number 
of cues and the functional relationship between cues and criterion, foster shifts between rule-
based and similarity-based strategies in judgment and categorization. The third manuscript 
explores which memory abilities underlie rule-based and similarity-based judgments. 
Specifically, it shows that working memory predicts to a stronger degree how well people 
solve rule-based judgment tasks, whereas episodic memory is more closely linked to 
judgment performance in similarity-based tasks. Furthermore, episodic memory also predicts 
selecting a similarity-based strategy, but not working memory. 
 
Strategy selection in judgment 9 
Strolling through a typical bookstore, one quickly notices that shelves are covered with books 
called The Art of Thinking Clearly, Allen Carr's Easy Way to Stop Smoking, What Women 
Really Want in Bed, or How to Cook Everything. In 2012, the sale of guidebooks in fact made 
up 13.8% of the total book sales in Germany (Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels, 
2013). Offering a way of solving daily life problems apparently meets the demands of the 
readers. In daily life, however, there are often variable routes to success: Spontaneously 
asking someone for his phone number may succeed in a bar, but seems to be an inappropriate 
pick-up strategy in an art gallery. In contrast, starting a philosophical discussion may pique 
someone’s interest in a gallery, but in a noisy club the discussion will probably be overheard. 
Hence, whether the strategy one follows is crowned with success often depends on the context 
or task environment (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Markman, Maddox, & Worthy, 2006). 
In recent decades, the idea that people possess a repertoire of strategies flourished in 
different fields of psychology ranging from memory (Dunlosky & Kane, 2007; McNamara & 
Scott, 2001) to categorization (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Ashby & 
O’Brien, 2005; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), 
judgment (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003; von Helversen 
& Rieskamp, 2008, 2009), and decision making (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Gigerenzer, Todd, 
& the ABC Research Group, 1999; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993). The concept of 
the adaptive toolbox, for instance, assumes that individuals can be characterized by a set of 
cognitive mechanisms that exploit evolved capacities (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Goldstein, 2008; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2011). Similarly, theories in 
categorization have repeatedly argued that people can rely upon qualitatively different 
categorization strategies that build upon distinct memory systems (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; 
Sloman, 1996; Smith & Grossman, 2008; Smith, Patalano, & Jonides, 1998). However, the 
idea that individuals may apply several strategies to solve problems opens up the question of 
how people select among these different strategies (Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Rieskamp & 
 Otto, 2006). One early solution to this strategy selection problem has been offered by 
contingency approaches to judgment and decision making (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et 
al., 1993). 
Contingency approaches portray the decision maker as actively selecting strategies 
that are adapted to the task environment and the cognitive capabilities of the decision maker 
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 1993). According to this approach, strategy selection 
constitutes a compromise between the accuracy achieved by using a strategy and the effort of 
executing a strategy. Selecting a particular strategy presupposes that the strategy is available 
in a person’s strategy repertoire (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Lemaire & Siegler, 1995). Second, 
the person needs to know that this strategy is applicable to the decision problem at hand 
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Lemaire & Siegler, 1995). The task environment offers feedback 
about the strategies’ accuracy and thereby increases the likelihood of selecting appropriate 
strategies and diminishes the likelihood of following inappropriate strategies (Rieskamp & 
Otto, 2006). Third, the decision maker needs to be willing and able to execute the strategy 
correctly (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Lemaire & Siegler, 1995). Time pressure, for instance, 
limits the time available for executing a strategy and hence may force the individual to apply 
simplifying strategies (Wright, 1974). Likewise, distractions impose an additional cognitive 
load on the decision maker and may restrict how much effort the decision maker can invest in 
strategy execution (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). Finally, learning about the strategies’ benefits 
and costs may strengthen — over time  — individual preferences for applying specific 
strategies and these stable tendencies may be linked to cognitive abilities (Bröder, 2003) or 
age (Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012). 
This dissertation contributed to the problem of strategy selection by investigating how 
task demands and memory abilities affect strategy use in judgment problems and how these 
judgment strategies, in turn, facilitate or impede judgments depending on the task 
environment. In the first manuscript, we focused on how reducing working memory capacity 
 fosters shifting to less demanding strategies and how this shift may help performance in 
judgment tasks for which the less demanding strategy is better suited. In the second 
manuscript we studied whether the same task components affect strategy selection in 
judgment and categorization by systematically varying the number of cues and the functional 
relationship between cues and criterion. The third manuscript, finally, focused on the question 
of how memory abilities promote judgments by facilitating strategy choice and strategy 
execution. In all studies, we put our emphasis on contrasting two kinds of judgment strategies: 
rule-based and similarity-based judgment strategies. 
 
Judgment Strategies 
People encounter judgment problems every day ranging from considering the suitability of a 
business dress to judging the attractiveness of an apartment to evaluating the effectiveness of 
a political program. Coming up with such a judgment requires inferring a continuous 
criterion, for instance the apartment’s attractiveness, from a number of critical attributes of 
this object (the cues), such as the size of the apartment or the monthly rent. 
Cognitive science particularly has contrasted two kinds of strategies (or cognitive 
processes1): rule-based and similarity-based strategies (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin et 
al., 2003; Nosofsky et al., 1994; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 2009). On the one hand, 
the decision maker may abstract rules describing how each cue relates to the criterion and find 
out the importance of each cue. To make a judgment, rule-based strategies assume that people 
finally combine the weighted cue values in an additive fashion (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & 
Kleinmuntz, 1979; Juslin et al., 2003). For instance, a tenant looking for a new apartment may 
try to figure out how much he appreciates a large apartment or a modern kitchen and assign a 
high weight to the apartment’s size. Consequently, the tenant will rate large apartments more 
favorably. Linear additive models have been predominantly used to capture these rules 
                                                 
1 The terms “processes” and “strategies” will be used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
 (Cooksey, 1996) and can describe people’s judgments in a variety of tasks (Brehmer & 
Brehmer, 1988) ranging from personal selection (Graves & Karren, 1992) to medical 
diagnoses (Wigton, 1996). 
On the other hand, the tenant may follow a similarity-based strategy and judge the 
apartment’s attractiveness by comparing it to past apartments he lived in. Similarity-based 
strategies, such as the exemplar model (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
Nosofsky, 1988), have been successfully applied to various areas in psychology from 
categorization to reasoning to memory. Exemplar models rely upon the retrieval of past 
experiences from long-term memory assuming that all previously encountered objects 
(exemplars) are stored in memory along with their criterion values (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). 
To judge the new object (the probe), previously encountered exemplars are retrieved from 
memory. The more similar a retrieved exemplar is to the probe, the more it influences the 
final judgment. Accordingly, if a tenant has already lived in an apartment with a similar floor 
plan, he may just recall how much he enjoyed living in his former apartment to rate the 
suitability of the new apartment. 
Obviously, the distinction between similarity and rules is at the heart of cognitive 
science (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Pothos, 2005; Sloman, 1996). The reason why various fields 
have repeatedly contrasted these strategies is that similarity- and rule-based strategies offer 
two fundamentally distinct ways of representing knowledge (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Juslin et 
al., 2003): Whereas similarity-based processes base inferences upon concrete instances stored 
in memory, rule-based processes rely upon explicit knowledge abstraction. Past research 
suggests that humans can rely upon both kinds of processes (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; 
Juslin et al., 2003; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 2009); indeed, within a specific domain 
such as judgment, the conditions triggering rule-based or similarity-based strategies are better 
and better understood (Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008). 
 
 Accuracy-Effort Trade-offs in the Selection of Judgment Strategies 
Accumulating evidence suggests that people adapt the judgment strategy to the task at hand 
(Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2007; Karlsson et al., 2008). One major 
factor shaping strategy selection is the relative accuracy that can be reached by executing 
rule-based or similarity-based strategies. Rule-based models can capture judgments well in 
linear multiple-cue judgment tasks in which the criterion is a linear additive function of the 
cues (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). In multiplicative judgment tasks, however, the criterion is a 
multiplicative function of the cues and, thus, task feedback strongly discourages rule 
abstraction processes, because a linear additive model cannot well represent the relationship 
between the cues and the criterion (Juslin et al., 2008). Therefore, people should shift to 
exemplar memory. Confirming this idea, it has been consistently found that more people rely 
on similarity-based processes in multiplicative judgment tasks (Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et 
al., 2007). Not all accuracy-based strategy shifts are necessarily successful on the first 
attempt. In nonlinear judgment tasks, for instance, a similarity-based strategy may not lead 
instantaneously to a good performance and so people shift back to the default, but 
inappropriate rule-based strategy (Karlsson et al., 2008; Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006). 
Accordingly, Karlsson et al. (2008) argued that executing a similarity-based strategy requires 
a deliberative strategic choice. 
Another major factor shaping strategy selection is the effort associated with executing 
rule-based and similarity-based strategies. Time pressure, for instance, has been found to 
reduce the consistency with which individuals implement a linear judgment policy in 
nonlinear judgment tasks (Rothstein, 1986). In a similar vein, cognitive load impairs rule-
based strategies more than implicit or similarity-based strategies suggesting that people may 
shift more to similarity-based strategies under cognitive load (Filoteo, Lauritzen, & Maddox, 
2010; Juslin et al., 2008; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). In contrast, if abstraction of linear 
rules is facilitated, for instance, by only changing one cue between trials or because the cue 
 directions are known, more people rely on rule-based learning (Juslin et al., 2008; Platzer & 
Bröder, 2013; von Helversen, Karlsson, Mata, & Wilke, 2013). Finally, feedback can also 
render rule abstraction more difficult and, hence, increase the effort of following a rule-based 
strategy. For instance, binary feedback in categorization often leads to switches to a 
similarity-based strategy because diminished feedback quality makes abstracting the correct 
rule more difficult (Juslin et al., 2003; Karlsson et al., 2008; von Helversen et al., 2013). 
How accurate and effortful certain strategies are may be learned over time (Rieskamp 
& Otto, 2006). Consequently, people may build up stable tendencies for rule-based or 
similarity-based learning that may be related to stable personal characteristics such as 
memory abilities (McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & Wiener, 2013). For instance, people with 
good episodic memory may prefer applying a similarity-based strategy. In this vein, it has 
been found that older adults are less likely to follow a similarity-based strategy— possibly, 
because they do not trust their long-term memory (Mata, von Helversen, et al., 2012). 
Alternatively, also adaptively choosing a strategy may hinge upon memory abilities (Mata, 
Pachur et al., 2012). In this spirit, higher intelligence helps to ignore information in case 
ignorance is adaptive (Bröder, 2003). Likewise, high working memory capacity does not 
predict which strategy people choose, but how good they are at following it (Craig & 
Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, & Kalish, 2012). 
Manuscript 1 particularly investigated how increasing the difficulty of abstracting 
rules by introducing a cognitive load can foster similarity-based judgment strategies and — 
depending on the accuracy that can be achieved by relying upon exemplar memory— can 
even benefit performance. Manuscript 2 pronounces how effort, manipulated by the number 
of cues, and accuracy, manipulated by the functional relationship between cues and criterion, 
interact to reinforce rule-based and similarity-based strategies across judgment and 
categorization tasks. Finally, Manuscript 3 goes one step further by investigating how 
individual differences in strategy use and judgment accuracy are grounded in memory 
 abilities thus shifting the focus even more towards how stable personal characteristics may be 
linked to preferences in strategy use. 
 
Making Judgments Under Cognitive Load 
Hoffmann, J A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2013a). Deliberation's blindsight: 
How cognitive load can improve judgments. Psychological Science, 24, 869-879. doi: 
10.1177/0956797612463581 
 
Distractions, such as a phone call from a student while writing your dissertation, are a hassle 
in daily life and often disturb performance. Distractions hurt performance because they 
impose an additional working memory load on the decision maker (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). 
Accordingly, under cognitive load, people tend to shift to strategies that are less working 
memory demanding, but often also less accurate (Juslin, et al., 2008; Payne, et al., 1993). In 
our paper, we suggested that under some circumstances this shift could also be beneficial for 
performance — in cases when the less demanding strategy provides a better solution to the 
problem at hand (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007). 
To test this hypothesis, our participants learned to solve a judgment task under a high 
cognitive load, a low cognitive load, or without cognitive load. This judgment task could be 
solved better by either a similarity-based judgment strategy (Experiment 1) or a rule-based 
judgment strategy (Experiment 2). While rule-based strategies should draw highly upon 
working memory capacity and rule abstraction is severely impaired under cognitive load 
(Filoteo et al., 2010; Juslin et al., 2008; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006), similarity-based 
strategies may rely to a lesser extent upon working memory capacity and may be rather driven 
by implicit, associative processes (Sloman, 1996). Accordingly, under cognitive load, people 
should abandon a rule-based strategy more often and shift to the less demanding similarity-
based strategy. In Experiment 1, we tested, whether this shift proves beneficial for judgment 
 performance in a multiplicative judgment task that can be better be solved by a similarity-
based strategy. 
In a training phase, our participants first learned to judge on a continuous scale how 
many small creatures different comic figures could catch. To predict the criterion, people 
could use five different features (or cues) of the comic figure (e.g., the shape of the ears). 
While judging these comic figures, participants had to remember two, four, or no letters to 
induce cognitive load. After each trial, participants received feedback about their judgment 
accuracy. This training phase finished when participants reached a learning criterion or the 
maximum number of training blocks. Afterwards, participants moved to a test phase in which 
they judged known and unknown comic figures twice without getting any performance 
feedback and without a concurrent cognitive load. 
At the end of the training phase, judgment accuracy did not differ between participants 
learning under high, low or without cognitive load. However, in the test phase, increasing 
cognitive load helped participants to make more accurate judgments for unknown items. To 
analyze more closely why performance even improved under cognitive load, we fitted three 
different cognitive models — a linear rule-based model, a similarity-based exemplar model, 
and a baseline model — to participants’ judgments at the end of training and predicted 
participants’ judgment in the test phase with the fitted parameters (a generalization test; 
Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). Under high cognitive load, more participants were better 
described by an exemplar model than by a linear or a baseline model. Moreover, this shift to a 
similarity-based strategy mediated the effect of cognitive load on judgment performance. 
Cognitive load, hence, increased shifting to similarity-based strategies and, in turn, 
improved judgment accuracy. However, shifting to a similarity-based strategy may harm 
performance in a judgment task that can best be solved by using rules. In Experiment 2, we 
tested how cognitive load affects strategy use and performance in a linear judgment task that 
can best be solved by more demanding rule abstraction strategy. Replicating a study from 
 Mata, von Helversen et al. (2012), participants learned to solve a linear judgment under a high 
cognitive load or without cognitive load. As in Experiment 1, under load participants 
switched more to similarity-based strategies, but this shift was less pronounced. In the linear 
task, however, following a similarity-based strategy harmed judgment accuracy for unknown 
items. 
In sum, increasing cognitive load makes rule abstraction more difficult and increases 
reliance upon less demanding similarity-based strategies. In addition, increasing cognitive 
load does not lead per se to worse performance, but can sometimes even improve 
performance — depending upon how well the less demanding strategy matches the problem 
at hand. 
 
Strategy Shifts in Judgment and Categorization 
Hoffmann, J. A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2013b). From rules to 
exemplars: Similar task features shape judgment and categorization processes. Manuscript to 
be submitted for publication. 
 
In some college courses, teachers are asked to judge students’ essays on a continuous grading 
scale — a typical judgment task; in other courses, however, teachers are only asked to 
categorize their students into the categories “pass” or “fail” — a usual categorization task. 
How teachers grade their students should obviously not depend on the response scale: the 
literature, however, has seldom linked judgment strategies to categorization strategies and 
vice versa (Juslin et al., 2003). On the one hand, rule-based and similarity-based strategies 
have been indeed proposed to underlie both judgments and categorizations (Erickson & 
Kruschke, 1998; Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; Nosofsky et al., 1994). On the other hand, people 
frequently shift from rule-based judgment strategies to similarity-based categorization 
strategies (Juslin et al., 2003; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2012; 
 von Helversen et al., 2013) and task characteristics identified as fostering shifts from rule-
based to similarity-based strategies vary between judgment and categorization. Whereas 
categorization research has intensively studied how the number of cues affects strategy choice 
(e.g. Ashby, Maddox, & Bohil, 2002; Filoteo et al., 2010; Maddox & Ashby, 2004; 
Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006), judgment research has pronounced the importance of the 
functional relationship in strategy selection (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Juslin et al., 2008; 
Karlsson et al., 2007). Consequently, it is still unclear whether strategy shifts from judgment 
to categorization generalize across a variety of task characteristics. 
To integrate the fields of judgment and categorization, we investigated how the 
number of cues and the functional relationship between cues and criterion affect strategy 
choice across the same categorization and judgment task. Overall, more cues (or dimensions) 
may increase the effort associated with rule abstraction (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008), whereas 
complex functional relationships, such as multiplicative functions, cannot be learned by 
abstracting linear rules (Juslin et al., 2008). Accordingly, a higher number of cues and more 
complex functional relationships should increase reliance upon exemplar memory in 
judgment and categorization. Furthermore, if the strategies people use to categorize objects 
match their judgment strategies people should rely upon similar strategies in both tasks 
(McDaniel et al., 2013). We investigated this question in two experiments in which 
participants solved both a categorization and a judgment task with the same underlying task 
structure. In two experiments we varied the task structure from a one-dimensional linear rule 
predicting judgments and category membership to a multidimensional linear rule to a 
multidimensional, multiplicative function (Experiment 1) and extended this to a 
multidimensional quadratic function (Experiment 2). In a training phase, participants learned 
to predict the judgment criterion or the category, respectively, of 25 objects based on four 
continuous features. After each trial, participants received feedback on their performance. In 
the subsequent test phase, participants judged or categorized 15 new objects four times. We 
 analyzed judgment and categorization strategies by using a generalization test to classify 
participants as following a rule-based strategy, a similarity-based strategy or a baseline model. 
In Experiment 1, a higher number of cues led to a shift to more similarity-based 
strategies in judgment and categorization with more people following rule abstraction in the 
one-dimensional, linear task than in the multidimensional, linear task. Likewise, increasing 
the complexity of the functional relation made participants rely more upon similarity-based 
strategies. Dealing with a categorization problem (in comparison to a judgment problem), 
however, did not make participants shift more to similarity-based strategies. Moreover, more 
cues and a more complex functional relationship made it more difficult to predict which 
strategy people would apply in the second task given the strategy they applied in the task they 
solved first. To replicate these findings in a second experiment, we used a multidimensional 
quadratic task that is even closer to a function learning task in which individual preferences 
for rule-based and similarity-based learning should become more pronounced (McDaniel et 
al., 2013). As in Experiment 1, a categorization task did not change the amount of participants 
best described by a similarity-based strategy. Moreover, it was hard to predict which strategy 
people best described by a similarity-based strategy would rely on in the second task. 
However, people relying upon rules in the first task were more likely to shift to similarity-
based processes in the second task. Taken together, these results suggest that providing scarce 
task feedback in categorization does not invite more similarity-based strategies per se. 
However, making rules more difficult or impossible to abstract not only triggers similarity-
based strategies, but also harms the ability to consistently detect the strategy best suited to 
solve the task. 
Memory Foundations of Human Judgment 
Hoffmann, J A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2013c). Pillars of judgment: How 
memory abilities affect performance in rule-based and exemplar-based judgments. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
 The judgment and categorization literature particularly highlights that rule-based and 
similarity-based strategies may draw upon different knowledge representations (Hahn & 
Chater, 1998; Smith et al., 1998; but Pothos, 2005) and there has been a heated debate as to 
what degree these knowledge representations rest upon different memory abilities (Ashby & 
O’Brien, 2005; Knowlton, 1999; Lewandowsky, 2011; Newell, Dunn, & Kalish, 2011; 
Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Smith et al., 1998). Ashby and O’Brien (2005), for instance, 
suggested that executing simple rule-based categorization strategies requires working memory 
capacity, whereas exemplar retrieval involves episodic memory. In a similar vein, Juslin et al. 
(2008) argued that cue abstraction could be conceived as a capacity-constrained sequential 
process, whereas similarity-based judgment strategies might be driven by explicit or implicit 
memory. Although the role of working memory capacity for rule abstraction has earned a lot 
of attention in judgment and categorization showing that, for instance, learning even simple 
rules is impaired by working memory load (Filoteo et al., 2010; Zeithamova & Maddox, 
2006), empirical evidence for the relationship between long-term memory and similarity-
based strategies is still scarce (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). Previous research has shown that 
exceptions to a rule, for instance, are recognized more often in a later recognition test (Davis, 
Love, & Preston, 2012; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 1995; Sakamoto & Love, 2004). Likewise, the 
instruction to remember all exemplars by heart helps performance in judgment tasks that can 
only be solved by similarity-based strategies (Olsson et al., 2006). Dissociations between 
recognition and categorization performance between amnesic patients and healthy controls, in 
contrast, have been taken as evidence that similarity-based strategies may tap into both 
implicit and explicit long-term memory (Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Smith & Grossmann, 
2008). 
The third paper tried to shed some light on how memory abilities promote the 
selection and execution of rule-based and similarity-based judgment strategies and how these 
strategies, in turn, affect judgment performance. Specifically, we hypothesized that low 
 working memory capacity should hurt executing rule-based strategies, whereas difficulties 
with encoding and retrieval from episodic memory may harm similarity-based strategies. 
Moreover, working memory capacity may also facilitate discovering the appropriate judgment 
strategy, whereas episodic memory may only strengthen the preference for employing 
similarity-based strategies. 
To investigate these questions, we conducted a study relating individual differences in 
memory abilities to judgment performance and judgment strategies in two different judgment 
tasks: A linear additive judgment task in which most participants should rely upon a rule-
based judgment strategy and a multiplicative judgment task in which most participants should 
be best described by a similarity-based strategy (the same tasks as in Manuscript 2). 
Additionally, we measured working memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory by three 
different tests each. Classifying participants to the judgment strategies indeed confirmed that 
participants switched from a rule-based strategy in the linear judgment task to a similarity-
based judgment strategy in the multiplicative task. To relate memory abilities to judgment 
performance we relied upon structural equation modeling. This analysis suggested that higher 
working memory capacity predicted higher judgment accuracy in linear judgment tasks, 
whereas the ability to solve multiplicative judgment tasks was predicted by episodic memory. 
Implicit memory was related to judgment performance neither in rule-based, nor in the 
similarity-based judgment tasks. Finally, better episodic memory also predicted choosing a 
similarity-based strategy in the multiplicative task and this choice of a similarity-based 
strategy enhanced judgment accuracy for similarity-based judgments. Working memory, in 
contrast, was linked to how well people executed the strategy learned in the linear judgment 
task and — ultimately — predicted judgment accuracy for rule-based judgments. 
In sum, these results emphasize that not only task demands drive strategy shifts 
between rule-based and similarity-based processing, but judgment strategies also exploit 
different underlying cognitive abilities. While high working memory capacity may help 
 people to abstract rules, similarity-based strategies build upon the ability to encode and 
retrieve items from episodic memory. This suggests that focusing on cognitive abilities can 
help us to understand why people establish preferences for learning based upon rules or based 
upon exemplars. 
 
General Discussion 
Following a contingency approach to strategy selection, I outlined in the introduction that 
people may select a judgment strategy by trading off the accuracy a particular strategy can 
achieve with the effort necessary to execute this strategy. Within this framework, I focused on 
contrasting two types of judgment strategies: rule-based and similarity-based strategies. 
Replicating previous results, we found in all three manuscripts that the relative accuracy of 
rule-based and similarity-based strategies is one major determinant of strategy selection 
(Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007). In Manuscript 1, we found a stronger switch to 
similarity-based strategies in a task in which reliance upon similarity is strongly enforced. 
Likewise, the functional relationship between cues and criterion fostered shifting to 
similarity-based strategies in judgment and categorization in the second paper. Indeed, even 
the same participants tended to rely more upon rules in linear tasks and more on similarity in 
multiplicative tasks (Manuscript 3).  
Beyond accuracy, however, the effort that needs to be invested into strategy execution 
also affects which strategy people select. Increasing the difficulty to abstract rules —either by 
imposing a cognitive load on the decision maker (Manuscript 1) or by increasing the number 
of cues that need to be considered by a rule-based strategy (Manuscript 2) — enhanced 
reliance upon similarity-based strategies. These results dovetail research suggesting that 
providing knowledge about the cue directions (Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen et al., 
2013) or a rule-based learning sequence (Juslin et al., 2008) facilitates abstraction of cue 
weights thereby fostering rule-based judgment strategies. 
 Finally, our third paper picked up the idea that people may also learn about the costs 
and benefits associated with each strategy and develop preferences over time for selecting one 
over another strategy. First, we found that the ability to solve rule-based and similarity-based 
judgment tasks hinges to a varying degree upon working memory and episodic memory. 
Furthermore, in line with research showing that older adults seem to avoid similarity-based 
strategies (Mata, von Helversen et al., 2012), we found that better episodic memory predicts 
how likely people are to select a similarity-based strategy over a rule-based strategy. Working 
memory capacity, in contrast, benefitted the ability to consistently execute learned strategies 
mimicking results suggesting that working memory is particularly important for executing 
learned rules (Del Missier et al., 2013). 
In doing so, this dissertation establishes ties between different fields of psychology — 
from judgment to categorization to memory — showing how these fields can profit from the 
vast knowledge accumulated in each of those fields over time: Manuscript 2 reunified 
categorization with judgment research by investigating how the cognitive strategies 
underlying human judgment match strategies people follow to categorize objects. This 
manuscript showed that, indeed, the major task components leading to strategy shifts in 
categorization also encourage strategy shifts in judgment and vice versa. Manuscript 1 and 3 
focused more on testing the memory representations underlying rule-based and similarity-
based strategies yielding converging evidence that high working memory capacity may be 
involved to a larger extent in rule abstraction than in exemplar memory. In addition, 
manuscript 3 strongly reinforced the role of episodic memory for similarity-based judgments 
— a topic that has still received too little attention in categorization, judgment, and decision 
making. 
In this dissertation, I offer contingency approaches as one conceptual framework to 
understand strategy selection. However, contingency approaches to strategy selection have 
not been left without critique: First, selecting a strategy may require applying a meta-strategy 
 to decide how to select the judgment strategy and hence simply move the strategy selection 
problem to a meta-level (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Second, although later approaches dropped 
the concept of a meta-strategy, these attempts to frame strategy selection as a function of 
effort and accuracy have been criticized as vague (Marewski & Schooler, 2011). To remedy 
these shortcomings, Rieskamp and Otto have suggested reinforcement learning as one 
mechanism helping to adapt the strategies to the task at hand. Alternatively, Marewski and 
Schooler proposed that the task environment, cognitive abilities, and the cognitive strategies 
mutually restrict the range of situations when a strategy can be applied. This dissertation 
supports the view that to advance our knowledge about strategy selection in judgment, 
categorization, and decision making, we need to consider in a common framework not only 
how people learn to adapt decision strategies to the task demands, but also how memory 
abilities may limit and shape the strategies we follow as routes to success. 
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Suppose you hurt your leg in an accident and go to the 
hospital for emergency treatment. While treating you, the 
physician is repeatedly interrupted by a medical assistant. 
Is the physician still able to treat you properly? Emergency 
physicians are—on average—interrupted 10 times per 
hour (Chisholm, Collison, Nelson, & Cordell, 2000). These 
interruptions can increase the risk of failure, such as 
medication errors (Westbrook, Woods, Rob, Dunsmuir, & 
Day, 2010). One reason why distractions are so damaging 
is that they increase cognitive load on the physician and 
reduce working memory capacity for the focal task 
(Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
Research has shown that high cognitive load severely 
impairs performance in various tasks, ranging from mem-
ory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) to motor abilities (Yogev-
Seligmann, Hausdorff, & Giladi, 2008) to problem solving 
(Logie, Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994). Similarly, making accu-
rate judgments, such as diagnosing a patient, can require 
high working memory capacity, and thus accuracy should 
suffer under cognitive load (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 
2008; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Weaver & Stewart, 
2012). Sometimes, however, cognitive load can improve 
performance: For instance, experienced golf players 
who are distracted putt better than experienced golf 
players focusing on performance aspects (Beilock, Carr, 
MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002). Likewise, cognitive load 
induced by the presence of other people often facilitates 
performance (e.g., Baron, 1986; Markman, Maddox, & 
Worthy, 2006). Given that negative consequences of cogni-
tive load are often, but not always, found, under what cir-
cumstances does performance increase under cognitive 
load?
To predict performance, we argue that one must con-
sider the cognitive strategies people use for solving prob-
lems and how well these strategies perform. Research 
shows that strategies demanding high working memory 
capacity are impaired under cognitive load, which induces 
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Abstract
Multitasking poses a major challenge in modern work environments by putting the worker under cognitive load. 
Performance decrements often occur when people are under high cognitive load because they switch to less 
demanding—and often less accurate—cognitive strategies. Although cognitive load disturbs performance over a wide 
range of tasks, it may also carry benefits. In the experiments reported here, we showed that judgment performance 
can increase under cognitive load. Participants solved a multiple-cue judgment task in which high performance could 
be achieved by using a similarity-based judgment strategy but not by using a more demanding rule-based judgment 
strategy. Accordingly, cognitive load induced a shift to a similarity-based judgment strategy, which consequently led 
to more accurate judgments. By contrast, shifting to a similarity-based strategy harmed judgments in a task best solved 
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people to switch to less demanding strategies (Beach & 
Mitchell, 1978; Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Payne et al., 1993; 
Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008). If less demanding strategies 
cannot help solve the task, performance decreases. 
However, if less demanding strategies can help solve the 
task, performance can increase (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007). 
Social pressure, for instance, expedites learning in non-
verbalizable categorization problems (Markman et al., 
2006) that are solvable by using similarity-based strategies 
( Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003) but harms learning in 
verbalizable categorization problems solvable by using 
rule-based strategies.
In the present work, we investigated how cognitive 
load changes strategy use in a multiple-cue judgment 
task and how strategy use interacts with the task environ-
ment. Specifically, we first tested whether cognitive 
load fosters switching from a rule-based judgment strat-
egy to a similarity-based judgment strategy. Second, we 
tested whether cognitive load improves performance in 
tasks for which the similarity-based strategy is better 
suited.
Multiple-Cue Judgments
In multiple-cue judgment tasks, a number of cues, such 
as a patient’s symptoms, are used to predict a quantitative 
criterion, say, an appropriate drug dosage for that patient. 
Recent research suggests that people commonly use two 
types of cognitive strategies for judgments: rule-based 
strategies and similarity-based strategies (Erickson & 
Kruschke, 1998; Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & 
McKinley, 1994; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 2009). 
Rule-based strategies assume that people try to find or 
abstract a rule specifying the relation between each cue 
and the criterion. The abstracted cue weights are then 
integrated in a linear additive fashion. For instance, a 
physician may apply a rule that specifies the appropriate 
dosage as a linear function of the patient’s symptoms. 
Linear regression models can capture these rules and 
have successfully described human judgment in various 
domains (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988).
Alternatively, physicians could recall patients they 
have previously treated and estimate the dosage accord-
ing to the treatment of similar patients. In this case, the 
physician relies on a similarity-based strategy. Models 
assuming a similarity-based strategy, such as exemplar 
models, successfully predict human behavior in a wide 
selection of cognitive tasks, such as categorization (Juslin 
et al., 2003; Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000) and judgment 
(Juslin et al., 2008). Exemplar models assume that previ-
ously encountered exemplars are stored in memory. When 
judging a new object, the similarity of this “probe” to all 
stored objects determines the judgment (see Section A 
in the Supplemental Material available online for the 
models’ mathematical descriptions).
Converging evidence suggests that people switch 
between rule- and similarity-based strategies depending 
on task characteristics ( Juslin et al., 2003; Juslin et al., 
2008; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010). For instance, 
Juslin and colleagues (2008) found that people used a 
rule-based cue-abstraction strategy in a linear judgment 
problem in which the criterion was an additive function 
of the cues. However, people switched to an exemplar 
strategy in a nonlinear task in which the criterion was a 
multiplicative function of the cues. Likewise, cognitive 
load may induce selecting another judgment strategy. In 
fact, evidence suggests that rule-based strategies demand 
more working memory capacity than similarity-based 
strategies ( Juslin et al., 2008). For instance, increased 
cognitive load impaired performance in rule-based cate-
gorizations but marginally affected performance in simi-
larity-based categorizations (Zeithamova & Maddox, 
2006, 2007; but see Miles & Minda, 2011). Furthermore, 
Filoteo, Lauritzen, and Maddox (2010) found that cogni-
tive load improved performance in similarity-based, but 
not in rule-based, categorizations; they explained that 
this improvement occurred because more people shifted 
to implicit procedural strategies when making similarity-
based categorizations. Sloman (1996) argued that similar-
ity-based processes are executed automatically and 
require little working memory capacity. However, to what 
extent similarity-based strategies draw on working mem-
ory is still debated (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Juslin et al., 
2008; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008; Lewandowsky, 
2011; Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998).
Following this debate, we investigated how cognitive 
load affects judgment strategies and performance. If work-
ing memory limitations affect rule-based strategies more 
than similarity-based strategies, increased cognitive load 
should promote a shift from rule-based to similarity-based 
judgments. Furthermore, when similarity-based strategies 
are better suited for solving the judgment problem—as in 
nonlinear judgment tasks—cognitive load may even 
enhance performance.
Study 1: Cognitive Load in a Nonlinear 
Judgment Task
To test our hypothesis, we trained participants in the 
present study to predict the criterion value for a number 
of objects using five cues. The criterion was a nonlinear, 
multiplicative function of the cues and could be better 
predicted by a similarity-based strategy than by a 
rule-based strategy (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). 
We manipulated cognitive load with a concurrent mem-
ory task in three conditions that differed according to 
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whether participants were given no, low, or high cogni-
tive load.
Method
Participants. Ninety participants (42 women, 48 men; 
mean age = 24 years, SD = 5 years) were recruited from 
the University of Basel. Participants received 17 Swiss 
francs (CHF) per hour (roughly $18) and a performance-
contingent bonus (M = 8.3 CHF) for participation. One 
participant who always made identical judgments was 
excluded from the analysis.
Design and materials. The cover story in the judg-
ment task was adopted from von Helversen et al. (2010) 
and asked participants to predict how many fictitious 
creatures (“Golbis”) a comic figure (a “Sonic”) could 
catch. The Sonics’ appearance differed in five binary fea-
tures (the cues): hair (spiky vs. dreadlocks), nose (red 
round vs. yellow beaky), tail (spiny vs. curly), ears (pointy 
vs. floppy), and body (green wings vs. blue spikes).1 
These cues could be used to predict how many Golbis a 
Sonic would catch (the criterion). Table 1 illustrates the 
task structure: The cues were given a binary value of zero 
or one, and they varied in their cue weights, that is, in 
their importance for predicting the criterion. The cue 
weights were randomly assigned to the five pictorial 
cues, as were the cue values (zero or one) to the features 
(e.g., spiny vs. curly). We divided the items into a training 
set and a validation set; both sets could be better solved 
Table 1. Cue and Criterion Values of Items in the Nonlinear Judgment Task of 
Study 1
Set and item Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 Criterion
Training set
 Item 1 1 1 0 1 1 20
 Item 2 0 0 0 1 0 1
 Item 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Item 4 0 1 0 0 1 2
 Item 5 1 1 0 0 1 7
 Item 6 1 0 0 1 1 5
 Item 7 0 0 0 0 1 0
 Item 8 1 1 0 1 0 9
 Item 9 0 1 0 0 0 1
 Item 10 0 0 1 0 0 1
 Item 11 0 1 0 1 0 2
 Item 12 0 1 0 1 1 5
 Item 13 0 0 1 1 1 4
 Item 14 1 0 1 1 1 16
 Item 15 1 1 0 0 0 3
 Item 16 1 1 1 1 1 62
Validation set
 Item 1 1 0 0 1 0 2
 Item 2 0 0 1 1 0 2
 Item 3 0 1 1 0 0 2
 Item 4 1 0 0 0 0 1
 Item 5 1 0 1 1 0 7
 Item 6 1 0 1 0 1 6
 Item 7 1 1 1 0 1 23
 Item 8 1 0 1 0 0 3
 Item 9 0 0 1 0 1 1
 Item 10 0 1 1 1 0 6
 Item 11 0 0 0 1 1 1
 Item 12 0 1 1 0 1 5
 Item 13 0 1 1 1 1 14
 Item 14 1 0 0 0 1 2
 Item 15 1 1 1 1 0 28
 Item 16 1 1 1 0 0 10
Note: Training items were presented in the training and the test phase. Validation items 
appeared only during the test phase.
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by a similarity-based strategy than a rule-based strategy. 
Additionally, the two strategies predicted different 
responses on the validation items (for item selection, see 
Section A in the Supplemental Material).
Procedure. To control for possible differences in work-
ing memory capacity, we first asked participants to com-
plete an operation-span task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, 
& Engle, 2005). During this task, participants recalled let-
ters while solving mathematical equations. The subse-
quent judgment task was divided into a training and a 
test phase. In the training phase, participants learned to 
make judgments for 16 training items. To induce a shift to 
a similarity-based strategy, we manipulated cognitive 
load during this phase across three conditions, which dif-
fered according to whether participants were given no, 
low, or high cognitive load. Thirty participants were 
assigned to each condition.
On each trial in the training phase, participants saw 1 
of the 16 Sonics from the training set and estimated its 
criterion value. After each trial, participants received 
feedback about the correct criterion value and the points 
earned. In the low- or high-cognitive-load condition, par-
ticipants saw two or four consonants, respectively, before 
the Sonic appeared. Consonants were presented consec-
utively, each for 2 s. After the participants received feed-
back about their criterion judgment, they were asked to 
recall the letters in their presentation order. The training 
phase ended when a learning criterion was reached. 
Participants met this learning criterion when judgment 
accuracy, as measured in root-mean-square deviation 
(RMSD) between participants’ judgments and the crite-
rion values, fell below 6 RMSD. Each participant com-
pleted at least 8 training blocks, each consisting of 16 
trials; training terminated after 14 blocks even if the 
learning criterion had not been reached. In the test phase, 
participants estimated criterion values for all 32 Sonics 
from the training and the validation sets twice without 
feedback and without cognitive load.
To motivate participants, we provided a performance-
contingent payment. In each trial, participants earned 10 
points (corresponding to 0.05 CHF) for a correct answer. 
The more their judgment deviated from the correct 
answer, the fewer points they received: They received 
9 points if their judgment deviated by one from the cor-
rect answer, 8 points if it deviated by two, 6 points if it 
deviated by three, and 3 points if it deviated by four. 
Participants under low and high cognitive load received 
an additional point for correct letter recall. To prevent 
participants from trading off recall performance and 
judgment performance, we did not award any points for 
the memory or for the judgment task when they could 
not recall the letters. Additionally, participants received a 
bonus of 3 CHF if they reached the learning criterion for 
the judgment task within 14 training blocks.
Results
Adherence to cognitive load. To check whether we 
manipulated cognitive load successfully, we calculated 
the percentage of correctly recalled letter sequences over 
all blocks. Letter recall was generally high; however, 
participants under low cognitive load recalled letters bet-
ter than did participants under high cognitive load, 
t(46.13) = 3.35, p = .002 (see Table 2). In both conditions, 
higher criterion-judgment accuracy was related to better 
letter recall (all rs < .35, all ps < .05), which indicates 
that participants did not trade off letter recall and judg-
ment accuracy. Excluding participants who recalled 
fewer than 90% of the letter sequences correctly led to 
comparable results. Taken together, these results suggest 
that the cognitive-load manipulation was successful.
Table 2. Mean Results for the Three Conditions in Study 1
Phase and measure No cognitive load Low cognitive load High cognitive load
Pretraining phase
 Operation-span score 37.5 (16.3) 36.0 (17.2) 42.7 (19.2)
Training phase
 Letters recalled (%) — 96.0 (4.3) 90.7 (7.5)
 Number of blocks completed 11.5 (2.5) 10.0 (2.3) 10.8 (2.8)
 Judgment accuracy: last block 8.14 (5.63) 7.40 (6.62) 8.54 (6.52)
Test phase
 Judgment accuracy: training set 8.03 (3.95) 8.79 (5.46) 10.49 (6.57)
 Judgment accuracy: validation set 12.87 (6.43) 10.55 (4.54) 9.30 (3.47)
 Judgment accuracy: both sets 11.21 (4.20) 10.20 (3.91) 10.30 (4.41)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Judgment accuracy was measured in root-mean-square deviations 
(RMSD) from the correct response.
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Differences in working memory capacity. Working 
memory capacity may be an important mediator of judg-
ment performance (DeCaro, Carlson, Thomas, & Beilock, 
2009; Lewandowsky, 2011). Hence, we measured indi-
vidual differences in working memory capacity with an 
operation-span task (Unsworth et al., 2005). Working 
memory capacity did not vary significantly between the 
cognitive-load conditions, F(2, 86) = 1.20, p = .305 (see 
Table 2). Including working memory capacity as a covari-
ate did not affect the results in any subsequent analysis.
Criterion-judgment performance. Can people learn 
accurate judgments even under high cognitive load? The 
majority of participants (68%) reached the learning crite-
rion within 14 blocks, which suggests that, overall, par-
ticipants mastered the task. The number of participants 
who did not reach the learning criterion did not differ 
significantly among conditions (high load: 11, low load: 
6, control: 12), F2(2, N = 89) = 2.85, p = .241.2 Addition-
ally, we assessed learning performance with the number 
of training blocks completed and judgment accuracy in 
the last training block (see Table 2). An analysis of vari-
ance revealed that participants in the two cognitive-load 
conditions did not require more training than participants 
without cognitive load, F(2, 86) = 2.30, K2 = .05, p = .107. 
Neither high nor low cognitive load resulted in poorer 
judgment accuracy in the last training block than did no 
cognitive load, F(2, 86) < 1, p = .778. These results show 
that cognitive load did not harm learning.
But were participants able to generalize the good per-
formance to validation items when they learned under 
cognitive load? We measured judgment accuracy in the 
test phase as the RMSD between the criterion value and 
participants’ judgments, averaged over the two test blocks 
separately for training and validation items. As expected 
based on the learning results, performance for training 
items did not differ significantly among the three condi-
tions, F(2, 86) = 1.61, K2 = .04, p = .206 (see Table 2). 
However, for validation items, participants made more 
accurate judgments in the two cognitive-load conditions 
than in the no-load condition, F(2, 86) = 4.00, K2 = .09, 
p = .022. Furthermore, a linear contrast for cognitive load 
showed that for validation items, increasing cognitive 
load led to higher judgment accuracy, F(2, 86) = 7.78, 
p = .007. In sum, consistent with our hypothesis, the 
results showed that cognitive load increased people’s 
judgment performance.
Cognitive modeling of judgment strategies. Accord-
ing to our hypothesis, cognitive load might induce peo-
ple to switch to a similarity-based strategy. Because the 
task could be better solved with a similarity-based strat-
egy than with a rule-based strategy, such a shift could 
explain performance improvements under cognitive load. 
We followed a cognitive-modeling approach to investi-
gate the judgment strategies participants used. We first 
fitted three computational models, an exemplar model 
(similarity-based strategy), a linear model (rule-based 
strategy), and a baseline model (estimating participants’ 
mean judgment), to participants’ judgments during the 
training phase (for details, see Section A in the Supple-
mental Material). We then determined how accurately the 
models predicted participants’ judgments during the test 
phase and excluded participants best described by the 
baseline model. To capture how much participants relied 
on a linear versus an exemplar model, we fitted a strategy 
weight ranging from zero to one to participants’ judg-
ments in the test phase. This strategy weight weighs the 
predictions of the linear and the exemplar model for the 
test phase. A strategy weight over .5 indicates a higher 
probability for the exemplar model; a strategy weight 
lower than .5 indicates a higher probability for the linear 
model. Classifying participants based on a threshold 
strategy weight of .5 was identical to a classification 
based on model fit in the test phase.
Cognitive load, indeed, affected the strategy weight, 
F(2, 67) = 6.98, K2 = .17, p = .005. Participants under high 
cognitive load had a higher strategy weight (M = .86, SE = 
.04) than did participants under low cognitive load (M = 
.70, SE = .07) or without cognitive load (M = .52, SE = .07). 
Figure 1 (upper panel) illustrates the effect of cognitive 
load on strategy use, with participants classified based on 
the strategy weight. In the control condition, the linear 
and the exemplar model predicted an equal percentage of 
participants best. However, under cognitive load, the 
exemplar model predicted the majority of participants 
best. In addition to cognitive load, working memory 
capacity may alter strategy choice. To analyze this rela-
tionship, we regressed strategy weight on working mem-
ory capacity using cognitive load as a covariate. In this 
analysis, working memory capacity did not predict strat-
egy weight beyond cognitive load, b = 0.001, SE = 0.002, 
t(67) = 0.54, p = .592. Taken together, these results suggest 
that cognitive load induced participants to rely more on a 
similarity-based than a rule-based judgment strategy.
Judgment accuracy and cognitive models. Can a 
change of strategy explain differences in judgment accu-
racy under cognitive load? Figure 1 (lower panel) shows 
judgment accuracy for validation items in the test phase, 
separately for participants assigned to the exemplar and 
the linear model. The figure illustrates that participants 
assigned to the exemplar model judged validation items 
more accurately than did participants assigned to the 
linear model.
If cognitive load increases judgment performance by 
changing the cognitive strategy, the strategy weight 
should mediate the effect of cognitive load on judgment 
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performance. We tested this hypothesis with a mediation 
analysis in which cognitive load was the independent 
variable, strategy weight was the mediator, and judgment 
accuracy for validation items was the dependent variable 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). First, we regressed judgment 
accuracy on cognitive load. This regression showed that 
increasing cognitive load led to a higher judgment accu-
racy, b = 2.39, SE = 0.78, t(68) = 3.08, p = .003, R2 = 
.12. However, with strategy weight included in the hier-
archical regression, cognitive load no longer predicted 
Linear
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Fig. 1. Judgment strategies in the nonlinear judgment task in Study 1. The pie charts show the percentage of participants in each of 
the three cognitive-load conditions who were best described by the baseline, the linear, or the exemplar model. The graph shows judg-
ment accuracy, measured in root-mean-square deviations (RMSDs) from the correct response, for validation items in the test phase as 
a function of model type and cognitive-load condition. Error bars represent ±1 SE.
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judgment accuracy, b = 0.95, SE = 0.75, t(67) = 1.27, p = 
.209. Instead, the strategy weight predicted judgment 
accuracy, b = 8.35, SE = 1.79, t(67) = 4.65, p < .001, R2 = 
.34. A test of the indirect effect indicated that the strategy 
weight mediated the effect of cognitive load on judg-
ment, b = 1.44, SE = 0.49, Sobel’s Z = 2.96, p = .003, and 
thus explains why participants performed better under 
cognitive load (see Section A in the Supplemental Material 
for additional results).
Study 2: Extension to a Linear 
Judgment Task
How does cognitive load influence performance in a lin-
ear task? In a linear judgment task, similarity-based strate-
gies lead to worse performance than rule-based strategies. 
Thus, if cognitive load causes participants to rely more 
on a less demanding similarity-based strategy than a 
more demanding rule-based strategy, this should decrease 
performance in a linear task. However, strategy selection 
is affected not only by the effort it takes to process a 
strategy, but also by feedback about strategy performance 
(Payne et al., 1993). Feedback reinforces successful strat-
egies and makes their selection more likely (Rieskamp & 
Otto, 2006). In the nonlinear task, feedback and cognitive 
load promoted reliance on similarity-based strategies. 
Yet, in a linear judgment task, feedback should favor a 
rule-based strategy. Accordingly, participants may be 
more motivated to use a rule-based strategy, which would 
reduce the influence of cognitive load on strategy selec-
tion. To investigate this question, we compared how peo-
ple under high cognitive load (four letters) and people 
without cognitive load solved a linear judgment task (see 
Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012).
Method
Sixty participants (35 women, 25 men; mean age = 25 
years, SD = 7 years) solved a linear judgment task. Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions: high cognitive load (in which participants saw four 
letters before each trial, as in Study 1) or no cognitive 
load (in which participants saw no letters before each 
trial). Participants received 17 CHF per hour and a perfor-
mance-contingent bonus (M = 5.4 CHF). The design and 
materials were the same as in Study 1, except that the 
Sonics’ appearance varied among only four binary cues: 
hair, nose, ears, and body. The criterion was a linear 
function of these four cues. The task consisted of a train-
ing and a test phase. During the training phase, partici-
pants repeatedly judged 10 training items until a learning 
criterion had been reached (with at least 8 and at most 16 
blocks). In the test phase, participants judged 10 training 
items and 6 validation items four times without feedback 
(see Section B in the Supplemental Material for details on 
the methods used in Study 2).
Results
To test whether people switched to a similarity-based 
strategy in the present study, we followed the same 
approach as in the first study. We modeled participants’ 
judgments and excluded participants assigned to the 
baseline model. Then we estimated the strategy weight to 
capture how much participants relied on an exemplar 
rather than a linear model. As illustrated in Figure 2 
(upper panel), the percentage of participants assigned to 
the exemplar model increased slightly under cognitive 
load, reflected in a marginally significant higher strategy 
weight in the high-load condition (M = .53, SE = .07) than 
in the control condition, (M = .33, SE = .07), t (49) = 1.91, 
d = 0.54, p = .061.
Cognitive load did not affect performance (high-load 
condition: M = 2.32 RMSD, SD = 0.97; control condition: 
M = 2.15 RMSD, SD = 0.93), t (58) = 0.68, p = .50. A 
regression analysis, however, showed that a higher strat-
egy weight representing similarity-based strategies pre-
dicted lower judgment performance on validation items, 
b = 0.873, SE = 0.319, t(49) = 2.735, p = .009, R2 = .13. 
Thus, a similarity-based strategy harmed judgment per-
formance in the linear task (see Fig. 2, lower panel).
In sum, cognitive load induced a shift to similarity-
based strategies even in a linear judgment task. 
Furthermore, following a similarity-based strategy harmed 
judgment performance. However, the shift was not pro-
nounced enough to effectively decrease performance 
under high cognitive load (see Section B in the 
Supplemental Material for a more detailed analysis of 
results of Study 2).
Discussion
In daily life, gaining time by doing several things at once 
is tempting. Although most people can walk and talk at 
the same time, using a mobile phone while driving can be 
dangerous. In fact, distraction impairs performance over a 
wide range of tasks (Baddeley, 1992). Distractions, how-
ever, may not always hurt performance. In contrast, we 
found that people made more accurate judgments after 
learning a nonlinear judgment task under concurrent 
memory load, a finding that matches research showing 
that cognitive load can enhance performance (Beilock & 
DeCaro, 2007; Filoteo et al., 2010; Markman et al., 2006).
In our research, we extended these findings to judg-
ments by modeling the cognitive strategies people use 
and linking these strategies to judgment performance. In 
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the nonlinear judgment task, cognitive load increased 
performance for validation items. This performance 
increase was explained by a shift from a rule-based strat-
egy to a less demanding but more accurate similarity-
based strategy. Switching to a less demanding strategy, 
however, does not always benefit judgment performance. 
If the strategy people use under cognitive load is not 
adapted to the judgment problem, judgment performance 
can decrease. Accordingly, in a linear judgment task, we 
found that following the less accurate similarity-based 
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Fig. 2. Judgment strategies in the linear judgment task in Study 2. The pie charts show the percentage of participants in the 
two cognitive-load conditions who were best described by the baseline, the linear, or the exemplar model. The graph shows 
judgment accuracy, measured in root-mean-square deviations (RMSDs) from the correct response, for validation items in the test 
phase as a function of model type and cognitive-load condition. Error bars represent ±1 SE.
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strategy impaired judgment performance. This suggests 
that considering the cognitive strategies people use under 
cognitive load is crucial for predicting performance.
Our results resonate with research suggesting that 
cognitive load induces people to switch to a less demand-
ing cognitive strategy (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Beilock & 
DeCaro, 2007; Payne et al., 1993; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 
2008). In the two experiments reported here, we found 
that participants under cognitive load were more likely to 
use a similarity-based strategy than participants who 
were not under cognitive load. One reason for this strat-
egy change could be that rule-based strategies are more 
susceptible to working memory limitations than similar-
ity-based strategies are ( Juslin et al., 2008). This is sup-
ported by research suggesting that rule-based strategies 
place strong demands on working memory (Ashby & 
O’Brien, 2005; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006, 2007), 
whereas similarity-based categorization may be learned 
via implicit, automatic processes (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, 
Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Filoteo 
et al., 2010; Markman et al., 2006, but see Karlsson et al., 
2008; Lewandowsky, 2011).
The tasks, however, differed in how much participants 
shifted their strategies under cognitive load. In the linear 
judgment task, participants relied less strongly on a simi-
larity-based strategy than participants did in the nonlin-
ear task. Possibly, performance feedback reinforced 
rule-based strategies enough to motivate participants to 
rely on a rule-based strategy that allowed accurate judg-
ments to outweigh effort reductions from switching to a 
similarity-based strategy (Payne et al., 1993).
The effect of cognitive load may also depend on type 
of load: In our studies, we focused on verbal cognitive 
load. Visual load, however, interferes more strongly with 
visual processing and reduces learning in similarity-based 
categorizations (Miles & Minda, 2011). Thus, high visual 
cognitive load may impair similarity-based judgment 
strategies. Additionally, the effect of cognitive load may 
depend on reward structure (Maddox & Markman, 2010; 
Worthy, Markman, & Maddox, 2009). Under high pres-
sure, aiming to minimize losses impairs performance in 
similarity-based categorizations (Worthy et al., 2009). In 
our studies, participants tried to maximize gains by col-
lecting as many points as possible. Yet it is possible that 
avoiding losses would hurt similarity-based judgments 
under cognitive load.
In sum, we found that people under cognitive load 
relied more often on a similarity-based judgment strategy 
than on a rule-based judgment strategy. Although this 
strategy change proved useful in a nonlinear judgment 
task, following a similarity-based strategy harmed perfor-
mance in a linear judgment task. Evidently, recognizing 
the cognitive strategies that people rely on is a key to 
understanding how they solve problems and can help 
researchers predict how good people are at solving them. 
Uncovering people’s cognitive strategies may lead to a 
better understanding of when and how people can main-
tain high performance even in distracting environments, 
such as emergency departments.
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Notes
1. We used one cue more in the present study than von 
Helversen, Mata, and Olsson (2010) did. To make sure that the 
additional cue (the tail) was as salient as the other cues, we 
asked 10 participants to name the differences among the most 
dissimilar Sonics.
2. Including only participants who learned the task yielded the 
same conclusions as the analysis based on the complete data set.
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Supplemental Material A: Cognitive Modeling of Judgment Strategies 
To understand the cognitive strategies underlying participants’ judgments, we fitted a 
similarity-based judgment model (an exemplar model) and a rule-based judgment model (a 
linear model) to each participant individually. Performance of the exemplar model (with one 
sensitivity parameter, h) and the linear model (with six parameters, one for each cue and a 
constant intercept) was compared to a baseline model that calculated each participant’s mean 
judgment. 
Similarity-Based Model 
Exemplar models assume that the similarity between the new object (the probe) and 
all stored exemplars is a major determinant of judgment. This similarity S(p,j) between probe 
p and exemplar j is a decay function of the distance between two objects (Nosofsky & Zaki, 
1998): 
€ 
S(p, j) = e−d pj , (A1) 
where dpj is the distance between the two objects. The distance was determined by the number 
of matching object features (or cues) weighted by a sensitivity parameter h: 
€ 
dpj = h xpi − x ji
i=1
I
∑
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
) ,  (A2) 
where xpi and xji are the cue values of the probe p and the exemplar j on dimension i. The 
sensitivity parameter h reflects the participant’s ability to discriminate between specific 
exemplars. The judgment  for the probe p is the average of the criterion values cj for 
stored exemplars j, weighted by their similarities (Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003): 
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. (A3) 
We also fitted an exemplar model with five attention parameters (one for each cue) 
to each participant’s judgments. On average, this more complex version of the exemplar 
model performed worse in generalization. For the sake of clarity, we restrict our report to an 
exemplar model with one sensitivity parameter. 
Rule-Based Model 
The linear model assumes that the final criterion estimate  of an object p is a 
linear additive function of the object’s cue values xpi:  
€ 
ˆ cp,Rule = k + wi ⋅ xpi
i=1
I
∑ , (A4) 
where wi are the cue weights for each dimension i and k is a constant intercept. 
Selection of Training and Validation Items 
We constructed two different item sets for the training and the test phase: First, we 
generated 100 training sets with 16 randomly selected items and determined their criterion 
values according to 
€ 
C = 0.2 e(22 x1 +20 x2 +17 x3 +15 x4 +12 x5 ) /15  (A5) 
where C is the criterion ranging from 0 to 62 and x1 to x5 are the cue values. The remaining 16 
items formed the validation set. From these training–validation set combinations we then 
selected all training sets that could not be solved by a rule-based strategy, that is, a linear 
model fitted these training sets worse than an exemplar model. Based on these training sets, 
we derived model predictions for the validation sets. We aimed for a validation set in which 
the exemplar model made more accurate predictions than the linear model, that is, in which a 
similarity-based strategy should lead to a higher judgment accuracy. Additionally, the final 
validation set was selected so that it strongly discriminated between the models’ predictions. 
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Generalization Procedure 
Since the models varied in the number of free parameters, that is, in model 
complexity, model performance was evaluated by a generalization test (Busemeyer & Wang, 
2000): In a generalization test, the complete set of items is split into a calibration set and a 
validation set. The model parameters are then estimated from the calibration set and used to 
make new predictions for the validation set. The discrepancy between these new predictions 
and the actual data gives an index of model fit. A compelling advantage of this methodology 
is that it accounts for model complexity. 
We fitted the models to each participant’s judgments in the last three training blocks. 
Subsequently, the estimated parameters were used to predict each participant’s mean 
judgment for each Sonic in the test phase. Model fit, the deviation between participants’ mean 
judgments and the models’ predictions, was measured in RMSD. After excluding participants 
best described by a baseline model, we determined a strategy weight ws, indicating if the 
linear or the exemplar model described participants’ judgments better: 
€ 
ˆ cp = ws⋅ ˆ cp,Ex + (1− ws)⋅ ˆ cp,Rule .      (A6) 
Based on each model’s optimal parameters, the strategy weight weighs the 
predictions of the exemplar model  and the linear model  by minimizing the 
deviation between the predicted judgments  and participants’ judgments in the test phase. A 
weight larger than .5 indicates a higher probability of using the exemplar model; a weight 
smaller than .5 indicates a higher probability of using the linear model. 
Results 
Without cognitive load, both the linear model and the exemplar model described 
participants’ judgments better than a baseline model, t(29) = 2.89, d = 0.34, p = .007 and t(29) 
= 3.11, d = 0.34, p = .004, respectively (see Table A1 for model fits and Table A2 for 
classification results). The exemplar model and the linear model could not be distinguished 
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from each other, t(29) = 0.05, d < 0.01, p = .962. Under low cognitive load, the exemplar 
model reached a better fit than the linear model, t(28) =4.19, d = 0.70, p < .001, and the 
baseline model, t(28) = 3.96, d = 0.70, p < .001. The same pattern emerged under high 
cognitive load: The exemplar model made more accurate predictions than the linear model, 
t(29) = 5.46, d = 0.90, p < .001, and a baseline model, t(29) = 3.67, d = 0.85, p = .001. 
 
Table A1 
Cognitive Models' Goodness-of-Fit Measured in Mean Root Mean Square Deviations 
(RMSDs) Separately for the Cognitive Load Conditions (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)  
 Cognitive model  
Condition Baseline model Linear model Exemplar model 
No cognitive load 12.42 (5.74) 10.73 (3.97) 10.71 (3.99) 
Low cognitive load 11.67 (3.65) 11.37 (2.85) 9.42 (2.74) 
High cognitive load 10.89 (3.23) 11.67 (3.28) 8.87 (2.94) 
 
 
Table A2 
Classification of Participants According to the Cognitive Models (Percentages in 
Parentheses) Separately for the Cognitive Load Conditions 
 Cognitive model  
Condition Baseline model Linear model Exemplar model 
No cognitive load 4 (13%) 13 (43%) 13 (43%) 
Low cognitive load 5 (17%) 5 (17%) 19 (66%) 
High cognitive load 10 (33%) 2 (7%) 18 (60%) 
! 5!
Supplemental Material B: Extension to a Linear Judgment Task 
In this study we investigated if cognitive load increased switching to similarity-based 
strategies in a linear task in which switching should hurt performance. To investigate this 
question we replicated the experiment with a commonly used linear judgment task (Mata, von 
Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012).  
Method 
Participants. Sixty participants (35 women, Mage = 25 years, SDage = 7 years) took 
part in our study, 30 in each condition. Participants received 17 CHF per hour and a 
performance-contingent bonus (M = 5.4 CHF). One participant did not perform the operation 
span task due to a mistake of the experimenter. 
Design. The task was to estimate a continuous criterion based on four binary cues. 
The criterion C was a linear additive function of the cue values according to 
€ 
C = 4x1 + 3x2 + 2x3 + x4 +10 , (B1) 
where C is the criterion ranging from 10 to 20 and x1 to x4 are the cue values. Participants 
were randomly assigned to either a control condition or a high cognitive load condition. The 
control condition replicated Mata et al.’s (2012) judgment task. In the high cognitive load 
condition, however, participants solved a concurrent memory task. 
Material. For the judgment task, we used the same cover story as in the main 
experiment. The Sonics’ appearance varied on four binary cues: Hair, nose, ears, and body. 
Table B1 illustrates the task structure: The binary cues could take the cue values zero or one 
and varied in their cue weights. The cue weights were randomly assigned to the four pictorial 
cues, as were the cue values (zero or one) to the features (e.g., spiky vs. dreadlocks). 
Procedure. Participants first completed an operation span task (Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock, & Engle, 2005). Afterward, participants solved the linear judgment task. As in the 
first study, the task consisted of a training and a test phase. During the training phase, 
participants repeatedly judged 10 training items. The training phase ended when a learning 
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criterion had been reached (after at least 8 and at most 16 blocks). Participants met this 
learning criterion when judgment accuracy fell below 1.5 RMSD. Participants in the high 
cognitive load condition additionally saw four consonants before the Sonic appeared on 
screen. Consonants were presented sequentially, each for 2 s. After participants received 
feedback about their judgment they were asked to recall the letters in their presentation order. 
In the test phase, participants judged 16 Sonics four times without feedback or cognitive load. 
To increase their motivation, participants received a performance-contingent 
payment. In each trial, participants earned 10 points for a correct answer (corresponding to 
0.05 CHF). If their judgments deviated by 1 from the correct answer, participants received 5 
points. If their judgment deviated by more than 1 from the correct answer, participants did not 
receive any points. Participants under cognitive load received an additional point for a correct 
recall of the letters. Yet, when they could not recall the letters they did not earn any points for 
the memory or the judgment task. Additionally, participants were paid a bonus of 3 CHF if 
they reached the learning criterion for the judgment task within 16 training blocks. 
Results 
Adherence to cognitive load. As in the main experiment, letter recall was high. 
Under high cognitive load, participants recalled 91.0% (SD = 7.8%) of the letter sequences 
correctly. Higher judgment accuracy was related to better letter recall, r(30) = -.37, p = .046, 
indicating no trade-off between the judgment and the memory task. 
Working memory capacity. Working memory capacity in the high cognitive load 
condition (M = 38.1, SD = 18.6) was comparable to working memory capacity in the no load 
condition (M = 41.4, SD = 16.1), t(57) = 0.73, p = .469. 
Judgment performance. Overall, the majority of the participants (62%) mastered 
the task and reached the learning criterion (10 did not reach the criterion in the control 
condition and 13 in the high load condition). To learn the task, participants in the control 
condition needed as many blocks (M = 12.3, SD = 6.3) as participants in the high cognitive 
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load condition (M = 12.3, SD = 3.6). The training block data violated normality assumptions, 
thus, we conducted a Mann–Whitney U test to test for differences between the cognitive load 
conditions. This test revealed no differences between the cognitive load conditions, U = 448, 
p = .975. Also, judgment accuracy in the last training block did not differ between 
participants without cognitive load (M = 1.67, SD = 1.12) or under high cognitive load, M = 
1.84, SD = 1.04, t(58) = 0.60, p = .552. In the test phase, judgments for trainings items were 
as accurate for participants without cognitive load (M = 1.71, SD = 0.89) as for participants 
under high cognitive load (M = 1.75, SD = 0.92), t(58) = 0.13, p = .896. Also, judgment 
accuracy for validation items did not differ between the cognitive load (M = 2.32, SD = .97) 
and the control condition (M = 2.15, SD = 0.93), t(58) = 0.68, p = .497. These results suggest 
that even under high cognitive load, participants learned the task well. In contrast to the 
nonlinear judgment task, however, cognitive load did not promote judgments for validation 
items. 
Additional analysis including working memory capacity indicated that participants 
with a higher working memory capacity learned to solve the task more easily. In the high load 
condition, participants with a higher working memory capacity needed fewer training blocks 
to learn the task, Kendall’s τ(28) = -.29, p = .041. Without cognitive load, however, working 
memory capacity was not related to the number of training blocks, Kendall’s τ(27) = -.12, p 
= .402. Next, we included working memory capacity as a covariate when analyzing judgment 
performance. A higher working memory capacity marginally increased judgment accuracy in 
the last training block, F(1,56) = 2.99, η2 = .05, p = .089. In the test phase, higher working 
memory capacity led to slightly better judgments for training items, F(1,56) = 3.95, η2 = .07, 
p = .052, but not for validation items, F(1,56) = 1.87, η2 = .03, p = .178. Thus, although a 
high working memory capacity slightly facilitated learning, it did not improve performance 
on validation items. 
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Cognitive modeling of judgment strategies. To test if people switched to a 
similarity-based strategy we followed the same approach as in the first study. We first fitted 
an exemplar model (similarity-based judgment strategy), a linear model (rule-based judgment 
strategy), and a baseline model to participants’ individual judgments during the training phase 
(see Table B2 for model fits and Table B3 for classification results). In both conditions, the 
exemplar model and the linear model outperformed a baseline model in predicting 
participants’ judgments. However, while in the control condition the linear model could 
predict participants’ judgments marginally better than the exemplar model, t(29) = 1.77, d = 
0.33, p = .088, there was no difference in model fits in the high cognitive load condition 
between the exemplar and the linear model. Further, we excluded participants following the 
baseline model. Then we estimated the strategy weight to capture how much participants 
relied on an exemplar versus a linear model. This strategy weight was slightly higher in the 
high load condition (M = .53; SE = .07) than in the control condition (M = .33, SE = .07), 
t(49) = 1.91, d = 0.54, p = .061. This result indicates that participants under high cognitive 
load were more likely to follow a similarity-based strategy. 
Besides cognitive load, working memory capacity may influence strategy choice. 
Thus, we regressed strategy weight on working memory capacity, including cognitive load as 
a covariate. Working memory capacity did not predict strategy weight beyond cognitive load, 
b = 0.001, SE = 0.003, t(47) = 0.33, p = .747. 
Judgment accuracy and cognitive models. In our first study, we showed that 
following a similarity-based strategy can benefit judgment performance in a nonlinear task. In 
a linear judgment task, however, reliance on an exemplar-based strategy should harm 
judgment performance. To test this assumption, we conducted a regression analysis on 
judgment performance for validation items with strategy weight as the independent variable. 
Indeed, a higher strategy weight predicted lower judgment performance on validation items, b 
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= -0.87, SE = 0.32, t(49) = 2.73, p = .009, R2 = .13. This result suggests that using a 
similarity-based strategy harmed judgments in the linear task.  
 
Table B1 
Cue and Criterion Values of Training and Validation Items in the Linear Judgment Task 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Criterion Item set 
0 0 0 0 10 Validation 
0 0 0 1 11 Training 
0 0 1 0 12 Training 
0 0 1 1 13 Training 
0 1 0 0 13 Training 
0 1 0 1 14 Training 
0 1 1 0 15 Validation 
0 1 1 1 16 Training 
1 0 0 0 14 Training 
1 0 0 1 15 Validation 
1 0 1 0 16 Training 
1 0 1 1 17 Training 
1 1 0 0 17 Validation 
1 1 0 1 18 Validation 
1 1 1 0 19 Validation 
1 1 1 1 20 Training 
Note: Training items were presented in the training and the test phase. Validation items only 
appeared during the test phase. 
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Table B2 
Cognitive Models' Goodness-of-Fit Measured in Mean Root Mean Square Deviations 
(RMSDs) Separately for the Cognitive Load Conditions (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 Cognitive model 
Condition Baseline model Linear model Exemplar model 
No cognitive load 2.00 (0.55) 1.29 (0.57) 1.45 (0.37) 
High cognitive load 2.10 (0.41) 1.61 (0.71) 1.55 (0.51) 
 
Table B3 
Classification of Participants According to the Cognitive Models (Percentages in 
Parentheses) Separately for the Cognitive Load Conditions 
 Cognitive model 
Condition Baseline model Linear model Exemplar model 
No cognitive load 5 (17%) 16 (53%) 9 (30%) 
High cognitive load 4 (13%) 12 (40%) 14 (46%) 
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Abstract 
The distinction between similarity-based and rule-based strategies has instigated a 
large body of research in categorization and judgment. Although the conditions guiding 
processing shifts are increasingly well documented within both tasks, it is largely unclear how 
factors which influence strategy choice in one task transfer to the other task. In two studies, 
we aimed to integrate research from these two fields by investigating how task components 
affecting strategy choices in judgment or categorization influence strategy choice across tasks. 
Specifically, we investigated how the number of dimensions, the functional relation between 
cue and criterions, and individual preferences influence strategy choice in categorization and 
judgment. In two experiments we varied the type of task (categorization or judgment) within 
participants and task structure between participants, comparing a one-dimensional linear to a 
multidimensional linear and two multidimensional nonlinear tasks. In both categorization and 
judgment more participants relied on similarity-based strategies when more dimensions had to 
be integrated and when the functional relationship was nonlinear suggesting that strategic 
shifts may be driven by task complexity. With more complex tasks people more frequently 
switched strategies between tasks suggesting that individual preferences may be overruled by 
task characteristics. 
 
 
Keywords: Judgment; categorization; cognitive processes 
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 On many occasions in everyday life, the same task can demand a coarse classification 
or a more fine-grained judgment. When applying for a job, for instance, the applicant may 
sort the jobs into broad categories such as “highly interesting” or “not interesting at all”. 
Alternatively, the applicant may judge on a more fine-grained scale how attractive the jobs 
are. Prototypical tasks to investigate judgments and categorizations share indeed some 
commonalities (Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003). Beyond sharing task characteristics, both 
research fields identified two main types of strategies people use to judge or classify objects 
(Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & 
Wiener, 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 2009): similarity-based strategies and rule-
based strategies. These strategies make different assumptions about the way knowledge is 
represented and the cognitive processes underlying judgments and categorizations (Hahn & 
Chater, 1998; Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003). In general, it is assumed that similarity-based 
strategies base inferences upon on a comparison with concrete instances stored in memory, 
whereas rule-based strategies rely upon explicit abstraction of knowledge (Hahn & Chater, 
1998). Although giving a coarse or a fine-grained response should not influence the cognitive 
processes that underlie the response, the two different research traditions have mostly 
described categorizations by similarity-based strategies, whereas judgment processes have 
been characterized as rule-based (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 
2009). Confirming this characterization, past research suggests that people frequently shift 
from rule-based strategies in judgment to similarity-based strategies in categorization (Juslin, 
Olsson et al., 2003; Pachur & Olsson, 2012; von Helversen, Karlsson, Mata, & Wilke, 2013; 
von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010). However, it is unclear if this strategy shift generalizes 
across various task characteristics. 
In fact, people can make use of both rule-based and similarity-based strategies in 
judgment (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013a; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; 
Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2007) and categorization (Juslin, Jones, Olsson, & Winman, 
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2003; Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004) with people choosing a strategy based upon the strategies’ 
accuracy and the effort associated with executing these strategies (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Across judgment and 
categorization, however, different task characteristics have been identified as determinants of 
strategy choice. Whereas categorization research has focused on the number of cues that need 
to be integrated (e.g. Ashby, Maddox, & Bohil, 2002; Filoteo, Lauritzen, & Maddox, 2010; 
Maddox & Ashby, 2004; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006), studies in judgment have focused on 
the functional relationship between the cues and the criterion as the most important factor 
influencing strategy choice (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Karlsson et al., 2007; Juslin et al., 2008). 
In the current paper we aim to integrate judgment and categorization research by 
investigating how the number of cues (or dimensions) and the functional relation between cue 
and criterion affect strategy choice across categorization and judgment tasks. Specifically, we 
suggest that people switch strategies in both tasks in response to task characteristics and these 
shifts can be explained by the relative accuracy of the strategies and the effort necessary to 
execute the strategies successfully. In the following we will first review past research on how 
the number of cues and the functional relation affect reliance on rule-based and similarity-
based strategies in judgment and categorization and, second, outline how a framework based 
on strategy accuracy and effort can explain these strategy choices. Finally, we will report two 
experimental studies to test our hypotheses. 
Rule-based and Similarity-based Strategies in Categorization and Judgment 
In general rule-based strategies are assumed to involve controlled processes that rely 
on abstracted knowledge (Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008). A typical 
rule-based strategy, the cue abstraction strategy (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Juslin, Jones et al. 
2003), assumes that people abstract how each cue relates to the criterion, that is they try to 
find out the importance of each cue. The judgment is the sum of the cue values, weighted by 
their importance. A job applicant may, for instance, try to figure out how much he appreciates 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  5!
challenging tasks or a high wage and assign a high weight to wage. Accordingly, the job 
applicant will rate jobs as more attractive the higher the jobs are paid. In a similar way, a 
person may follow the rule that all jobs are classified as interesting that do pay a minimum 
salary. Hence the probability of classifying the job as interesting should increase with 
increasing wage. Rule-based strategies proposed in the literature vary in their complexity 
from rules considering only one cue or two cues (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Erickson & 
Kruschke, 1998; Nosofsky, Little, & Denton, 2011; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994) to 
linear rules with several cues (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Juslin et al., 2008; Newell, Weston, 
Tunney, & Shanks, 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2013). Are there limits in the complexity rules 
can take? By definition, rule-based strategies rely on abstract explicit knowledge implying 
that rules can be verbalized (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Evidence suggests that people build up 
task knowledge in linear tasks with multiple cues indicating that people can follow linear 
rules and possess insight in the rule-based process (Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, & Shanks, 
2006). More complex nonlinear rules, however, have often been rejected based on theoretical 
and empirical grounds (Busemeyer, Byun, DeLosh, & McDaniel, 1997; Juslin et al., 2008).  
In contrast, a typical similarity-based strategy, the exemplar model, assumes that the 
similarity to past instances is used to make a categorization or judgment (Juslin, Olsson et al., 
2003; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1988). These exemplar models assume that all 
previously encountered objects (the exemplars) are stored in long-term memory along with 
their associated categories. When categorizing a new object (the probe), past exemplars are 
retrieved from memory and the probe is compared to all exemplars stored in memory. The 
more similar the probe is to a past exemplar, the more likely the probe will be classified as 
belonging to the same category. For instance, when categorizing a new job offer, people may 
remind themselves of all jobs they had in the past. If the job applicant liked jobs with 
customer interaction in the past, the applicant will probably also judge a new job offer as 
attractive that requires customer contact.  
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Factors Encouraging Shifts between Rule-based and Similarity-based Strategies 
Number of Cues 
The categorization literature has suggested that people approach a categorization task 
by testing simple rules that consider only one or two dimensions. In case these rules are not 
successful, people switch to similarity-based strategies (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; 
Nosofsky et al., 1994). For instance, Nosofsky et al. (1994) suggested that people test simple 
one- or two-dimensional rules when learning categorization tasks, but store exceptions in 
memory if the rules do not work. Similarly, Erickson and Kruschke (1998) suggested that 
people simultaneously process rules and exemplars, but restricted the rules tested to one 
dimension. Furthermore, people seem to process categorization tasks differently that can be 
solved by a simple one- or two-dimensional rule compared to categorization tasks that require 
information integration1 (Ashby et al., 2002; Filoteo et al., 2010; Maddox & Ashby, 2004; 
Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). In sum, this suggests that the number of cues is an important 
factor driving rule-based or similarity-based processing. 
Likewise, meta-analyses in judgment identified the number of cues as one major factor 
determining judgment performance (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008; Kaufmann & Athanasou, 
2009). If more cues have to be considered for making a judgment, judgment performance 
decreases (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). Kareleia and Hogarth (2008) reasoned that this 
decrease can be explained by a decreasing match between the linear cue combination of the 
judge and the linear model of the environment. Instead people may follow more complex 
compound cue strategies if the number of cues increases (Einhorn, 1971). Hence, it is possible 
that an increasing number of cues foster similarity-based strategies. As a factor influencing 
strategy choice, however, the number of cues has been — to our knowledge — mostly 
neglected. 
Functional Relationship between Cues and Criterion 
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The main factor influencing strategy shifts in judgment is the functional relation 
between the cues and the criterion (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 
2007; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). Indeed, the majority of research suggests that 
people rely more on similarity-based strategies if the task cannot be solved by a linear rule, 
for instance, if the criterion is a multiplicative function of the cues (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; 
Juslin et al., 2008). One exception to this pattern constitute quadratic task structures in which 
the criterion is a quadratic function of the cues. Because the same criterion value is associated 
with multiple, but dissimilar exemplars, neither similarity-based strategies nor rule-based 
strategies yield to good performance early in training and people drop back to the default, but 
useless cue abstraction process (Karlsson et al., 2008; Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006). 
The functional relationship between cue and criterion has also been studied in function 
learning tasks in which people learn to predict a continuous criterion based on one cue with 
varying functional relationships between cue and criterion. Overall, past research suggests 
that linear relationships are learnt faster than exponential or quadratic functions (Busemeyer 
et al., 1997; DeLosh, Busemeyer, & McDaniel, 1997). In addition, rule-based function 
learning models fare well at predicting extrapolation for linear functions, but fail on 
exponential or quadratic functions (De Losh et al., 1997; McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). 
However, extrapolation frequently follows an approximately linear function and associative, 
similarity-based models only account successfully for extrapolation in more complex tasks if 
they incorporate a linear, rule-based extrapolation mechanism (De Losh et al., 1997; 
McDaniel & Busemeyer, 2005). 
In categorization, nonlinear or quadratic relationships are also learned more slowly 
and less accurately than linear relationships (Ashby & Gott, 1988), but people can reach near-
optimal performance when learning nonlinear bounds (Ashby & Maddox, 1992). Overall, 
however functional relations have been rarely considered as a factor influencing rule-or 
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similarity-based processing or these comparisons have led to inconclusive results (Maddox & 
Ashby, 1993; McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995, 1996; Wills & Pothos, 2011). 
In sum, past research suggests that the number of cues is an important factor 
influencing strategy shifts in categorization but research in judgment is scarce. Similarly, the 
functional relationship has been identified as an important factor influencing strategy 
selection in judgment, but only rarely considered in categorization. A framework to 
understand strategy selection has been offered by contingency approaches (Beach & Mitchell, 
1978; Payne et al., 1993). These approaches assume that people select among a set of decision 
strategies by trading off the accuracy that can be achieved by following a strategy against the 
effort that needs to be invested in learning and executing a strategy. The functional 
relationship between cues and criterion may limit a strategy’s accuracy, whereas a higher 
number of cues may increase the effort necessary to execute a strategy. 
Understanding Strategy Choice As an Accuracy-Effort Trade-Off 
A large body of research suggests that strategy choices are driven by the accuracy of 
the strategies. Task feedback reinforces the better performing strategy and thus allows the 
decision maker to adapt their strategies to the demands of the task (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; 
Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Likewise, the relative accuracy of strategies has been suggested as 
the main mechanism underlying strategy choices in judgment and categorization. For instance, 
models assuming that people switch between rule-based and similarity-based strategies 
frequently assume that the probability of a given process depends on its accuracy (Erickson & 
Kruschke, 1998; Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky et al., 1994). Indeed, people often prefer the 
more accurate strategy (Filoteo et al., 2010; Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, & Kalish, 2012). 
Moreover, even if the task structure suddenly changes, people are able to adapt — to some 
degree —decision strategies to the decision task based upon task feedback (Kämmer, 
Gaissmaier, & Czienskowski, 2013; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Similarly, people are more 
frequently relying on an exemplar-based strategy in multiplicative judgment tasks, because 
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the cue abstraction model does not achieve accurate judgments (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; 
Juslin et al., 2008; von Helversen et al., 2013). 
Besides accuracy also the effort with which the strategies can be learnt has been 
identified as an important factor in strategy choice (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 
1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). For instance, if people can easily discriminate past exemplars, 
it is easier to store these exemplars and, accordingly, people tend to rely more strongly upon 
similarity-based strategies (Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004). In contrast, if cue directions are known, 
less effort needs to be invested in abstracting cue weights so that more people rely on rule-
based learning (Platzer & Bröder, 2012; von Helversen et al., 2013; Newell et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, also different forms of feedback may increase or reduce the effort associated 
with abstracting rules. Pachur and Olsson (2012), for instance, found that learning which of 
two objects has a higher criterion value enhances reliance on cue abstraction processes, 
possibly because people focus on how differences in cue values are associated with 
differences in judgment criteria —an important step in cue abstraction. Binary feedback in 
categorization, however, makes abstracting the correct rule more difficult, resulting in more 
people switching from a cue abstraction strategy in judgment to similarity-based 
categorization strategies (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Karlsson et al., 2008; von Helversen et 
al., 2010). 
Lastly, people may also build up initial preferences for specific strategies over time 
because they learn to associate each strategy with its achieved accuracy and the involved 
effort (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). It has been suggested recently that 
these individual preferences for rule- or exemplar-based strategies may be rather stable and 
transfer across tasks (McDaniel et al., 2013). In particular, McDaniel et al. (2013) found that 
people identified as rule-learners in complex function learning tasks generalize their 
performance more successfully than exemplar-learners to new items in abstract categorization 
tasks. Furthermore, these preferences may be linked to individual differences such as memory 
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ability (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013b; McDaniel et al., 2013) or age (Mata, 
von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012). 
Hypotheses 
Taken together, the relative accuracy and effort of the strategies can be used to predict 
how the number of dimensions and the functional relationship between the cues and the 
criterion should influence participants’ strategies in judgment and categorization. Specifically, 
in judgment, one would expect that most participants should rely on a rule-based strategy in a 
one-dimensional linear (OLIN) task, because the rule-based strategy is accurate and easy to 
learn. In a multidimensional linear (MLIN) task a cue abstraction strategy is correct, but more 
cues have to be considered than in the OLIN task making the rule-based strategy more 
difficult to learn. Accordingly, some people may rely upon initial preferences and default to 
an exemplar-based strategy. Finally, in a multidimensional multiplicative (MMULT) task, the 
majority should switch to an exemplar strategy because now a cue abstraction strategy fails. 
In categorization a similar pattern is expected: Specifically, one would expect the 
largest number of rule-users in an OLIN task. In MLIN tasks, however, more cues hinder 
correctly abstracting the weights for more complex rule-based strategies. Importantly, binary 
feedback in categorization — in comparison to more fine-grained feedback in judgment — 
further complicates cue abstraction leading to an even higher percentage of exemplar users in 
the MLIN categorization task than in judgment. Finally, in a MMULT task, this shift to 
exemplar-based strategies should be even more pronounced because any linear cue 
abstraction strategy fails to solve this task. 
Lastly, if people have stable preferences for exemplar-based or rule-based strategies 
people should tend to rely on the same strategy in both tasks. Specifically, if one used an 
exemplar-based strategy in the first task, the conditional probability of using an exemplar-
based strategy in the second task should be close to 1. Likewise, if one used a rule-based 
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strategy in the first task, the conditional probability of using a rule-based strategy in the 
second task should be close to 1. 
Study 1 
To test the influence of these factors, we conducted an experiment in which 96 participants 
solved both a categorization and a multiple-cue judgment task with the same task structure 
allowing us to investigate preferences across tasks. In addition, we varied the task structure on 
three levels, comparing an OLIN to a MLIN and a MMULT task to investigate if the results 
found in categorization and judgment can be generalized across tasks. 
Method 
Participants. 
Ninety-six participants (76 females, MAge = 23.7, SDAge = 5.9) were recruited from the 
University of Basel. Participants received course credit or a book certificate (worth 25 Swiss 
Francs, CHF) for participating in the experiment. In addition, they could earn a bonus of 3 
CHF in each task and had the opportunity to win one of six Amazon vouchers (worth 25 CHF 
each). 
Design and material. 
We used two different cover stories for the categorization and the multiple-cue 
judgment task. One cover story asked participants to judge the toxicity of a bug: In the 
multiple-cue judgment task participants estimated how toxic a bug was on a scale from 0 to 
50, whereas in the categorization task participants classified the bug as toxic or harmless. The 
other cover story asked participants to judge how successful comic figures were at catching 
small animals: In the multiple-cue judgment task, participants judged how many small 
animals the comic figure caught on a scale from 0 to 50, whereas they classified the comic 
figure as catching few or many animals in the categorization task. 
The stimuli for the two cover stories consisted of pictures of either bugs or comic 
figures. These bugs and comic figures varied on four different continuous cues. The bugs 
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varied on the length of their legs, their antennae and their wings, and the number of points on 
their back. The comic figures had different sizes of their ears and their nose, a different 
number of hairs and stripes on their shirt. These pictorial cues could be used to predict the 
criterion (the toxicity of a bug or the success of the comic figure). 
To manipulate task complexity, we varied how these cues had to be combined to form 
the judgment criterion. In the MLIN task, the criterion yMLIN was a linear, additive function of 
the cues: 
yMLIN = 4 c1 + 3 c2 + 2 c3 + c4, (1) 
where c1 to c4 are the cue values ranging from 0 to 5. According to their cue weights, c1 
reflects the most important cue and c4 the least important one.  
In the OLIN task only one cue predicted the judgment criterion yOLIN: 
yOLIN = 10 c3. (2) 
Finally, in the MMULT task, the function generating the criterion yMMULT included a 
multiplicative combination of the cues: 
€ 
yMMULT =
4c1 + 3c2 + 2c3 +c4 + 2c1c2 c3 +c2 c3c4
8.5  (3) 
In the categorization tasks, the criterion was not continuous anymore, but binary. This 
binary criterion was created by a median split on the corresponding judgment criterion for all 
possible items. Sonics (or bugs) with criterion values above the median were classified as 
catching many animals (or as toxic). Sonics (or bugs) with criterion values below the median 
were classified as catching few animals (or as harmless). This median split creates a linear 
category boundary in the OLIN and the MLIN task and a nonlinear category boundary in the 
MMULT task. 
In all tasks, the cues were randomly assigned to the pictorial cues (e.g., ears or nose). 
Higher cue values, however, were always associated with more salient pictorial cue features. 
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For instance, a cue value of zero corresponded to a bug without points on the back and a cue 
value of five to a bug with five points on its back. 
From all possible items, we constructed a training set and a validation set. First, we 
generated 1000 trainings including 25 training items. Second, we selected one training set 
fulfilling two criteria: (a) One or two dimensional rules should not lead to a high accuracy in 
the multidimensional categorization tasks. (b) Rule-based processes should solve the 
MMULT judgment and categorization task worse than exemplar-based processes, that is, a 
(log-) linear regression fitted the training set worse than an exemplar model. Next, we 
generated 100 validation sets consisting of 15 training items. Finally, we selected a training-
validation set combination in which the validation set strongly discriminated between the 
models’ predictions in all judgment and categorization tasks. Table 1 depicts the final training 
set and Table 2 the validation set. 
Procedure. 
Participants solved both a categorization and a judgment task with the same task 
structure. Participants were randomly assigned to three different task structures: OLIN, LIN, 
or MMULT tasks. Thirty-two participants were assigned to each condition. The assignment of 
the cover stories to the tasks and the order of the tasks were counterbalanced within each 
condition. 
Both tasks consisted of a training phase and a test phase. During the training phase, 
participants learned to predict the criterion value (or the category) for 1 of 25 training items. 
In each trial they first estimated the criterion or categorized the item. Afterwards they 
received feedback about their own answer, the correct outcome and the points they earned. In 
a training block, all 25 training items were presented in random order. After 10 training 
blocks the training phase ended and participants moved on to the test phase. In this test phase, 
participants judged all 15 new validation items four times without getting any feedback. 
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Participants were incentivized to achieve a high task performance. In each trial of the 
categorization tasks, participants could earn 20 points for a correct answer, 10 points for items 
that were classified with a probability of .5 to both categories, and 0 points for an incorrect 
answer. In the judgment tasks, participants earned more points the less their judgment j 
deviated from the correct criterion y: 
€ 
Points = 20 − ( j − y)
2
7.625  (4) 
This function was truncated so that participants could win at most 20 points and could 
not loose any points in each trial. The more points participants earned in a task the higher 
were their chances of winning an Amazon coupon for that task. In addition, participants could 
earn a bonus of 3 CHF in both tasks, if they reached 80% of the points in the last training 
block. In the categorization task, this learning criterion corresponded to 80% correct 
classifications. In the judgment task, judgment accuracy was measured in root-mean-square 
deviations (RMSD) between participants’ judgments and the criterion. Participants reached 
the learning criterion if judgment accuracy was below 5.5 RMSD in the last training block. 
Results 
Performance in the categorization task. 
Overall, participants solved the OLIN task more successfully than the MLIN or the 
MMULT task. Table 3 reports the mean percentage of errors in the last training block and the 
four test blocks. Participants made fewer errors in the OLIN task than in the MLIN or 
MMULT task in the last training block as well as in the test phase. Because the error rates in 
the OLIN task deviated from normality and variances were not homogeneous, we used non-
parametric tests to test for the effect of the conditions. The number of cues affected how well 
people had learned the categorization task in the last training block, but not the functional 
relationship. Participants made fewer errors in the OLIN task than in the MLIN task (Mann-
Whitney U = 64.5, p < .001) and in the MMULT task (U = 85.5, p < .001), but there was no 
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difference in the error rates between the MLIN and the MMULT task (U = 499.5, p = .865).2 
Similarly, participants made fewer errors on the validation items in the OLIN task than in the 
MLIN task (U = 47, p < .001) and in the MMULT task (U = 60.5, p < .001). But like in the 
last training block, error rates did not differ between the MLIN and MMULT task (U = 441.5, 
p = .343). 
Performance in the judgment task 
In the judgment task we measured accuracy as the RMSD between the criterion value 
and participants’ judgment. Similar to the categorization task, participants made— on average 
— more accurate judgments in the OLIN task than in the MLIN or the MMULT task (see 
Table 3) Again, judgment accuracy in the OLIN task was not normally distributed and 
variance homogeneity was not given. Therefore, we relied on nonparametric tests to test the 
differences between conditions. As in the categorization task, participants made more 
accurate judgments in the OLIN task than in the MLIN task (U = 200, p < .001) or in the 
MMULT task (U = 222, p < .001), but judgment accuracy did not differ between the MLIN 
and the MMULT task (U = 391, p = .104).3 Similarly, participants judged the validation items 
more accurately in the OLIN task than in the MLIN task (U = 131, p <.001) or in the 
MMULT task (U = 159, p < .001). Judgment accuracy did not differ between the MLIN and 
the MMULT task (U = 453, p = .428). 
Modeling of cognitive processes 
To identify the cognitive processes people rely on in judgment and categorization, we 
used a computational modeling approach. We compared how well three cognitive models 
described participants’ responses at the end of training and predicted participants’ responses 
in the test phase: a baseline model (estimating participants’ mean judgment or the category 
bias), a cue abstraction model modeled by a (log-) linear regression for rule-based strategies, 
and an exemplar model with a free sensitivity parameter for similarity-based strategies.4 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  16!
Cue abstraction model. We relied on a linear cue abstraction model as a prototypical 
rule-based strategy. The cue abstraction models can represent simple rule-based strategies 
relying on a single cue, but also allows more complex rules combining several cues in a linear 
additive fashion. It does not include nonlinear rules or interactions because there is little 
evidence that these can be learnt via a rule-based strategies (Busemeyer et al., 1997; Juslin et 
al., 2008)5. The cue abstraction processes can be mathematically described with linear 
regression models. Accordingly, the estimated criterion value 
€ 
ˆ c p of an object p is the 
weighted sum of the cue values xpi, 
€ 
ˆ c p = k + wi ⋅ x pi
i=1
I
∑
 (5) 
where wi are the cue weights for each cue i and k is a constant intercept. 
The probability to classify an object to category b, 
€ 
p ˆ b =1( ) , can be predicted by 
logistic regression models. 
€ 
p ˆ b =1( ) = e
k+ wi ⋅x pi
i=1
I
∑
1+ e
k+ wi ⋅x pi
i=1
I
∑
. (6) 
The smoother logistic function accounts for random error in the decision making process 
(Juslin, Jones et al., 2003). 
Exemplar model. In exemplar models, the similarity S(p,j) between the probe p and 
exemplar j is an exponential decay function of the distances dpj between the objects (Nosofsky 
& Zaki, 1998). 
€ 
S p, j( ) = e−dpj . (7) 
Thus, smaller distances between the probe p and exemplar j indicate a higher similarity 
between theses objects. To determine this distance, the cue values xpi of probe p are compared 
to the cue values xji of exemplar j on all cues i. The more the cue values match each other, the 
smaller is the distance between the objects (Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). 
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€ 
dpj = h x pi − x ji
i=1
I
∑
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) 
. (8) 
The sensitivity parameter h determines how strongly similarity decays with distance. Smaller 
sensitivity parameters indicate a lower decline of similarity with distance. 
The probability of categorization the probe p into response category b, 
€ 
p ˆ b =1( ) , can 
then be determined calculating the similarity of probe p to all exemplars in category b and 
comparing it to the similarity of probe p to all exemplars (Nosofsky, 1988).
 
 
€ 
p ˆ b =1( ) =
β⋅ S(p, jb=1)
j=1
J
∑
β⋅ S(p, jb=1)
j=1
J
∑ + 1− β( )⋅ S(p, jb=0)
j=1
J
∑
 (9)
 
The category bias β finally models how much people tend to respond with category b. 
To account for judgment processes, Juslin, Olsson et al. (2003) assumed that the 
criterion value cj of an exemplar is stored together with its cue values in memory. To estimate 
the criterion value of a new probe 
€ 
ˆ c p, the criterion values cj for each exemplar are weighted 
by the similarities. 
€ 
ˆ c p =
S( p, j)⋅ c j
j=1
J
∑
S( p, j)
j=1
J
∑
 (10)
 
Model estimation and comparison. All models were fitted to participants’ responses 
in the last three training blocks by minimizing the deviance -2LL, the negative summed log-
likelihood L of the model given the data. 
€ 
−2LL = −2⋅ ln L( )∑  (11) 
In the categorization task, the likelihood was the models’ predicted probability of the chosen 
category. In the judgment task, we calculated the likelihood as the probability density of 
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participants’ judgments j assuming a truncated normal distribution with the models’ predicted 
responses 
€ 
ˆ c p as the mean of the normal distribution and a fitted standard deviation σ.6 
€ 
L =
1
σ
φ j ˆ c p,σ( )
Φ 50 ˆ c p,σ( ) −Φ 0 ˆ c p,σ( )  (12) 
This truncated normal distribution was chosen because it matched the response scale from 0 
to 50. 
To compare which model described participants’ judgments better at the end of 
training, we calculated the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). This model 
selection criterion can be used to compare non-nested models. In addition, the BIC penalizes 
overly complex models by accounting for the number of free model parameters k: 
BIC = -2LL + k ln(n), (13) 
where n denotes the number of observations. Smaller BIC values indicate a better model fit. 
The estimated parameter values were then used to predict participants’ average 
responses on the validation items during the test phase. To determine model fit, we then 
calculated the deviances based upon the difference between model predictions’ and 
participants responses. This generalization test corrects not only for model complexity in 
terms of the number of free parameters, but it also corrects for functional complexity 
(Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). Finally, we used this generalization test to classify participants 
as following a cue abstraction model, an exemplar model, or a baseline model (Hoffmann et 
al., 2013a). 
Model fits and deviances. 
To compare model fits in training and test, we relied upon Wilcoxon tests for paired 
data, because BICs and deviances were not normally distributed. Categorizations at the end of 
training were overall not well described by a baseline model (see Table 4 for BICs, deviances, 
and strategy classification). In the OLIN task, the exemplar model accounted better for 
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participants’ categorizations than the cue abstraction model (z = 4.66, p < .001), but did not 
distinguish between the cue abstraction and the exemplar model in the MLIN (z = 1.42, p 
= .155) or MMULT task (z = -0.99, p = .322). Overall, the baseline model could also not 
predict categorizations better than the cue abstraction or the exemplar model for validation 
items in the test phase. In the OLIN task, the cue abstraction model fared better at predicting 
categorizations than the exemplar model (z = -4.26, p < .001) suggesting that the BIC 
punished the cue abstraction model too harshly. In the MLIN task, however, the cue 
abstraction model could neither be distinguished from the baseline model (z = 1.31, p = .191) 
nor the exemplar model (z = 0.37, p = .708). Likewise, in the MMULT task, model deviances 
again did not disentangle the cue abstraction and the exemplar model (z = 0.15, p = .881). 
Accordingly, comparing average model fit did not suggest that rule- or exemplar-based 
processes dominated categorization behavior in the MLIN or MMULT task. 
Like in the categorization task, a baseline model could not account for participants’ 
judgments at the end of training (see Table 5 for BICs, deviances and strategy classification) 
The exemplar model described judgments more accurately than the cue abstraction model in 
the OLIN task (z = 2.9, p = .003) and the MMULT task (z = 2.7, p = .007). In the OLIN task, 
however, the two models could not be distinguished by BIC values (z = 1.2, p = .239). 
Mirroring the results from the training phase, the baseline model was also not able to predict 
participants’ judgments in the test phase. In the OLIN task, the cue abstraction model also 
made more accurate predictions than the exemplar model (z = 4.9, p < .001). However, the 
generalization test could not discriminate between the cue abstraction model and the exemplar 
model in the MLIN task (z = 1.1, p = .278) or the MMULT task (z = 1.8, p = .079). 
Strategy classification. 
To investigate how the number of cues and the functional relationship influenced 
judgment and categorization strategies, we first classified each participant based upon the 
model deviances as best described by a cue abstraction, an exemplar, or a baseline model. 
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Descriptively, in the categorization tasks, most participants relied upon a rule-based strategy 
in the OLIN task (see Table 4 and Figure 1). Likewise, most participants followed a rule-
based strategy in the MLIN task. In the MMULT task, however, one half of the participants 
were best described by an exemplar-based model, while the other half was best described by a 
cue abstraction model. The classification yielded a similar picture for the judgment task (see 
Table 5 and Figure 1): In the OLIN task, almost all participants were assigned to the cue 
abstraction model. The cue abstraction model still described most participants best in the 
MLIN task, whereas more than half of the participants were best described by the exemplar 
model in the MMULT task. 
Next, we conducted a multivariate ordinal logistic regression analysis on the strategy 
classification in categorization and judgment. The independent variable type of task 
(categorization vs. judgment) was repeated within participants. In addition we included one 
variable coding the number of cues and a second variable coding the functional relationship. 
Overall, participants shifted more to exemplar-based processes from the OLIN to the MLIN 
task, b = -2.28, SE = .39, Wald χ2(1) = 35.08, p < .001, and again more from the MLIN to the 
MMULT task, b = -0.92, SE = .39, Wald χ2(1) = 5.55, p = .019, indicating that both the 
number of cues and the functional relationship led to a shift in cognitive processes. The type 
of task, however, did not affect the cognitive process, b = -0.06, SE = .30, Wald χ2(1) = 0.04, 
p = .839. Repeating the analysis only for the MLIN task neither indicated that participants 
shifted more to exemplar-based processes in the categorization task compared to the judgment 
task, b = -0.56, SE = .49, Wald χ2(1) = 1.29, p = .256. In sum, these results suggest that 
participants indeed adapted the cognitive process to the number of cues and the functional 
relationship between the cues and the criterion, but the type of task did not affect the process 
people relied. 
Matching processes in judgment and categorization. 
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To find out how individual preferences for rule-based or exemplar-based learning 
affected shifts between cognitive processes, we classified participants in a first step as 
following a cue abstraction model in both tasks, as following an exemplar model in both tasks, 
or as shifting between strategies in both tasks irrespective of the type of task (judgment or 
categorization). Overall, the number of cues and the functional relationship changed shifting 
behavior significantly, χ2(4)=10.06, p = .039. While in the OLIN task most participants (n = 
26) relied upon a cue abstraction model in both tasks, the number of participants following a 
cue abstraction model decreased in the MLIN task (n = 15) and the MMULT task (n = 7). By 
contrast, the number of participants assigned to the exemplar model in both tasks increased 
from the OLIN (n = 0), to the MLIN (n = 6), to the MMULT task (n = 10). However, also the 
number of participants shifting between processes increased from the OLIN (n = 6), to the 
MLIN (n = 11), to the MMULT task (n = 15).  
Figure 2 depicts the conditional probability of following a cue abstraction model (an 
exemplar model) in the second task given that participants were best described by a cue 
abstraction model (an exemplar model) in the first task. In the OLIN task, participants were 
likely to stay with a cue abstraction model (CAM) in the second task if they were best 
described by a cue abstraction model in the first task, p(CAMSecond| CAMFirst). In addition, 
they were unlikely to follow an exemplar model in the second task, even if they were best 
described by an exemplar model in the first task, p(ExemplarSecond| ExemplarFirst). While 
p(CAMSecond| CAMFirst) decreased in the MLIN task and even more in the MMULT task, 
p(ExemplarSecond| ExemplarFirst) consistently increased from the OLIN to the MLIN task and 
even more in the MMULT task. However, the probabilities in the MMULT task are less 
distinct from each other and closer to .5 (a probability of .5 would be expected, if half of the 
participants shifted from a cue abstraction model in the first task to a different strategy in the 
second task), indicating that more cues and a more complex functional relationship make it 
more difficult to predict from the first task the cognitive processes underlying the second task. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that more cues and a more complex functional 
relationship make shifting from a rule-based strategy to another strategy more likely, while at 
the same time strengthen the preference for similarity-based strategies. As a consequence, 
participants’ strategy choices are less predictable the more complex the task structure is. 
Discussion 
Study 1 examined whether providing scarce task feedback in categorization invites similarity-
based processing and how the number of dimensions and the functional relation between cues 
and criterion influence reliance upon similarity-based strategies in judgment and 
categorization. We found that in both categorization and judgment, the OLIN task was best 
described by a cue abstraction model. Once more dimensions had to be integrated reliance on 
exemplar models increased with most people choosing an exemplar model in the MMULT 
task. These results replicate findings in judgment that judgments are better described by a 
similarity-based exemplar model than a cue abstraction strategy in tasks requiring the 
multiplicative combination of several cues (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Juslin et al., 2008; 
Karlsson et al., 2007). This increased reliance upon the better performing similarity-based 
strategy indicates that task feedback helped adapting the cognitive process to task demands 
(Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). In addition, we showed that also the 
number of cues affects categorization and judgment strategies. The requirement to integrate 
more cues increased reliance on a similarity-based strategy suggesting that simple rules are 
more easily learnt than complex rules. This result resonates well with recent research showing 
that people abandon effortful cue abstraction processes more often under cognitive load 
(Filoteo et al., 2010; Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006). In sum, these 
results match well with the idea that the relative accuracy and effort of the strategies play an 
important role in strategy selection (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 1993). 
In contrast to our hypotheses we did not replicate the finding that more people relied 
on a cue abstraction strategy in categorization than in judgment in the MLIN task. There are 
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several potential explanations for this. In the first place, the rule-based cue abstraction 
strategy we used allows more complex rules than are mostly considered in categorization. In 
categorization rule-based processes are frequently restricted to conjunctive and disjunctive 
rules involving one or two dimensions. If two or more dimensions have to be integrated, for 
instance when learning optimal linear or nonlinear decision bounds, it is assumed that people 
rely on procedural learning (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). In contrast, 
the judgment literature assumes that linear, additive relationships can be likewise learned by a 
rule-based cue abstraction strategy, drawing the line for rule abstraction between linear 
relationships and nonlinear relationships. Recent findings support the latter view: For instance, 
participants’ explicit ratings of cue importance are highly correlated with cue weights derived 
from fitting a linear, additive model to linear tasks suggesting that people possess insight into 
the rule abstraction process (Lagnado, et al., 2006). Likewise, how well people learn rule-
based as well as information-integration categorizations is associated with working memory 
capacity (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Working memory capacity further predicts how 
accurate people make rule-based judgments, whereas similarity-based judgments rely more 
heavily on episodic memory (Hoffmann et al., 2013b). Furthermore, we did not find evidence 
that the majority of participants relied on a nonlinear bound in the MMULT categorization 
task7 — what would have been expected if people indeed learned the optimal decision bound 
via a procedural learning process. Another reason why not more people relied on a cue 
abstraction strategy in categorization than in judgment could be that our task involved 
continuous instead of binary cues. Continuous cue values make it easier to abstract the 
direction of the relationship between a cue and the criterion and thereby facilitate the 
abstraction of cue weights (Newell et al., 2009), a factor that reliably enhances reliance on 
rule-based strategies (Platzer & Bröder, 2012; von Helversen et al., 2013). 
With regard to the question if people approach judgment and categorization tasks 
similarly we found that the number of cues as well as the functional relation promoted 
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similarity-based processes in both judgment and categorization. However, more cues and a 
more complex function made participants shift more often between cognitive strategies from 
the first to the second task. One reason for this is possibly that more complex tasks make it 
more difficult to find the best way to solve the task so that people choose cognitive strategies 
more inconsistently. Alternatively, it has been proposed that individual preferences for 
learning based upon rules or exemplars are more pronounced in tasks that do not strongly 
favor one solution (McDaniel et al., 2013). People may learn over time how accurate and 
effortful it is to rely on rule-based strategies in comparison to exemplar-based strategies 
(Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Consequently, people may build up stable tendencies for rule-
based or similarity-based learning that may be related to stable personal characteristics like 
memory abilities (McDaniel et al., 2013). In study 2, we investigate if increasing the effort 
associated with exemplar memory reduces the demand characteristics of the task environment 
and hence makes preferences for rule-based and exemplar-based learning more prevalent. 
Study 2 
In study 2, we boost how effortful relying upon similarity-based strategies is by introducing a 
multidimensional quadratic (MQUAD) task structure in which the criterion is quadratic 
function of the cues. MQUAD judgment tasks are particularly hard to learn for two reasons: 
First, linear rules cannot be abstracted successfully so that they do not lead to good 
performance in training (Olsson et al., 2006). Second, an exemplar strategy can, in principle, 
learn to solve the task. However, the same criterion value is associated with multiple, but 
dissimilar exemplars making it more difficult to use exemplar memory (Olsson et al., 2006). 
Consequently, neither similarity-based processes nor rule-based processes yield to good 
performance early in training and people are supposed to drop back to the default, but useless 
rule abstraction process (Karlsson et al., 2008; Olsson et al., 2006). Indeed, people only solve 
quadratic judgment tasks if they are explicitly instructed to remember single instances (Olsson 
et al., 2006). 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  25!
Interestingly, people can, however, master MQUAD categorization and one-
dimensional quadratic function learning tasks (Ashby & Maddox, 1992; Ashby, Waldron, Lee, 
& Berkman, 2001; Busemeyer et al., 1997; Pachur & Olsson, 2012). One reason why people 
may still be able to solve MQUAD categorization tasks is possibly that it is easier to store 
only two different categories that are associated with the exemplars. In this vein, it has been 
found that also learning in MQUAD tasks that require categorizing exemplars into four 
different categories is significantly impaired (Ashby et al., 2001). Similar to Olsson et al. 
(2006), Ashby et al. (2001) concluded that people default to suboptimal linear decision rules. 
In sum, both studies suggest that people may shift to a large extent from rule-based strategies 
in judgment to similarity-based strategies in categorization. 
However, MQUAD tasks may also foster reliance on personal preferences for rule-
based or exemplar-based learning. For instance, McDaniel et al. (2013) found that people 
stick to their preferred learning strategy in linear V-shaped function learning tasks that are 
structurally most similar to quadratic judgment tasks. These learning preferences, in turn, 
transferred to how well people learned abstract categorization tasks. Hence, it is also possible 
that a MQUAD task again increases reliance on similar processes in judgment and 
categorization. 
In sum, we expected to replicate the key finding from previous studies that people 
learn successfully to solve MQUAD categorization tasks, whereas learning should suffer 
more in MQUAD judgment tasks. Second, we tested if people still follow an exemplar-based 
strategy in MQUAD categorization tasks, but default to a rule-based strategy in MQUAD 
judgment tasks. To test these predictions, our participants solved a categorization and a 
judgment task with the same MQUAD task structure. 
Method. 
Participants. 
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Thirty-two participants (25 females, MAge = 26.5, SDAge = 10.7) were recruited from 
the University of Basel. Participants received course credit or a participation fee (20 CHF per 
hour) for participating in the experiment. In addition, they could earn a bonus of 3 CHF in 
each task and had the opportunity to win one of two Amazon vouchers (worth 25 CHF each).  
Design and material. 
We used the same cover stories and pictures as in Study 1. In the MQUAD task, the 
judgment criterion was a quadratic function of the cues: 
€ 
yMQUAD = 0.83 4 c1 − 2.5( )
2
+ 3 c2 − 2.5( )
2
+ 2 c3 − 2.5( )
2
+ c4 − 2.5( )
2
− 2.5[ ] (14) 
where c1 to c4 are the cue values ranging from 0 to 5. According to their cue weights, c1 
reflects the most important cue and c4 the least important one. Subtracting 2.5 from each cue 
centered the cue values on their mean. Consequently, high and low cue values are associated 
with higher criterion values, whereas intermediate cue values were associated with lower 
criterion values. The categories for the binary categorization task were created by performing 
a median split on the judgment criterion. This median split generates a category structure with 
a spherical category boundary. Accordingly, the less similar an exemplar is to the prototypical 
exemplar with intermediate cue values, the more likely it is that the exemplar belongs to a 
different category than the prototype. 
To select a training set and a validation set, we generated again 1000 training sets with 
25 training items and selected a training set that a) could not well be solved by one- or two 
dimensional rules in the categorization task and that b) was fitted worse by a (log-) linear 
regression than by an exemplar model. In a second step, we generated 100 validation sets 
consisting of 15 validation items and finally selected a validation set for which the cognitive 
models made strongly diverging predictions. The final training and validation sets are 
depicted in Table 6 and 7, respectively. 
Procedure. 
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The procedure followed closely the procedure used in Study 1. Participants solved 
both a MQUAD judgment and categorization task. Task order as well as assignment of cover 
stories to the tasks was counterbalanced. 
Like in Study 1, participants learned to predict the criterion values or the categories for 
the 25 training items over 10 training blocks. In the test phase, participants judged or 
categorized 15 validation items four times without getting any feedback. We encouraged 
participants to achieve a high performance by incentivizing their answers like in Study 1. In 
addition, participants could earn a bonus of 3 CHF if they reached more than 80% of the 
points in the last training block in the categorization task or more than 55% of the points in 
the last training block in the judgment task. The relaxed learning criterion in the judgment 
task corresponds approximately to a RMSD below 10 and accordingly participants reaching 
the learning criterion should outperform a linear model and a baseline model by 2 RMSD 
(RMSDBaseline = 12, RMSDLinear = 11.8). 
Results 
Performance in the categorization task. 
Overall, participants solved the MQUAD categorization task worse than the MLIN or 
MMULT categorization tasks in Study 1 (see Table 3 for categorization and judgment 
performance). Although performance in the training phase dropped, still 25 participants 
(78.1%) reached a performance better than a baseline model predicting 44% of errors in the 
training phase.8 Similarly, participants made more errors on validation items in the test phase 
than in study 1. 
Performance in the judgment task. 
Like in the categorization task, performance dropped in the judgment task compared to 
the MLIN and MMULT judgment tasks in Study 1. In both the training and the test phase 
participants made on average less accurate judgments than in Study 1.9 However, still 19 
participants (59.4%) outperformed a baseline model in the last training block. Because of the 
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different response scales it is difficult to compare judgment to categorization performance 
based upon the RMSD (Mata et al., 2012). Therefore, we used the number of participants 
classified as outperforming or falling behind the baseline model in the last training block of 
the categorization and the judgment task. Overall, a marginal smaller amount of participants 
fared better than the baseline model in the judgment task compared to the categorization task, 
b = 0.89, SE = .46, Wald χ2(1) = 3.80, p = .051. 
Model fits and deviances. 
At the end of training, the exemplar model described participants’ categorizations best 
(see Table 4 for BICs, deviances, and strategy classifications), outperforming the baseline 
model (z = 3.14, p = .002) and the cue abstraction model (z = 4.43, p < .001).10 In the test 
phase, the baseline model could not be distinguished from the cue abstraction model (z = 1.22, 
p = .224). The exemplar model, however, predicted participants’ categorization in the test 
phase more accurately than the baseline model (z = 3.14, p = .002) or the cue abstraction 
model (z = 2.77, p = .006). 
In the judgment task, the BICs did not discriminate between the cognitive models (see 
Table 5 for BICs, deviances, and strategy classifications). The BIC for the baseline model did 
not differ from BICs for the cue abstraction model (z = 0.654, p = .513) or the exemplar 
model (z = 0.505, p = .614). Neither could the cue abstraction model and the exemplar model 
be distinguished (z = 0.299, p = .765). In the test phase, only the cue abstraction model made 
more accurate predictions than the baseline model (z = 3.09, p = .002). The exemplar model 
be discriminated from the baseline model (z = 0.08, p = .940), nor from the cue abstraction 
model (z = 0.75, p = .454). 
Strategy classification. 
To analyze judgment and categorization strategies more closely and to assess how the 
type of task may change the cognitive process, we classified participants to the baseline, the 
cue abstraction, and the exemplar model. In categorization, this classification provided 
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stronger evidence for the exemplar model (see Figure 3). In judgment, however, a similar 
amount of participants was classified to the exemplar model and the cue abstraction model. 
To test how the type of task (judgment or categorization) affected the cognitive 
process, we again performed an ordinal, logistic regression on strategy classification with task 
feedback as the independent variable. Overall, task feedback did not affect strategy 
classification, b = 0.64, SE = .51, Wald χ2(1) = 1.52, p = .217. This result suggests that 
although the judgment task was harder to learn, not more people tend to rely on similarity-
based processes in the categorization than in the judgment task. 
Matching processes in judgment and categorization. 
Like in Study 1, we analyzed shifting behavior by classifying participants as following 
a cue abstraction model in the first and the second task, as following an exemplar model in 
both tasks or as shifting between processes. Descriptively, the majority of participants shifted 
between cognitive processes from one task to the other (21 participants). Four participants 
were best described by the cue abstraction model in both tasks and seven participants by the 
exemplar model. Figure 2 depicts the conditional probability of following a cue abstraction 
model (an exemplar model) in the second task given that participants followed a cue 
abstraction model (an exemplar model) in the first task they solved. Overall, p(ExemplarSecond| 
ExemplarFirst) was higher than .5 indicating that participants tended to stay with the exemplar 
model in the second task. Interestingly, however, p(CAMSecond| CAMFirst) was rather low 
suggesting that participants abandoned a cue abstraction strategy in the second task and 
shifted more to similarity-based strategies in the second task. 
Discussion 
Study 2 investigated how increasing the difficulty to execute similarity-based 
strategies affects performance and cognitive strategies in categorization and judgment. 
Matching previous research we found that MQUAD judgment tasks are particularly hard to 
learn in terms of judgment accuracy, whereas categorization accuracy shows smaller 
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decrements (Ashby & Maddox, 1992; Ashby et al., 2001; Pachur & Olsson, 2012). More 
participants could outperform a baseline model in the categorization task than in the judgment 
task. These results are in line with research showing that increasing the number of categories 
harms categorization performance in MQUAD tasks (Ashby et al., 2001).  
Mimicking results from Study 1, however, the type of task did not change cognitive 
processes. Although, descriptively, a few more participants were classified to the exemplar 
model in the categorization task than in the judgment task, there was no effect of the type of 
task. Finally, participants were not simply stuck with an inefficient cue abstraction process in 
judgment. Indeed, analyzing shifting behavior suggested a practice effect: People were more 
likely to abandon cue abstraction, if they already experienced how difficult cue abstraction 
was in a first task. Possibly, people transferred knowledge of the task structure to the new task 
and deliberatively chose in the second task to rely upon a similarity-based strategy already 
early in training (Olsson et al., 2006). Indeed, only 11 participants followed the same strategy 
in both tasks suggesting that individual preferences are overridden by task feedback, even if 
these tasks make it at first difficult to figure out how to solve the task best. 
General Discussion 
The distinction between similarity and rules is core to many areas of cognitive science 
(Hahn & Chater, 1998; Pothos, 2005; Sloman, 1996), but little research has linked similarity-
based and rule-based processes across different domains like judgment and categorization. 
We contributed to integrating judgment and categorization research by studying how the 
number of cues and the functional relationship between cue and criterion shape cognitive 
strategies in judgment and categorization. Specifically, we suggested that the functional 
relationship restricts the accuracy that can be achieved by relying upon rules or similarity. 
Binary task feedback in categorization and the number of cues, however, increase the effort 
associated with abstracting rules (Study 1) or with storing single exemplars (Study 2). Finally, 
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we examined to what extent categorization processes match the processes people rely on 
when making judgments. 
Across both studies, we found that functions that increasingly deviate from linear 
relationships promote similarity-based processing in both judgment and categorization. 
Matching research from judgment (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 
2007), this result highlights that categorization and judgment behavior is highly adapted to the 
task demands with the relative accuracy of rule-based and similarity-based strategies as one 
key determinant of strategy shifts. Beyond that, these results emphasize that the functional 
relationship also drives shifts between rule-based and similarity-based processes in 
categorization — a factor that has been rarely studied in categorization or led to ambiguous 
results (Maddox & Ashby 1993; McKinley & Nosofsky, 1995, 1996). 
In line with past research, we also found that more cues make it more difficult to 
abstract explicit rules and enhance similarity-based strategies in categorization (Ashby et al., 
2002; Filoteo et al., 2010; Maddox & Ashby, 2004; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006) and 
judgment (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). This result suggests that increasing the effort necessary 
for rule abstraction further forces participants to adopt more similarity-based processes. 
However, in contrast to studies using binary cues (Juslin, Olsson et al., 2003; Mata et al., 
2012; von Helversen et al., 2010, 2013), both studies did not find evidence that reduced task 
feedback in categorization invites more similarity-based processes than continuous feedback 
in judgment. One reason why scarce feedback may have less impact on processing is that the 
continuous cues we used implicitly convey knowledge about the cue directions (Newell et al., 
2009) and hence may foster cue abstraction processes also more strongly in categorization 
(Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen et al., 2013). Apparently, continuous cue information 
can trigger cue abstraction and compensate for less informative feedback. 
As one of the first studies, we directly investigate the extent to which people adopt 
similar strategies in the domains of judgment and categorization. Striking is the fact that the 
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more cues the task involved and the more complex the functional relationship between cues 
and criterion was, the more people tended to abandon rule-based strategies from the first to 
the second task. As a result, participants also shifted more between rule-based and similarity-
based processes. One reason why these inconsistencies may arise is that task complexity 
makes it more difficult to detect the adequate solution to the task. Indeed, in the 
multidimensional quadratic task a huge percentage of participants at first seemed to fall back 
to rule abstraction (cue abstraction: 47%; exemplar: 34%). However, in the second task they 
experienced fewer problems in detecting the underlying task structure and shifted more to an 
exemplar-based process (cue abstraction: 31%; exemplar: 59%). In addition, this result also 
raises concerns against the idea that individual preferences for learning rule-based or 
similarity-based become stronger the less determined the task environment is (McDaniel et al., 
2013). 
In our study, however, we also found that still the majority of participants in Study 1 
were classified as following the same process to judge and categorize objects suggesting that 
judgment and categorization processes build upon common principles. In the MLIN task, for 
instance, 50% of the participants were best described with a cue abstraction model in both 
tasks. While judgment research has argued that such cue abstraction models describe explicit 
cue abstraction processes, categorization research has often claimed that people learn linear 
boundaries implicitly (Ashby & Maddox, 2005; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). These formed 
linear boundaries are difficult to verbalize and people, hence, do not build up any explicit task 
knowledge (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Our result, however, resonates well with current 
findings showing that how well people solve rule-based categorization tasks is highly 
correlated with accuracy in information integration categorizations (Lewandowky, 2011) and 
that people adopting task-appropriate strategies in rule-based categorizations are also more 
likely to adopt the appropriate strategy in information integration (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
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In line with these findings, our results move explicit cue abstraction processes assumed in 
judgment closer to implicit information integration processes in categorization. 
On a theoretical level, our study matches well with the idea that people can both rely 
on similarity-based and rule-based processes (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Olsson et 
al., 2003; Nosofsky et al., 1994; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). While our study 
conceptualized the interaction of rules and similarity as shifts between cognitive strategies, it 
is also likely that people base judgment and categorizations simultaneously on rules and 
similarity by blending these cognitive processes (Hahn, Prat-Sala, Pothos, & Brumby, 2010; 
von Helversen, Herzog, & Rieskamp, 2013). Future computational accounts may further 
exploit how rules and similarity interact by disentangling shifting and blending accounts. 
Taken together, our study suggests that people approach complex tasks by relying 
more on similarity, whereas scarce feedback does not further alter how people make 
judgments. Complex tasks, however, also pose a challenge by rendering the identification of 
task-appropriate strategies more difficult. Studying how people deal with a range of cognitive 
tasks may thus help to identify the conditions systematically triggering rules and similarity 
and to explore or to limit the generality of those two accounts. 
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Footnotes 
1. Information integration models (or decision bound models) assume that people 
learn to separate categories by implicitly forming linear or quadratic categories boundaries 
(Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998). A linear decision bound corresponds 
mathematically to our instantiation of cue abstraction categorization models. In contrast to 
cue abstraction models, decision bound models suggest that decision rules are learnt 
implicitly via procedural learning and cannot be verbalized (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Ashby 
& Maddox, 2005). 
2. The order of the tasks (categorization or judgment task first) and the cover story 
(bugs or Sonics) did not affect how well people learned the task, U = 1101, p = .706, and U = 
1032.5, p = .377, respectively. 
3. The cover story (bugs or Sonics) did not affect judgment accuracy (U = 1132, p 
= .883), but order of the tasks (judgment or categorization first) had a marginal effect on 
judgment accuracy (U = 898.5, p = .062). 
4. In addition we also fitted an exemplar model with four attention weights. This 
model did not outperform the predictions of an exemplar model with one parameter in the 
categorization task, OLIN: -2LL = 66.53 (SD = 78.04), MLIN: -2LL = 93.60 (50.32), 
MMULT: -2LL = 83.23 (64.29). Likewise, the exemplar model with four attention weights 
only generalized better in the OLIN judgment task than the exemplar model with one 
parameter, OLIN: -2LL = 20.08 (SD = 185.00), MLIN: -2LL = 135.92 (SD = 17.72), 
MMULT: -2LL = 130.12 (SD = 16.18). Furthermore, the linear model generalized better than 
the exemplar model with four attention weights in almost all task, except the MMULT 
judgment task. 
5. We also tested two-dimensional conjunctive and disjunctive categorization rules. 
Overall, these rules did not describe a large number of participants best: OLIN: 3.1% (1 
participant), MLIN: 15.6% (5 participants), MMULT: 15.6% (5 participants). 
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6. To not overweigh tiny differences in model predictions, likelihood values could not 
exceed 100 or fall below .001. Similarly, the fitted standard deviations had to exceed .001. 
7. Only 8 participants (25%) were best described when fitting equation 3 to 
participants’ categorizations in the MMULT task and predicting categorizations for validaion 
items. The cue abstraction model still predicted 13 participants (41 %) best and the exemplar 
model 11 participants (34 %). 
8. Categorization performance in the last training block was neither affected by order, 
F(1,29) = 2.15, p = .153, nor the cover story, F(1,29) = 0.14, p = .716. 
9. The order of the tasks did not affect judgment performance in the last training block, 
F(1,29) = 0.79, p = .382. Participants were slightly better at judging bugs (RMSD = 10.8, SD 
= 2.4) than Sonics in the last training block (RMSD = 13.1, SD = 3.0), F(1,29) = 5.74, p 
= .023. 
10. Again, an exemplar model with four parameters did not make more accurate 
predictions than an exemplar model with one parameter in the categorization task (-2LL = 
88.92, SD = 62.69) and the judgment task (-2LL = 157.12, SD = 11.27). 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  36!
References 
Ashby, F. G., Alfonso-Reese, L. A., Turken, A. U., & Waldron, E. M. (1998). A 
neuropsychological theory of multiple systems in category learning. Psychological 
Review, 105, 442–481. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.105.3.442 
Ashby, F. G., & Gott, R. E. (1988). Decision rules in the perception and categorization of 
multidimensional stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 14, 35–53. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.14.1.33 
Ashby, F. G., & Maddox, W. T. (1992). Complex decision rules in categorization: 
Contrasting novice and experienced performance. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 18, 50–71. doi:10.1037/0096-
1523.18.1.50 
Ashby, F. G., & Maddox, W. T. (2005). Human category learning. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 56, 149–178. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070217 
Ashby, F. G., Maddox, W. T., & Bohil, C. J. (2002). Observational versus feedback 
training in rule-based and information-integration category learning. Memory & 
Cognition, 30, 666–677. 
Ashby, F. G., & O’Brien, J. B. (2005). Category learning and multiple memory systems. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 83–89. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.003 
Ashby, F. G., Waldron, E. M., Lee, W. W., & Berkman, A. (2001). Suboptimality in human 
categorization and identification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 
77-96. doi: 10.1037//0096-3445.130.1.77 
Beach, L. R., & Mitchell, T. R. (1978). A contingency model for the selection of decision 
strategies. The Academy of Management Review, 3, 439–449. 
Busemeyer, J. R., Byun, E., DeLosh, E. L., & McDaniel, M. A. (1997). Learning functional 
relations based on experience with input-output pairs by humans and artificial neural 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  37!
networks. In Lamberts K. & D. Shanks (Eds.), Concepts and Categories (pp. 405–
437). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Busemeyer, J. R., & Wang, Y.-M. (2000). Model comparisons and model selections based on 
generalization criterion methodology. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 44, 171–
189. doi:10.1006/jmps.1999.1282 
DeLosh, E. L., Busemeyer, J. R., & McDaniel, M. A. (1997). Extrapolation: the sine qua non 
for abstraction in function learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 23, 968–986. 
Einhorn, H. J. (1971). Use of nonlinear, noncompensatory models as a function of task and 
amount of information. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 6, 1-27. 
Erickson, M. A., & Kruschke, J. K. (1998). Rules and exemplars in category learning. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 107–140. doi:10.1037/0096-
3445.127.2.107 
Filoteo, J. V., Lauritzen, J. S., & Maddox, W. T. (2010). Removing the frontal lobes: The 
effects of engaging executive functions on perceptual category learning. 
Psychological Science, 21, 415–423. doi:10.1177/0956797610362646 
Hahn, U., & Chater, N. (1998). Similarity and rules: Distinct? Exhaustive? Empirically 
distinguishable? Cognition, 65, 197–230. doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(97)00044-9 
Hahn, U., Prat-Sala, M., Pothos, E. M., & Brumby, D. P. (2010). Exemplar similarity and rule 
application. Cognition, 114, 1–18. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.08.011 
Hoffmann, J. A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2013a). Deliberation’s blindsight: How 
cognitive load can improve judgments. Psychological Science, 26, 869-879. doi: 
10.1177/0956797612463581 
Hoffmann, J A., von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2013b). Pillars of judgment: How 
memory abilities affect performance in rule-based and exemplar-based judgments. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  38!
Juslin, P., Jones, S., Olsson, H., & Winman, A. (2003). Cue abstraction and exemplar memory 
in categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 29, 924–941. 
Juslin, P., Karlsson, L., & Olsson, H. (2008). Information integration in multiple cue 
judgment: A division of labor hypothesis. Cognition, 106, 259–298. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.02.003 
Juslin, P., Olsson, H., & Olsson, A.-C. (2003). Exemplar effects in categorization and 
multiple-cue judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 133–156. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.132.1.133 
Kämmer, J. E., Gaissmaier, W., & Czienskowski, U. (2013). The environment matters: 
Comparing individuals and dyads in their adaptive use of decision strategies. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 8, 299-329.  
Karelaia, N., & Hogarth, R. M. (2008). Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of 
lens model studies. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 404–426. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.134.3.404 
Karlsson, L., Juslin, P., & Olsson, H. (2007). Adaptive changes between cue abstraction and 
exemplar memory in a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 1140–1146. 
Karlsson, L., Juslin, P., & Olsson, H. (2008). Exemplar-based inference in multi-attribute 
decision making!: Contingent, not automatic, strategy shifts? Judgment and Decision 
Making, 3, 244–260. 
Kaufmann, E., & Athanasou, J. A. (2009). A meta-analysis of judgment achievement as 
defined by the lens model equation. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 68, 99–112. 
doi:10.1024/1421-0185.68.2.99 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  39!
Lagnado, D. A., Newell, B. R., Kahan, S., & Shanks, D. R. (2006). Insight and strategy in 
multiple-cue learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 162–183. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.135.2.162 
Lewandowsky, S. (2011). Working memory capacity and categorization: Individual 
differences and modeling. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 37, 720–738. doi:10.1037/a0022639  
Lewandowsky, S., Yang, L. X., Newell, B. R., & Kalish, M. L. (2012). Working memory 
does not dissociate between different perceptual categorization tasks. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 38, 881–904. doi: 
10.1037/a0027298 
Maddox, W. T., & Ashby, F. G. (1993). Comparing decision bound and exemplar models of 
categorization. Perception & Psychophysics, 53, 49–70. doi:10.3758/BF03211715 
Maddox, W. T., & Ashby, F. G. (2004). Dissociating explicit and procedural-learning based 
systems of perceptual category learning. Behavioural Processes, 66, 309–332. 
doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2004.03.011 
Mata, R., Helversen, B. von, Karlsson, L., & Cüpper, L. (2012). Adult age differences in 
categorization and multiple-cue judgment. Developmental Psychology, 48, 1188–
1201. doi:10.1037/a0026084 
McDaniel, M. A., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2005). The conceptual basis of function learning and 
extrapolation: Comparison of rule-based and associative-based models. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 12, 24–42. doi:10.3758/BF03196347 
McDaniel, M. A., Cahill, M. J., Robbins, M., & Wiener, C. (2013). Individual differences in 
learning and transfer: Stable tendencies for learning exemplars versus abstracting 
rules. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Advance online publication. 
doi:10.1037/a0032963 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  40!
McKinley, S. C., & Nosofsky, R. M. (1995). Investigations of exemplar and decision bound 
models in large, ill-defined category structures. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 21, 128–148.  
McKinley, S. C., & Nosofsky, R. M. (1996). Selective attention and the formation of linear 
decision boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 22, 294–317. 
Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory of classification learning. 
Psychological Review, 85, 207–238. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.85.3.207 
Newell, B. R., Weston, N. J., Tunney, R. J., & Shanks, D. R. (2009). The effectiveness of 
feedback in multiple-cue probability learning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 62, 890–908. doi:10.1080/17470210802351411 
Nosofsky, R. M. (1988). Exemplar-based accounts of relations between classification, 
recognition, and typicality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 14, 700–708. doi:10.1037//0278-7393.14.4.700 
Nosofsky, R. M., & Johansen, M. K. (2000). Exemplar-based accounts of “multiple-system” 
phenomena in perceptual categorization. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7, 375–
402. 
Nosofsky, R. M., Little, D. R., & Denton, S. E. (2011). Response-time tests of logical-rule 
models of categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 37, 1–27. doi:10.1037/a0021330 
Nosofsky, R. M., Palmeri, T. J., & McKinley, S. C. (1994). Rule-plus-exception model of 
classification learning. Psychological Review, 101, 53–79. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.101.1.53 
Nosofsky, R. M., & Zaki, S. R. (1998). Dissociations between categorization and recognition 
in amnesics and normal individuals: An exemplar-based interpretation. 
Psychological Science, 9, 247–255. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00051 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  41!
Olsson, A.-C., Enkvist, T., & Juslin, P. (2006). Go with the flow: How to master a nonlinear 
multiple-cue judgment task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 32, 1371–1384. doi: 10.1037/0278- 7393.32.6.1371 
Pachur, T., & Olsson, H. (2012). Type of learning task impacts performance and strategy 
selection in decision making. Cognitive Psychology, 65, 207–240. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2012.03.003 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Platzer, C., & Bröder, A. (2013). When the rule is ruled out: Exemplars and rules in decisions 
from memory. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26, 429–441. doi: 
10.1002/bdm.1776 
Pothos, E. M. (2005). The rules versus similarity distinction. The Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 28, 1–14.  
Rieskamp, J., & Otto, P. E. (2006). SSL: A theory of how people learn to select strategies. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 207–236. doi:10.1037/0096-
3445.135.2.207 
Rouder, J. N., & Ratcliff, R. (2004). Comparing categorization models. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 63–82. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.133.1.63 
Schwarz, G. (1978). Estimating the dimension of a model. The Annals of Statistics, 6, 461–
464. 
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 119, 3–22. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3 
von Helversen, B., Herzog, S. M., & Rieskamp, J. (2013). Haunted by a Doppelgänger: 
Irrelevant facial similarity affects rule-based judgments. Experimental Psychology, 
29, 1-11. 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  42!
von Helversen, B., Karlsson, L., Mata, R., & Wilke, A. (2013). Why does cue polarity 
information provide benefits in inference problems? The role of strategy selection 
and knowledge of cue importance. Acta Psychologica, 144, 73–82. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2013.05.007 
von Helversen, B., Mata, R., & Olsson, H. (2010). Do children profit from looking beyond 
looks? From similarity-based to cue abstraction processes in multiple-cue judgment. 
Developmental Psychology, 46, 220–229. doi:10.1037/a0016690 
von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2008). The mapping model: A cognitive theory of 
quantitative estimation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 73–96. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.137.1.73 
von Helversen, B., & Rieskamp, J. (2009). Models of quantitative estimations: Rule-based 
and exemplar-based processes compared. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35, 867–889. doi:10.1037/a0015501 
Wills, A. J., & Pothos, E. M. (2011). On the adequacy of current empirical evaluations of 
formal models of categorization. Psychological Bulletin, 138, 102-125. 
doi:10.1037/a0025715 
Zeithamova, D., & Maddox, W. T. (2006). Dual-task interference in perceptual category 
learning. Memory & Cognition, 34, 387–398. doi:10.3758/BF03193416 
 
Running Head: COMPARING JUDGMENT AND CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES  43!
Table 1 
Training Set for Study 1. Judgment Criteria and Categorizations were Derived from Equation 
1 (MLIN),  Equation 2 (OLIN), and Equation 3 (MMULT). 
Cues Judgment Categorization 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 MMULT MLIN OLIN MMULT MLIN OLIN 
2 1 0 3 2 14 0 0 0 0 
1 4 1 4 5 22 10 0 0 0 
0 3 1 2 2 13 10 0 0 0 
0 2 3 0 1 12 30 0 0 1 
5 5 4 0 29 43 40 1 1 1 
0 4 5 4 12 26 50 1 1 1 
2 4 3 0 9 26 30 1 1 1 
1 4 3 5 13 27 30 1 1 1 
1 0 2 4 1 12 20 0 0 0 
1 0 0 2 1 6 0 0 0 0 
5 3 3 5 21 40 30 1 1 1 
1 1 5 5 7 22 50 1 0 1 
1 2 0 5 2 15 0 0 0 0 
5 5 0 1 4 36 0 0 1 0 
0 4 3 1 4 19 30 0 0 1 
4 2 1 3 6 27 10 1 1 0 
0 5 2 3 6 22 20 1 0 0 
5 5 2 4 22 43 20 1 1 0 
5 1 3 4 9 33 30 1 1 1 
4 0 2 4 3 24 20 0 0 0 
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1 4 1 5 6 23 10 1 0 0 
3 0 5 5 3 27 50 0 1 1 
0 2 5 0 2 16 50 0 0 1 
1 5 2 4 10 27 20 1 1 0 
3 4 5 5 30 39 50 1 1 1 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear task; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear task; MMULT 
= Multidimensional, multiplicative task 
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Table 2 
Validation Set for Study 1. Judgment Criteria and Categorizations were Derived from 
Equation 1 (MLIN),  Equation 2 (OLIN), and Equation 3 (MMULT). 
Cues Judgment Categorization 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 MMULT MLIN OLIN MMULT MLIN OLIN 
3 5 1 4 10 33 10 1 1 0 
3 4 4 3 21 35 40 1 1 1 
5 0 3 4 4 30 30 0 1 1 
3 4 2 5 14 33 20 1 1 0 
5 0 5 5 4 35 50 0 1 1 
3 2 0 2 2 20 0 0 0 0 
2 3 4 0 9 25 40 1 .5 1 
4 5 4 5 36 44 40 1 1 1 
5 0 5 3 4 33 50 0 1 1 
4 3 0 1 3 26 0 0 1 0 
2 1 2 0 3 15 20 0 0 0 
2 5 2 3 12 30 20 1 1 0 
4 0 0 2 2 18 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 4 22 10 0 0 0 
3 3 3 5 15 32 30 1 1 1 
Notes: OLIN = One-dimensional, linear task; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear task; 
MMULT = Multidimensional, multiplicative task 
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Table 3 
Performance in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT Categorization and Judgment Tasks in Study 
1 and in the MQUAD Categorization and Judgment task in Study 2 (Standard Deviations in 
Parenthesis) 
 Task condition 
 OLIN MLIN MMULT MQUAD 
Categorization task     
  % errors Training 3.8 (8.7) 22.5 (9.1) 23.4 (12.9) 29.3 (15.5) 
  % errors Test 3.5 (8.3) 24.0 (11.1) 21.8 (13.1) 35.2 (18.4) 
Judgment task     
  RMSD Training 4.2 (8.0) 6.7 (3.1) 5.4 (2.1) 11.9 (2.9) 
  RMSD Test 3.4 (6.2) 5.8 (1.5) 5.5 (1.9) 14.2 (2.6) 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear task; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear task; MMULT 
= Multidimensional, multiplicative task; MQUAD = Multidimensional, quadratic task; RMSD 
= Root mean square deviation 
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Table 4 
Model Fits During Training and Test in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT Categorization Tasks 
in Study 1and in the MQUAD Categorization Task in Study 2 (Standard Deviations in 
Parenthesis) 
 Model 
 Baseline Cue abstraction Exemplar 
 OLIN 
BIC Training 103.64 (0.49) 35.29 (24.13) 25.08 (24.89) 
Deviance Test 83.13 (0.70) 18.10 (22.66) 54.22 (28.76) 
Classification (n) 0 27 5 
 MLIN 
BIC Training 102.31 (2.22) 69.62 (20.39) 72.25 (17.44) 
Deviance Test 84.91 (6.84) 82.10 (54.87) 71.38 (16.34) 
Classification (n) 2 21 9 
 MMULT 
BIC Training 101.39 (4.68) 79.39 (13.70) 74.33 (22.89) 
Deviance Test 83.00 (3.07) 64.89 (23.90) 64.50 (11.01) 
Classification (n) 0 17 15 
 MQUAD 
BIC Training 101.59 (2.70) 111.08 (11.33) 87.64 (20.18) 
Deviance Test 82.82 (3.84) 84.03 (10.54) 72.91 (14.79) 
Classification (n) 5 9 18 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear task; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear task; MMULT 
= Multidimensional, multiplicative task; MQUAD = Multidimensional, quadratic task; BIC = 
Bayesian Information Criterion 
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Table 5 
Model Fits During Training and Test in the OLIN, MLIN, and MMULT Judgment tasks in 
Study 1and in the MQUAD Judgment Task in Study 2 (Standard Deviations in Parenthesis) 
 Model 
 Baseline Cue abstraction Exemplar 
 OLIN 
BIC Training 1021.5 (26.2) -300.2 (1127.8) -396.5 (1255.2) 
Deviance Test 193.7 (7.3) -37.0 (175.4) 62.6 (106.8) 
Classification (n) 2 30 0 
 MLIN 
BIC Training 852.4 (34.1) 697.16 (90.3) 705.6 (98.0) 
Deviance Test 157.2 (8.7) 130.3 (15.3) 133.6 (15.6) 
Classification (n) 0 19 13 
 MMULT 
BIC Training 772.0 (50.5) 680.0 (67.9) 628.46 (95.8) 
Deviance Test 146.3 (12.3) 130.4 (17.9) 123.0 (14.7) 
Classification (n) 1 13 18 
 MQUAD 
BIC Training 871.22 (60.84) 871.13 (68.48) 859.44 (72.97) 
Deviance Test 158.16 (10.26) 156.21 (11.60) 157.38 (12.32) 
Classification (n) 4 16 12 
Note. OLIN = One-dimensional, linear task; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear task; MMULT 
= Multidimensional, multiplicative task; MQUAD = Multidimensional, quadratic task; BIC = 
Bayesian Information Criterion 
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Table 6 
Training Set for Study 2. Judgment Criteria and Categorizations were Derived from Equation 
15 for the Multidimensional Quadratic Task 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Judgment Categorization 
0 3 1 4 25 2 
0 5 0 5 50 2 
0 5 3 2 35 2 
1 0 0 0 37 2 
1 1 2 4 13 1 
1 3 4 3 10 1 
1 5 2 5 27 2 
2 0 0 0 30 2 
2 1 4 5 13 1 
2 2 1 4 5 1 
2 3 0 2 10 1 
2 3 1 5 8 1 
2 3 5 2 10 1 
2 5 2 0 20 1 
2 5 3 0 20 1 
3 0 4 3 18 1 
3 1 2 0 10 1 
3 3 5 1 12 1 
3 5 3 5 20 1 
4 0 0 1 33 2 
4 3 0 4 18 1 
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5 0 5 1 47 2 
5 2 1 2 23 2 
5 2 4 5 28 2 
5 4 5 4 37 2 !
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Table 7 
Validation Set for Study 2. Judgment Criteria and Categorizations were Derived from 
Equation 15 for the Multidimensional Quadratic Task. !
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Judgment Categorization 
0 2 0 3 30 2 
0 4 2 0 30 2 
1 0 1 3 25 2 
1 2 2 2 7 1 
1 5 5 2 32 2 
2 3 1 3 3 1 
3 2 3 0 5 1 
3 2 4 1 5 1 
3 3 0 3 10 1 
3 3 1 4 5 1 
3 3 3 2 0 1 
3 4 4 3 8 1 
4 2 2 3 7 1 
5 2 4 1 25 2 
5 4 5 3 35 2 
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Figure 1. Classification of participants to the baseline, the cue abstraction, and the exemplar 
model depending on the type of task (categorization or judgment) in Study 1. OLIN = one-
dimensional, linear task; MLIN = Multidimensional, linear task; MMULT = 
Multidimensional, multiplicative task. 
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Figure 2. Conditional probabilities of following a cue abstraction model (CAM) or an 
exemplar model in the second task given that the participant followed a CAM or an exemplar 
model in the first task, respectively. Conditional probabilities are depicted for the OLIN (one-
dimensional, linear), the MLIN (multidimensional, linear), and the MMULT 
(multidimensional, multiplicative) task from Study 1 as well as for the MQUAD 
(multidimensional, quadratic) task from Study 2. 
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Figure 3. Classification of participants to the baseline, the cue abstraction, and the exemplar 
model depending on the type of task (judgment or categorization) in the multidimensional, 
quadratic task in Study 2. 
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Abstract 
Making accurate judgments is an essential skill in everyday life. However, 
although the relation of different memory abilities to categorization and judgment 
processes has been hotly debated, the question is far from resolved. We contribute to 
the solution by investigating how individual differences in memory abilities affect 
judgment performance in two tasks that induce rule-based or exemplar-based 
judgment strategies. In a study with 279 participants, we investigated how working 
memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory affect judgment accuracy and 
strategy use. As predicted, participants switched strategies between tasks. 
Furthermore, structural equation modeling showed that the ability to solve rule-based 
tasks was predicted by working memory, whereas episodic memory predicted 
judgment accuracy in the exemplar-based task. We did not find evidence that 
judgment accuracy was related to implicit memory. Last, the probability of choosing 
an exemplar-based strategy was related to better episodic memory, but strategy 
selection was unrelated to working memory capacity. In sum, our results suggest that 
different memory abilities are essential for successfully adopting different judgment 
strategies. 
 
Keywords: Judgment; working memory; episodic memory; rule-based and 
exemplar-based processes 
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“The only way to learn the rules of this Game of games is to take the usual prescribed 
course, which requires many years.” (Hermann Hesse) 
 
In Hesse’s fictitious country Castalia, one of the greatest honors is to be elected as a 
Magister Ludi, the master of the glass bead game. This glass bead game integrates 
knowledge from all the major scholarly disciplines — ranging from mathematics to 
music to philosophy — by storing this academic knowledge in the form of game 
symbols. During the game, these symbols are combined to form new ideas according 
to the grammar of the game. A challenging glass bead play thus hinges on two 
cornerstones of cognition: long-term memory and working memory. On the one hand, 
a glass bead player needs to store knowledge in long-term memory and retrieve this 
knowledge during the game. On the other hand, combining this knowledge requires 
the ability to manipulate information while keeping it activated for a short time — one 
key function of working memory. 
Long-term memory and working memory are crucial for solving various tasks 
in everyday life. When shopping, for example, it is necessary to remember the items 
you intended to buy — a typical long-term memory task. Quickly summing up the 
prices in your shopping basket, by contrast, places strong demands on working 
memory. The ability to make accurate judgments may also hinge on basic memory 
processes. To judge, for instance, the attractiveness of a job offer, people may recall 
past work experiences from long-term memory. Alternatively, people may form an 
initial judgment and repeatedly update this judgment by gathering information from 
the job advertisement — a process that draws on key functions of working memory. 
These examples clearly highlight that it is hardly possible to think of judgments 
without considering memory abilities. 
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Indeed, the role of memory processes in making judgments cannot be 
overstated (Weber, Goldstein, & Barlas, 1995). Consequently, the interplay of long-
term memory and working memory plays a major role in theories in categorization, 
judgment, and decision making (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the 
ABC Research Group, 1999; Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Marewski & Schooler, 
2011). In particular the question of the degree to which different categorization and 
judgment strategies draw on distinct memory systems has animated a heated scientific 
debate (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Knowlton, 1999; Lewandowsky, 2011; Newell, 
Dunn, & Kalish, 2011; Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; Smith, Patalano, & Jonides, 1998). In 
this vein, a growing body of research investigating the role of working memory 
capacity has suggested that higher working memory capacity helps people make more 
accurate judgments and categorizations (Lewandowsky, 2011; Weaver & Stewart, 
2012). However, the contribution of long-term memory has been largely ignored in 
empirical research (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Del Missier et al., 2013; Tomlinson, 
Marewski, & Dougherty, 2011). Furthermore, we can think of no study that 
considered how various memory abilities interact with different categorization or 
judgment strategies.  
Our goal was to fill this gap and shed light on which memory abilities underlie 
judgments. Specifically, we investigated how individual differences in working 
memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory interact with the judgment strategies 
people use. Focusing on two fundamental judgment strategies — rule-based and 
exemplar-based strategies (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 
2003; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008, 2009) — we examined how memory 
abilities influence the selection and execution of these judgment strategies and, 
ultimately, judgment performance. 
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We first provide an overview about memory abilities and the strategies 
underlying human judgments. We then explore theoretically how judgment strategies 
are grounded in memory processes and how memory abilities encourage the selection 
of different judgment strategies. Finally, we report an individual difference study 
examining how memory abilities influence judgment accuracy and strategy use. 
Memory Abilities 
Memory refers to people’s ability to store information. Memory research has 
drawn a major distinction between long-term memory and working memory. While 
long-term memory stores information for a long time period from minutes to years, 
working memory serves the purpose of manipulating information and maintaining this 
information in a highly active state for a short time (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). 
Recent theories often understand working memory as consisting of activated 
representations in long-term memory (Oberauer, 2009; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). 
Indeed, evidence from individual difference studies suggests that working memory 
correlates with performance in long-term memory tasks (Del Missier et al., 2013; 
Mogle, Lovett, Stawski, & Sliwinski, 2008; Unsworth, 2010). Specifically, working 
memory may control encoding into and strategic retrieval from long-term memory 
(Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & 
Anderson, 1996; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2013). 
Furthermore, memory research has drawn a prominent distinction between 
implicit and episodic long-term memory (we use the term episodic memory here to 
refer to explicit long-term memory for specific events). Whereas episodic memory 
measures reflect conscious recollection of facts or episodes, in implicit memory tests 
previous experiences facilitate performance, but these performance effects do not 
require conscious recollection of past experiences (Roediger, 1990; Squire & Zola, 
1996). Countless studies have shown dissociations between implicit and episodic 
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memory tests and these dissociations have often been taken as evidence for two 
distinct memory systems (Squire & Zola, 1996). For instance, correlation studies 
showed that implicit memory measures, such as word stem completion, are not 
correlated with episodic memory measures, such as cued recall (Bruss & Mitchell, 
2009; Fleischman, Wilson, Gabrieli, Bienias, & Bennett, 2004; Perruchet & Beaveux, 
1989). At the same time, however, the idea that there exist distinct episodic and 
implicit memory systems has been repeatedly challenged (e.g., Berry, Shanks, 
Speekenbrink, & Henson, 2012; Dew & Cabeza, 2011; Roediger, 1990). Recently, for 
instance, Berry et al. (2012) suggested that one single process model accommodates 
performance differences between recognition and implicit repetition priming tests. In 
addition, several studies raised methodological concerns about the reliability of 
implicit memory measures (Buchner & Brandt, 2003; Buchner & Wippich, 2000; 
Meier & Perrig, 2000). All this considered, it is still an open question if episodic and 
implicit memory can best be understood as two distinct memory systems. 
Judgment Strategies 
People make judgments every day ranging from estimating the probability of 
rainfall to judging the attractiveness of a job. Making such judgments requires 
inferring a continuous criterion, for instance, job attractiveness, from a number of 
critical attributes of this object (i.e., the cues), such as the yearly income or the task 
demands. People may rely on two different types of judgment strategies: rule-based 
and exemplar-based (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Juslin et al., 2003; von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2008, 2009). 
Rule-based strategies assume that people form hypotheses about the 
relationship between the cues and the criterion and apply this knowledge to make a 
judgment (Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2008). Rule-based judgment strategies have 
been predominantly captured with a linear, additive model (Cooksey, 1996) or a cue 
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abstraction model (Juslin et al., 2003). Linear models describe people’s judgments in a 
variety of tasks ranging from personal selection (Graves & Karren, 1992) to medical 
diagnoses (Wigton, 1996) and have been found to match people’s explicitly stated 
judgment rules (Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979; Lagnado, Newell, Kahan, 
& Shanks, 2006). Based on the lens model (Brunswik, 1956), the linear model 
assumes that people explicitly abstract a weight for each cue and then combine the 
weighted cue values in an additive fashion (Einhorn et al., 1979, Juslin et al., 2003). 
For instance, when judging the attractiveness of a job offer, people first determine how 
much they value income and the variety of task demands. Then they weight the yearly 
income and task demands of the job by their respective importance and combine this 
knowledge by adding the weighted cue values. 
Exemplar-based judgment strategies, by contrast, rely on the retrieval of past 
experiences from exemplar memory. For instance, when judging the attractiveness of a 
new job, people may think about past jobs they have held. Exemplar-based strategies 
assume that previously encountered objects are stored in memory along with their 
criterion values (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). To judge the new object (the probe), 
previously encountered objects (exemplars) are retrieved from memory. For instance, 
when judging the attractiveness of a job offer, a job applicant may recall previous 
work experiences. The more similar a retrieved exemplar is to the probe, the more it 
influences the final judgment. Accordingly, if a job applicant worked in a job with 
similar task demands, he might just recall how much he liked his former job to rate the 
attractiveness of the new job offer. Thus, exemplar-based strategies imply that people 
store concrete instances without abstracting any knowledge and engage in an 
associative similarity-based process during retrieval. 
In sum, rule-based and exemplar-based strategies differ in their assumptions 
about the cognitive processes underlying judgments (Hahn & Chater, 1998; Juslin et 
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al., 2003). Whereas rule-based strategies use abstracted knowledge about the world to 
reason about new instances, similarity-based or exemplar-based strategies rely on the 
similarity to past instances. Research suggests that both strategies are frequently used, 
with strategy selection depending on task characteristics (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; 
Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2007; Platzer & Bröder, 2013; von Helversen, Karlsson, 
Mata, & Wilke, 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009) and individual differences 
(Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012; von Helversen, Mata, & Olsson, 
2010): Specifically, people rely more on cue abstraction strategies in linear judgment 
tasks where the criterion is a linear additive function of the cues but shift to exemplar-
based strategies in multiplicative judgment tasks where the criterion is a nonlinear 
function of the cues (Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013a; Juslin et al., 
2008). This shift presumably takes place because the cue abstraction strategy does not 
allow accurate judgments in nonlinear environments (Juslin et al., 2008; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). In the following section, we review theoretical and 
empirical work on how the cognitive processes underlying rule-based and exemplar-
based strategies map onto different memory abilities. 
Linking Judgment Strategies and Memory Abilities 
In general, memory abilities can limit two different aspects of strategy use: 
strategy execution and strategy selection (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Lemaire & Siegler, 
1995; Mata, Pachur, et al., 2012). First, memory abilities can influence strategy 
execution, the ability to execute a strategy correctly. Better episodic memory, for 
instance, can enhance exemplar retrieval from memory and thus lead to more accurate 
exemplar-based judgments. Second, memory abilities can influence strategy selection 
by either fostering the ability to choose the more accurate strategy or boosting the 
preference for a single strategy (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). We first address the 
question of how the execution of rule-based and exemplar-based strategies are related 
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to working memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory and thereafter address the 
question of strategy selection. 
The Influence of Memory Abilities on Strategy Execution 
Rule-based strategies. Solving a rule-based categorization or judgment task 
has often been equated with logical reasoning (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005) or problem 
solving (Juslin et al., 2008). Like reasoning or problem-solving tasks, rule-based 
strategies such as cue abstraction are thought to involve a serial, controlled hypothesis-
testing process and, in turn, working memory (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Brehmer, 
1994; Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). Specifically, working memory may be required by 
two aspects of the rule-based judgment process: rule abstraction and rule execution. 
Relying on cue abstraction requires abstracting the cue weight, the weight that 
should be given to a specific cue. One way this can be achieved is by comparing two 
objects, relating the difference in judgment criteria to the difference in cue values, and 
then updating the cue weights accordingly (Juslin et al., 2008; Pachur & Olsson, 
2012). This comparison process likely taxes working memory, because it involves 
storing information about the two judgment objects for a short time and actively 
manipulating this information, key functions of working memory (Atkinson & 
Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Overall, recent research supports this idea, 
showing that learning rules hinges on working memory. Learning simple, one-
dimensional categorization rules, for instance, is impaired by a concurrent verbal task 
(Filoteo, Lauritzen, & Maddox, 2010; Zeithamova & Maddox, 2006, 2007). In a 
similar vein, cognitive load studies in judgment have suggested that people abandon 
cue abstraction strategies more frequently under cognitive load than without load 
(Hoffmann et al., 2013a). Finally, learning a judgment task is easier if the sequence 
reduces working memory demands by facilitating a direct comparison of cue values 
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and judgment criteria (Helsdingen, Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2011; Juslin et al., 
2008). 
Not only learning a rule, but also applying a rule may involve working memory 
processes, such as mental updating and inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000; Oberauer, 
2009). When making a judgment people may start with an initial estimate that is 
updated with each new piece of evidence (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Juslin et al., 
2008) — a process that requires keeping the past estimate in mind and manipulating it 
mentally. Furthermore, rule application requires inhibiting information, because 
people need to focus attention on the relevant cues and ignore those that are irrelevant. 
In line with this idea, Del Missier et al. (2013) found that correctly applying decision 
rules was related to working memory capacity. Specifically, rule application involved 
inhibiting irrelevant information and updating information in working memory (Del 
Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010, 2012). 
Long-term memory may be less important for making rule-based judgments, 
compared to working memory. Once a rule has been established, only the cue weights 
need to be retrieved from long-term memory (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956). 
Previously encountered objects, in contrast, can be forgotten (von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2008), so that episodic memory should have a negligible influence on rule 
execution.  
Exemplar-based strategies. Exemplar-based strategies assume that judgments 
are based on the similarity to previously encountered exemplars (Juslin et al., 2003; 
Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1988), suggesting that executing exemplar-based 
strategies should be linked to episodic memory (Hintzman, 1986, 1988; Nosofsky, 
1988).  Basically, two major types of episodic memory processes may contribute to 
successfully adopting exemplar-based strategies: encoding into and retrieval from 
episodic memory (Estes, 1986; Shiffrin & Atkinson, 1969). 
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Before any information can be recalled from memory, it is necessary to form a 
memory representation (i.e., to encode) and store this information (Estes, 1986). Like 
episodic trace models of human episodic memory, for instance, MINERVA 2 
(Hintzman, 1984, 1986), most exemplar-based models assume that exemplars are 
encoded in separate memory traces, storing each presentation of an exemplar in a 
single trace (Estes, 1986; Nosofsky, 1988). Accordingly, the more often an object is 
presented, the more often it is encoded and the more likely is its subsequent retrieval. 
Likewise, elaboration, adding information to the memory trace, or spacing exemplar 
presentations across time intervals can deepen encoding (Brown & Craik, 2000; 
Martin, 1968). Beyond storing the exemplars in episodic memory, successfully 
adopting an exemplar-based strategy also requires accurately retrieving the stored 
exemplars from episodic memory. Retrieval may fail because the probe’s features — 
serving as retrieval cues — do not activate memory traces for stored exemplars or past 
exemplars can no longer be discriminated (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). 
Although theoretical accounts suggest strong links between episodic memory 
and exemplar-based strategies, empirical evidence for the relationship is still scarce 
(Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). Nevertheless, it has been shown that the instruction to learn 
all exemplars by heart helps learning in judgment tasks solvable by exemplar 
strategies (Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006). Likewise, if single exemplars have to be 
memorized to solve a categorization task, these exemplars are recognized more easily 
in a subsequent recognition test (Davis, Love, & Preston, 2012; Palmeri & Nosofsky, 
1995; Sakamoto & Love, 2004). In contrast, if people cannot identify past exemplars, 
they are less inclined to follow exemplar-based strategies (Rouder & Ratcliff, 2004). 
Furthermore, similar to spacing effects in memory (Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, & 
Rohrer, 2006), spacing exemplar repetitions helps when solving exemplar-based tasks 
(McDaniel, Fadler, & Pashler, 2013).  
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Neuropsychological work has challenged the view that similarity-based 
category learning depends solely on episodic memory (Knowlton, 1999; Smith, 2008). 
The multiple-systems view (Ashby & O’Brian, 2005; Smith & Grossman, 2008) 
proposes instead that some category structures are learned implicitly. Specifically, it 
has been argued that implicit memory underlies prototype distortion tasks in which 
new items have to be categorized based on the similarity to a prototype extracted from 
previously encountered exemplars. For instance, Knowlton and Squire (1993) found 
that amnesiac patients classified new items with the same accuracy as a healthy 
control group but were less accurate at recognizing patterns they had seen before. 
Similar dissociations between amnesiac patients and a control group have been found 
in implicit memory research. While amnesiac patients are severely impaired in 
recognizing or recalling previously studied words, they do not show performance 
deficits in implicit word completion tests (Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984). 
Accordingly, Smith and Grossman (2008, p. 259) concluded that “similarity-based 
categorization can be based on either explicit or implicit memory.” Likewise, Juslin et 
al. (2008) indicated that exemplar-based strategies might be driven by different 
representations, including perceptual traces and semantic memory structures. 
However, proponents of exemplar-based accounts have rejected the idea that 
exemplar-based strategies rely on an implicit memory system distinct from episodic 
memory (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). They have argued that dissociations between 
categorization and recognition can be easily explained by a single exemplar model. 
Thus, it is still an open question if implicit memory is related to exemplar-based 
judgments. 
Besides implicit and episodic memory, working memory could also be helpful 
for learning in exemplar-based judgment tasks. Lewandowsky (2011), for instance, 
argued that every recollection-based long-term memory task should be related to 
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working memory capacity. Underpinning his argument, working memory has been 
found to support encoding and retrieval processes in episodic memory (Baddeley et 
al., 1984; Craik et al., 1996; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Unsworth et al., 2013). Retrieving 
past exemplars may also involve a deliberative search process in long-term memory 
(Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008). Indeed, research suggests that 
working memory load not only harms rule-based strategies but also disturbs retrieving 
past exemplars when judging new objects (Juslin et al., 2008). Furthermore, learning 
to solve rule-based and exemplar-based categorization tasks is facilitated by high 
working memory capacity (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky, 2011; 
Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, & Kalish, 2012). Therefore, working memory capacity 
should — in general — promote executing exemplar-based judgment strategies. 
However, if working memory promotes exemplar-based processing by enhancing 
episodic memory, episodic memory will serve as a mediator between working 
memory capacity and exemplar-based judgments, and hence, working memory 
capacity should lose importance for predicting exemplar-based judgments. 
The Influence of Memory on Strategy Selection 
Beyond influencing strategy execution, memory abilities could also influence 
which strategies people choose (Hoffmann et al., 2013a). The demands rule-based and 
exemplar-based strategies place on specific memory abilities can be conceptualized as 
costs and benefits of using a strategy. To choose a strategy, people may learn to trade 
off the benefits and costs associated with each strategy (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Rieskamp, 2006; Rieskamp & Otto, 2006). Hence, 
memory abilities could strengthen or weaken the preference for employing a specific 
strategy. In this vein, people with good episodic memory may take advantage of their 
skills and select an exemplar-based strategy more often, whereas people with bad 
episodic memory may avoid remembering past exemplars. In line with this idea, it has 
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been found that older adults avoid following an exemplar-based strategy — possibly 
because it places high demands on episodic memory (Mata, von Helversen et al., 
2012). In the same way, high working memory capacity may facilitate using rules and 
thus encourage rule-based processing. 
However, there is also good reason to believe that memory abilities 
differentially affect selecting a rule- or exemplar-based strategy. When learning to 
make judgments, people seem to start with a rule and only switch to an exemplar-
based strategy if the rule fails (Juslin et al., 2008; Nosofsky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 
1994). Accordingly, if rule-based strategies serve as a default option, memory abilities 
such as high working memory capacity may not be required to select a rule-based 
judgment strategy, but only to execute the rule-based strategy successfully. 
Beyond influencing preferences for specific strategies, memory abilities could 
also influence the general ability to choose the strategies adaptively (Mata, Pachur et 
al., 2012). Consistently, Bröder (2003) found that more intelligent participants tended 
to select a strategy that ignores information when this strategy performs well. 
Similarly, people with higher working memory capacity do not simply prefer rule-
based strategies in categorization; instead they seem to select the more appropriate 
strategy for the task at hand (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 
2012). Thus, people with high working memory capacity may not only apply rules 
more accurately but may also be faster in detecting when rules cannot properly solve 
exemplar-based judgment tasks, prompting a shift to exemplar-based strategies. 
Predictions for judgment performance and strategy selection  
To predict how memory abilities are related to judgment performance, it is 
necessary to take the judgment task into account. Research suggests that people prefer 
rule-based strategies in linear judgment tasks but switch to exemplar-based strategies 
in multiplicative judgment tasks (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Juslin et al., 2008). Thus, 
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memory abilities should differentially affect judgment performance in linear and 
multiplicative tasks. 
Specifically, low working memory capacity should harm the execution of cue 
abstraction strategies, because incorrect cue weights are learned or applying the 
learned rule is disrupted. In contrast, poor episodic memory should only marginally 
influence the execution of a cue abstraction strategy above working memory. 
Consequently, higher working memory capacity but not better episodic memory 
should be linked to more accurate judgments in linear, additive judgment tasks. 
Successfully executing an exemplar-based strategy, in contrast, hinges on encoding 
into and retrieval from episodic memory so that better episodic memory — and 
possibly implicit memory abilities — should improve judgment accuracy in 
multiplicative judgment tasks, whereas working memory should not affect judgment 
performance in a multiplicative task above episodic memory. Regarding strategy 
selection, working memory capacity may help people to detect and choose the more 
appropriate strategy in linear and multiplicative judgment tasks. Episodic memory, in 
contrast, may make it more likely that people rely on retrieval of past exemplars in 
multiplicative judgment tasks. 
The Present Study 
The current study examined how memory abilities relate to judgment 
performance in two different judgment tasks: a linear, additive judgment task and a 
multiplicative judgment task. Additionally, we measured working memory, episodic 
memory, and implicit memory with three different tests each. We selected the memory 
tests so that variance stemming from material or task-specific effects was reduced, 
allowing us to measure relatively pure latent abilities (Miyake et al., 2000). For this 
purpose, we used memory tests that included different types of material (verbal, 
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spatial, or numeric) and different types of tests (e.g. recognition, cued recall, and free 
recall for episodic memory). 
Participants 
 Two hundred and seventy-nine participants (147 female, 132 male, MAge = 
24.0, SDAge = 6.0) were recruited at the University of Basel. Participants received an 
hourly fee for their participation (20 Swiss francs, CHF, approx. U.S. $22) and could 
earn an additional bonus in the judgment tasks (M = 10.3 CHF, SD = 2.5 CHF). 
Overall, it took participants about 5 hr to complete the study, including a break of half 
an hour. 
Automated Working Memory Span Tasks 
Working memory span tasks were designed to measure both storage and 
processing of information in working memory (Redick et al., 2012), by letting 
participants process one set of stimuli while remembering another set of stimuli. For 
instance, in each trial of the operation span task, participants first see a simple 
equation. After they solve the equation and give the answer, they see the first letter 
that has to be remembered. Subsequently, another equation is presented and another 
letter has to be remembered, until the set size (the number of to-be-remembered 
letters) is reached. Finally, participants are asked to recall the letters in the order of 
their appearance. Trials with different set sizes are randomly interspersed, with each 
set size repeated three times. 
We used three different span tasks that are often used in individual differences 
studies (Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009; Unsworth, McMillan, 
Brewer, & Spillers, 2012): the reading span, the operation span, and the symmetry 
span. All span tasks were taken from Unsworth et al. (2009) and translated into 
German. We measured working memory capacity using the partial credit score as the 
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dependent variable (Conway et al., 2005). The partial credit score is the sum of all 
items recalled in the correct position over all trials. 
Operation span. Participants were asked to solve mathematical equations 
while remembering letters. Set size varied from 3 to 7 so that partial credit scores 
could range from 0 to 75. 
Reading span. In the reading span participants judged the plausibility of a 
sentence while remembering letters.1 Set size varied from 3 to 7 so that partial credit 
scores could range from 0 to 75. 
Symmetry span. Participants judged the symmetry of a chessboard picture 
while remembering the positions of squares in a 4 × 4 matrix. In each trial, participants 
first saw a chessboard picture and were asked to judge its symmetry. Afterward, one 
square in the 4 × 4 matrix was highlighted and participants were asked to remember its 
position. After the set size had been reached, participants recalled the positions of the 
squares by clicking on the squares in the order of their appearance. Set size varied 
from 2 to 5 so that partial credit scores could range from 0 to 42. 
Episodic Memory Tasks 
We measured episodic memory with three different tasks: a free recall task 
with pictures, a cued recall task with numbers, and a recognition test of verbs. 
Picture free recall. We selected 20 pictures from a picture database (Rossion 
& Pourtois, 2004) that had high ratings on imagery and concreteness. Each picture was 
presented for 3 s on a computer screen and participants were asked to remember them. 
After a retention interval of 2 min participants recalled the pictures by naming them. 
Performance was measured as the percentage of correctly recalled pictures. 
Cued number recall. We assessed cued number recall with a computerized 
version of the cued number recall task from the Berliner Intelligenzstruktur-Test Form 
4 (BIS 4; Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997). Fifteen pairs of a two- and a three-digit 
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number were first presented for 10 s on the screen. After a retention interval of 2 min, 
participants saw the cued number pair as well as four, three-digit number distractors 
and had to indicate which three-digit number was initially presented together with the 
two-digit number. Performance was measured as the percentage of correctly recalled 
three-digit numbers. 
Verb recognition. We selected 40 verbs with five to seven letters from the 
Hager and Hasselhorn database (1994), which is rated high on imagery and 
concreteness. Twenty verbs were assigned to a list of old items and 20 to a list of new 
items with the two lists matched on word length, imagery, and concreteness. In the 
study phase, participants learned the old verbs for 3 s each. After a retention interval 
of 2 min, participants indicated whether they recognized the 40 verbs from the study 
phase by classifying them as old or new. Performance was measured as the percentage 
of verbs correctly classified as old or new. 
Implicit Memory Tasks 
Previous studies have questioned the reliability of implicit memory measures 
(Buchner & Brandt, 2003; Buchner & Wippich, 2000; Meier & Perrig, 2000). To 
increase the reliability, we followed the suggestion of Buchner and Brandt (2003) and 
used performance tests that always had a correct solution (instead of association tests 
such as word stem completion). Our participants solved three different implicit 
memory tests: a speeded presentation test of line drawing, an identification test for 
sounds presented in noise, and an identification test for degraded nouns. 
We measured performance in the implicit memory tasks as the difference in 
median reaction times between old and new items, including correct and incorrect 
answers. Negative reaction time differences indicate that participants responded faster 
to the old items than to the new items, showing an implicit memory effect, a 
facilitation of performance because of prior experience. 
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Speeded presentation of line drawings. The design of the speeded 
presentation task followed closely an experiment by Musen and Treisman (1990). We 
randomly created 500 line drawings. From these line drawings we excluded duplicates 
and drawings representing simple forms, such as arrows. From the remaining items we 
randomly selected 40 line drawings — 20 old and 20 new — for the implicit memory 
test with the restriction that they had at most two lines in common. To determine the 
presentation threshold we used 40 different line drawings from the remaining items. 
These line drawings had at least two lines that were different from all items used in the 
implicit memory test. 
Using a threshold procedure we first determined the presentation length at 
which participants could correctly reproduce half of the line drawings. Starting with a 
presentation length of 400 frames (approx. 1200 ms), participants were asked to 
retrace the briefly presented line drawing on a mask that was composed of all lines 
possible in the line drawing. Participants were forced to draw all five lines. If they 
could not remember all the lines they were asked to guess. After each correct 
reproduction the presentation length decreased by 100 frames (300 ms). After each 
incorrect drawing, the presentation length increased by 100 frames. We decreased the 
step size to 10 frames (30 ms) after five turning points (the term turning point refers to 
a switch between decreases and increases in presentation length). 
In the subsequent implicit learning phase, participants were asked to click as 
fast as possible on all lines of the 20 old items. Participants retraced all old items 
twice. After a 2-min retention interval, participants again completed a speeded 
reproduction task. The presentation length was set to the presentation length after the 
last trial of the threshold in the reproduction task. Participants were asked to redraw 
the briefly presented old and new line drawings. Performance was measured as the 
difference in median reaction times between old and new line drawings. 
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Identification of degraded nouns. Forty nouns with a high rating on imagery 
and concreteness and a length of five to seven letters were selected from the Hager and 
Hasselhorn (1994) database. Nouns that were highly similar to each other in spelling 
were excluded. The nouns were alphabetically sorted and 20 items with the same 
initials were randomly included in the old and new item list. To present the nouns in a 
degraded fashion, we superimposed an 8 × 2 chessboard mask over each noun. Nine of 
the 16 squares were randomly turned black, so that identification of the noun was 
made difficult.2 
In the study phase, participants were asked to count the vowels in 20 nouns, 
with German umlauts counting as two vowels. Each noun was presented for 3 s on 
screen. After a retention interval of 2 min, participants were asked to correctly identify 
40 degraded nouns by typing in the noun names. Half of the nouns were old; that is, 
they had already been presented in the study phase. Performance was measured as the 
difference in median reaction times between old and new degraded nouns. 
Sound identification in noise. We selected 40 sounds from the Database for 
Environmental Sound Research and Application (Gygi & Shafiro, 2010) with a length 
between 0.55 and 3.54 s. All sounds were equalized for RMS (root mean squared) 
loudness, so that mean RMS loudness was 60 dB. For the sound identification task, the 
sounds were embedded in 5 s of white noise with a signal-to-noise ratio of -15 dB. 
Each sound started 0.5 s after stimulus onset. 
In the study phase, participants were asked to indicate whether the 20 old 
sounds had a higher or lower pitch than their own voice. After a 2-min retention 
interval, participants listened to 20 old sounds from the study phase and 20 new 
sounds, all embedded in noise.3 After each sound, participants were shown the name 
of the sound as well as the names of two other sounds that never appeared in the study 
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and had to indicate which of the sounds they had listened to. Performance was 
measured as the difference in median reaction times between old and new sounds. 
Judgment Tasks 
Participants solved both a linear and a multiplicative judgment task, taken from 
Hoffmann, von Helversen, and Rieskamp (2013b). In both tasks, participants had to 
judge a continuous criterion ranging from 0 to 50 based on four cues varying on a 
continuous scale from 0 to 5. In the linear judgment task, the criterion y was a linear, 
additive function of the cues: 
€ 
y = 4c1 + 3c2 + 2c3 +c4 , (1) 
where c1 reflects the most important cue according to its cue weight. Each cue value 
varied between 0 and 5. In the multiplicative judgment task the function generating the 
criterion y included a multiplicative combination of the cues: 
€ 
y = 4c1 + 3c2 + 2c3 +c4 + 2c1c2 c3 +c2 c3c48.5  (2) 
We used two different cover stories for the linear and the multiplicative 
multiple-cue judgment task. In the linear judgment task, participants judged whether a 
comic figure was a good or bad catcher of small creatures. In the multiplicative 
judgment task, participants estimated the toxicity of a bug. The stimuli for the two 
cover stories consisted of pictures of either bugs or comic figures. These bugs and 
comic figures varied on four cues. The bugs varied on the length of their legs, their 
antennae, and their wings, and the number of spots on their back. The comic figures 
had different sizes of ears and nose and a different number of hairs and stripes on their 
shirt. Table 1 illustrates the task structure: The cues could be used to predict the 
correct criterion value. The visual features were randomly assigned to the cues. The 
items were divided into a training set and a validation set. In the linear task, both sets 
could be better solved by applying a rule-based judgment strategy; in the 
Running Head: MEMORY AND JUDGMENT 22 
multiplicative task, however, an exemplar-based strategy should lead to a better 
performance. Additionally, the rule-based and the exemplar-based strategy predicted 
different responses on the validation items. 
Both tasks consisted of a training phase and a test phase. During the training 
phase, participants learned to estimate the criterion values for 25 training items from 
the training set. In each trial, participants first saw a picture of a bug or a comic figure 
and were asked to estimate its criterion value. Afterward they received feedback about 
the correct value, their own estimate, and the points they had earned. The training 
phase ended after 10 training blocks, each consisting of the 25 training items presented 
in a random sequence. In the subsequent test phase, participants judged 15 new 
validation items four times but did not receive any performance feedback. 
To motivate participants to reach a high performance, participants could earn 
points in every trial. The number of points they earned was a truncated quadratic 
function of the deviation of their judgment j from the criterion y: 
€ 
Points = 20 − ( j − y)
2
7.625  (3) 
At the end of the judgment tasks, the points earned were converted to a 
monetary bonus (1,500 points = 1 CHF). In addition, participants earned a bonus of 3 
CHF if they reached 80% of the points in the last training block (corresponding to a 
root mean square deviation [RMSD] of less than 5.5 in both judgment tasks). 
Filler Tasks 
The filler tasks for the retention intervals were matched with the memory tests 
so that they did not include the same stimulus material. All filler tasks were paper-and-
pencil versions of the tests. We used six mostly attention-based filler tasks: the d2 Test 
(Brickenkamp, 2002), the underline “x,” the letter series, the mark numbers divisible 
by 7, and the number-symbol task from the BIS 4 (Jäger et al., 1997), as well as the 
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letter sets task from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (KIT; Ekstrom, 
French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). In the d2 attention test, for instance, participants 
are asked to cross out all d’s with two small dashes while ignoring all p’s or d’s with 
more (or fewer) dashes (Brickenkamp, 2002). 
Procedure 
Participants solved all tasks on one day with a half-hour break between the two 
sessions. The tasks were presented in the same order to each participant. In the first 
session, participants first solved the linear judgment task. Afterward, they moved on to 
the operation span, then solved the verb recognition (filler task: number-symbol test), 
the sound identification in noise (filler task: letter series), and the picture free recall 
task (filler task: underline x), and finally they completed the symmetry span. 
The second session started with the multiplicative judgment task. Afterward, 
participants completed the reading span, the degraded identification of nouns (filler 
task: mark numbers divisible by 7), the cued number recall task (filler task: d2 Test), 
and the speeded presentation of line drawings (filler task: letter sets). 
Results 
In a first step, we analyzed participants’ average performance in the memory 
tasks and judgment tasks (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics) and modeled 
participants’ judgment strategies. In a second step, we fitted a measurement model to 
memory abilities and judgment performance separately. Next, we linked these two 
measurement models, estimating a structural model that predicts judgment accuracy 
by memory abilities. Finally, we investigated how strategy execution and strategy 
selection in the judgment tasks influences the relationship between memory abilities 
and judgment accuracy. 
Performance Measures 
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Performance in the memory tasks. Performance in the working memory span 
tasks was comparable to normative data (Redick et al., 2012). Participants achieved a 
higher partial credit score in the operation and the reading span than in the symmetry 
span, indicating that they recalled more items in these tasks. In the episodic memory 
tasks, participants showed a higher recall rate in the recognition task than in the free 
recall or the cued recall task. In the implicit memory tasks, participants showed, on 
average, a higher implicit memory effect in the degraded presentation task than in the 
identification in noise task or the speeded presentation task. In the speeded 
presentation task, participants did not respond faster to the old items at all. 
Performance in the judgment tasks. At first, we assessed how well 
participants learned to solve the judgment tasks. As an indicator of judgment 
performance, we calculated the RMSD between participants’ judgments in the last 
training block and the correct criterion, with lower RMSDs indicating higher judgment 
accuracy. We used Wilcoxon z tests to compare performance in the judgment tasks, 
because the judgment data showed slight deviations from normality. 
Overall, participants successfully learned to solve the judgment tasks. 
However, more participants earned a bonus in the multiplicative judgment task (81% 
of the participants) than in the linear judgment task (52% of the participants), χ2(1) = 
7.56, p = .006. Also, participants judged the training items on average more accurately 
in the multiplicative judgment task than in the additive judgment task, Wilcoxon z = 
4.92, p < .001. 
Next, we investigated how well people could generalize their performance to 
new validation items in the test phase. Judgment performance for validation items was 
measured as the RSMD between the correct criterion and participants’ mean 
judgment, that is, the judgment for each validation item averaged over the four 
presentations in the test phase. Judgment performance in the test phase was 
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comparable between the linear and the multiplicative judgment task (Wilcoxon z = 
1.46, p = .145) but improved slightly compared to the training phase in both judgment 
tasks. This improvement was probably caused by a more restricted range of criterion 
values. 
Modeling of Judgment Strategies 
To investigate which judgment strategy participants relied on, we adopted a 
cognitive modeling approach. For each participant, we fitted a linear regression model 
(describing the rule-based strategy), an exemplar model (describing an exemplar-
based strategy), and a baseline model (estimating participants’ mean judgments) to 
participants’ judgments in the last three blocks of the training phase and predicted 
participants’ mean judgments for validation items by using the fitted parameter 
estimates (von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008). This so-called generalization test 
possesses the advantage that it accounts for model complexity not only in terms of the 
number of free parameters but also in terms of their functional form (Busemeyer & 
Wang, 2000). We then compared the models based on the RMSD between model 
predictions and participants’ judgments in the training phase and the test phase. We 
used Wilcoxon sign-ranked tests for these model comparisons because the RMSDs 
were not normally distributed. 
Linear model. Linear regression models have been used to mathematically 
describe rule-based judgment strategies. In linear models, the importance of each cue 
for making a judgment is reflected in its cue weight; the higher the cue weights are, 
the more they influence the final judgment. The final criterion estimate 
€ 
ˆ c p of an object 
p is the weighted sum of the cue values xpi: 
€ 
ˆ c p = k + wi ⋅ x pi
i=1
I
∑  (4) 
where wi are the cue weights for each cue i and k is a constant intercept. 
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Exemplar model. To describe the exemplar-based strategy mathematically we 
used an exemplar model with one free sensitivity parameter (Juslin et al., 2003).4 In 
exemplar models, the similarity S(p,j) between the probe p and the exemplar j is an 
exponential decay function of the objects’ distances dpj (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998): 
€ 
S(p, j) = e−dpj . (5) 
This distance is determined by summing up the absolute differences between 
the cue values xpi of the probe and the cue values xji of the exemplar on each cue i and 
then weighting this sum by the sensitivity parameter h. 
€ 
dpj = h x pi − x ji
i=1
I
∑
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) . (6) 
Correspondingly, the more closely the cue values of the probe and the 
exemplar match each other, the smaller the distance is between the objects. The 
sensitivity parameter expresses how strongly people discriminate among the stored 
exemplars. A sensitivity parameter close to 0 indicates no discrimination and a high 
sensitivity parameter indicates that people specifically remember each exemplar. 
The criterion estimate 
€ 
ˆ c p is then determined as the average sum of the 
similarities weighted by their corresponding criterion values cj. 
€ 
ˆ c p =
S( p, j)⋅ c j
j=1
J
∑
S( p, j)
j=1
J
∑
. (7) 
Model fits. At the end of training, the baseline model did not provide a good 
description of participants’ judgments in the linear and the multiplicative judgment 
task (see Table 3 for fit indices during training and test). In the linear judgment task, 
the linear model described participants’ judgments overall better than the exemplar 
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model (z = 14.5, p < .001), whereas the linear model did not outperform the exemplar 
model in the multiplicative judgment task (z = 1.5, p = .145). 
In the test phase, the linear model also accounted better for participants’ 
judgments than the exemplar model in the linear judgment task (z = 11.2, p < .001). In 
contrast, the exemplar model made slightly more accurate predictions for participants’ 
judgments than the linear model in the test phase of the multiplicative judgment task (z 
= 4.8, p < .001). Replicating the results from the training phase, the baseline model 
described participants’ judgments worse than the linear model or the exemplar model 
in the linear judgment task (linear model: z = 14.1, p < .001; exemplar model: z = 14.2, 
p < .001) and the multiplicative judgment task (linear model: z = 14.0, p < .001; 
exemplar model: z = 14.0, p < .001). 
Strategy classification. To further examine individual differences in strategy 
selection, we classified participants as selecting the strategy that led to the smallest 
RMSD between model predictions and participants’ mean judgments. As shown in 
Figure 1, most participants adapted their judgment strategy to the judgment task. 
Whereas in the linear judgment task the majority of participants were best described 
by the linear model (nLinear = 220, nExemplar = 42, nBaseline = 17), in the multiplicative 
judgment task most participants were classified as following an exemplar model 
(nLinear = 99, nExemplar = 176, nBaseline = 4), χ2(2) = 136.31, p = .001. Indeed, half of the 
participants (50.2%) switched from a linear, rule-based strategy in the linear judgment 
task to an exemplar-based strategy in the multiplicative judgment task. 
To capture how much participants relied on a cue abstraction or an exemplar-
based strategy, we also fitted a strategy weight parameter to participants’ judgments in 
the test phase, excluding participants best described by the baseline model (Hoffmann 
et al., 2013a). This strategy weight can take values between 0 and 1 and weights the 
predictions of the exemplar and linear models. 
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€ 
ˆ c p = ws⋅ ˆ c p, Exemplar + (1− ws)⋅ ˆ c p, Linear  (8) 
A strategy weight above .5 indicates a higher probability for the exemplar 
model; a strategy weight below .5 indicates a higher probability for the linear model. 
Because the strategy weights were not normally distributed, we calculated a 
one-sample Wilcoxon test. Indeed, the strategy weight was on average below .5 in the 
linear judgment task, n = 262, M = .22, SD = .28, skewness = 1.32, kurtosis = 0.81, z = 
11.3, p < .001, whereas it was larger than .5 in the multiplicative judgment task, n = 
275, M = .60, SD = .38, skewness = -.52, kurtosis = -1.26, z = -3.9, p < .001. 
Taken together, our results underscore that participants’ judgment processes 
were highly task sensitive (Juslin et al., 2008; Karlsson et al., 2007). While most 
participants relied on a rule-based judgment strategy in the linear judgment task, the 
majority adopted an exemplar-based strategy in the multiplicative judgment task. 
Structural equation modeling 
To understand how judgment performance is grounded in memory abilities, we 
followed a structural equation modeling approach. One particular strength of structural 
equation modeling is that it allows testing of theories about relations between 
theoretically well-defined latent constructs extracted from manifest indicators 
(Hayduk, Cummings, Boadu, Pazderka-Robinson, & Boulianne, 2007). In doing so, 
structural equation modeling corrects for task-specific variance, providing 
measurement-error-free estimates of the latent construct (Tomarken & Waller, 2005). 
A recommended approach (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) is first to estimate the 
measurement model that relates the manifest indicators to the latent constructs and 
then to test the relations between the latent constructs based on theoretical 
assumptions. 
Model fit is often evaluated based on several fit indices (Iacobucci, 2010; 
Kline, 2011) among them chi-square (χ2), the standardized root mean square residual 
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(SRMR), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA). Because descriptive data indicated some deviations from 
multivariate normality, we estimated all models using a maximum likelihood estimator 
with robust standard errors (MLR) and Satorra–Bentler scaled χ2 values (scaling 
factor, SF) for χ2 difference tests (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). 
Measurement model for memory abilities. To establish construct validity, 
we first estimated a measurement model for memory abilities from the memory data. 
We hypothesized that working memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory 
constitute three separate latent constructs, each described by three tests (episodic 
memory: recognition, free recall, and cued recall; working memory: operation span, 
reading span, and symmetry span; implicit memory: degraded presentation, speeded 
presentation, and identification in noise). Although working memory and episodic 
memory are typically positively correlated (Brewer & Unsworth, 2012), implicit 
memory should be uncorrelated with episodic memory (Bruss & Mitchell, 2009) and 
is probably uncorrelated with working memory, as well. Table 4 depicts the zero-order 
correlations between all memory and judgment tasks. Because we could not estimate a 
measurement model for implicit memory, we fixed all unstandardized factor loadings 
for the implicit memory measures to 1 in all measurement models. 
Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 2, a three-factor latent-variable model that 
assumed working memory and episodic memory are correlated but independent from 
implicit memory provided the best fit, χ2(28) = 38.08, SF = 0.97, p = .097, CFI = .95, 
RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .05. Model fit was neither improved by adding a correlation 
between implicit memory and working memory, χ2(27) = 38.63, SF = 0.95, p = .069, 
CFI = .94, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .05, nor by adding a correlation between implicit 
memory and episodic memory, χ2(27) = 38.06, SF = 0.97, p = .077, CFI = .94, 
RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04. Furthermore, assuming that working memory, episodic 
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memory, and implicit memory are uncorrelated decreased model fit, χ2(29) = 45.81, 
SF = 0.99, p = .025, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06, Δχ2(1) = 5.28, p = .022.  
These results replicate the key finding from previous individual difference 
studies: that working memory and episodic memory are moderately correlated 
(Brewer & Unsworth, 2012; Del Missier et al., 2013; Unsworth, 2010). In addition, 
our results support the assumption that implicit memory is independent from episodic 
memory (Bruss & Mitchell, 2009) and working memory. 
Measurement model for judgment performance. The measurement model 
for judgment performance was particularly interesting because — to our knowledge — 
judgment research has not yet investigated if performance in linear and multiplicative 
judgment tasks is task-specific or depends on a more general ability to learn 
judgments. To measure judgment performance in both tasks, we used the RMSD 
between participants’ judgments and the correct criterion in each of the four test 
blocks of the two tasks (see Table 3 for zero-order correlations). Judgment 
performance in the linear judgment task was assumed to constitute one latent factor, 
whereas judgment performance in the multiplicative task constituted the second latent 
factor. We then compared three measurement models against each other, assuming (a) 
that the latent factors are completely uncorrelated, (b) that the latent factors are 
correlated, or (c) that the latent factors are identical; that is, performance over all test 
blocks in the linear and the multiplicative judgment task can be described by one 
latent factor. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, a measurement model that assumed a correlation 
between performance in the linear judgment task and performance in the 
multiplicative judgment task provided the best fit, χ2(19) = 21.87, SF = 1.23, p = .291, 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .03, suggesting two moderately correlated latent 
factors. Omitting the correlation between the latent factors did not harm model fit with 
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regard to CFI (0.99) and RMSEA (.05). However, the other two fit criteria yielded a 
different picture, χ2(20) = 33.84, SF = 1.24, p = .027, SRMR = .11, Δχ2(1) = 10.29, p 
= .001. A model that assumed a single latent factor for judgment performance was 
rejected by all fit criteria, χ2(20) = 571.79, SF = 1.15, p < .001, CFI = 0.53, RMSEA = 
.31, SRMR = .23. 
Taken together, the small correlation between judgment accuracy in the linear 
and the multiplicative task yields some evidence that individual differences in 
judgment performance partly stem from a general ability to solve judgment problems. 
However, a huge amount of the individual differences in judgment performance were 
idiosyncratic to the multiplicative or the linear judgment task, suggesting that distinct 
processes may account for individual differences in task performance. 
Predicting Judgment Performance With Memory Abilities 
Do individual differences in memory abilities determine how well people solve 
different judgment tasks? We predicted that participants with higher working memory 
capacity should make more accurate judgments in the linear judgment task, whereas 
participants with better episodic memory skills should solve multiplicative judgment 
tasks more accurately. To test this hypothesis against competing ideas, we combined 
the measurement model for memory abilities with the measurement model for 
judgment performance into one structural model that assumes a path from working 
memory to judgment performance in the linear task and a path from episodic memory 
to judgment performance in the multiplicative task. We compared this model to three 
alternative models (1) a null model that assumes memory abilities do not predict 
judgment performance at all, (2) a model that assumes implicit memory further 
predicts performance in multiplicative judgment tasks, and (3) a full model that 
additionally assumes working memory predicts judgment performance in 
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multiplicative tasks and episodic memory predicts judgment performance in linear 
tasks. 
The hypothesized structural model captured the underlying covariance 
structure very well, χ2(117) = 110.71, SF = 1.01, p = .646, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .05, and better than the three alternative models: Assuming no relationship 
between memory abilities and judgment performance decreased model fit 
considerably, χ2(119) = 149.79, SF = 1.01, p = .030, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = .03, 
SRMR = .09, Δχ2(2) = 35.22, p < .001. Indeed, omitting the path from working 
memory to judgment performance in the linear task decreased model fit, χ2(118) = 
133.94, SF = 1.01, p = .150, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .08, Δχ2(1) = 17.49, 
p < .001. Likewise, omitting the path from episodic memory to judgment performance 
in the multiplicative task decreased model fit, χ2(118) = 130.94, SF = 1.01. p = .197, 
CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .07, Δχ2(1) = 20.25, p < .001. Also, including 
implicit memory could not further explain performance differences in the 
multiplicative task, χ2(116) = 110.54, SF = 1.01, p = .626, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .05, Δχ2(1) = 0.05, p = .823. Finally, also the full model that assumed 
working memory and episodic memory are both important for predicting judgment 
performance in the linear and the multiplicative judgment task did not outperform the 
hypothesized model, χ2(115) = 107.02, SF = 1.00, p = .690, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 
.00, SRMR = .04, Δχ2(2) = 3.41, p = .182. 
In line with our hypothesis, the resulting structural model (Figure 4) shows that 
people with higher working memory capacity solved linear judgment tasks more 
accurately than people with lower working-memory capacity, whereas people with 
better episodic memory skills solved multiplicative judgment tasks better than people 
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with bad episodic memory abilities.5 In the next step, we investigated if memory 
abilities also influence strategy selection. 
Tracing the Path From Memory Abilities to Judgment Performance Through 
Judgment Strategies  
Strategy selection. In the Introduction we outlined that memory abilities may 
change strategy selection in two possible ways. On the one hand, working memory 
may make it more likely that people detect the task-appropriate judgment strategy 
faster; accordingly, working memory should predict strategy selection in the linear and 
the multiplicative task and strategy selection, in turn, predicts judgment accuracy. On 
the other hand, it is possible that an active strategy selection is only necessary for 
executing exemplar-based strategies. In this case, episodic memory may only predict 
strategy selection in the multiplicative task.  
To investigate how memory abilities affect strategy selection and, in turn, 
judgment accuracy, we relied on mediation analyses. If memory abilities influence 
judgment accuracy by altering the judgment strategy, then strategy selection should 
mediate the relationship between memory abilities and judgment performance. In 
doing so we compared a null model that assumed strategy selection does not mediate 
the relationship between memory abilities and judgment accuracy against different 
mediator models. Alternative models proposed that (a) strategy selection mediates the 
relationship between episodic memory and performance only in the multiplicative 
judgment task, (b) strategy selection in addition mediates the relationship between 
working memory and performance in the linear task, or (c) working memory 
additionally predicts strategy selection in the multiplicative task. 
To conduct theses analyses, we relied on the continuous strategy weight. 
Because the strategy weight indicates only how much participants relied on an 
exemplar-based strategy or a cue abstraction strategy, participants classified as 
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following a baseline model in the linear or the multiplicative task were coded as 
missing on that variable. To avoid excluding all their data, we used a full information 
maximum likelihood approach to estimate the structural model (Tomarken & Waller, 
2005). 
Overall, the best fitting structural model assumed that episodic memory 
predicts strategy selection in the multiplicative judgment task and this choice, in turn, 
influences judgment accuracy in the multiplicative judgment task, χ2(100) = 94.94, SF 
= 1.03, p = .624, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .05. This model fit significantly 
better than a model that did not assume a path from memory abilities to strategy 
selection or from strategy selection to judgment performance, χ2(102) = 186.60, SF = 
1.04, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .10, Δχ2(2) = 83.75, p < .001. The 
model fit could not be improved by additionally assuming that strategy selection 
mediates the relationship between working memory and judgment accuracy in the 
linear judgment task, χ2(98) = 90.73, SF = 1.03, p = .686, CFI =1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .04, Δχ2(2) = 4.11, p = .128. Also, assuming that working memory predicts 
strategy selection in the multiplicative task did not increase model fit, χ2(99) = 93.78, 
SF = 1.03, p = .629, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04, Δχ2(1) = 1.17, p = .280. 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the best fitting structural model shows that strategy 
selection partly mediated the relationship between episodic memory and judgment 
performance in the multiplicative task. People with better episodic memory were more 
likely to select an exemplar-based strategy in the multiplicative task, and this change 
in judgment strategy increased judgment accuracy in the multiplicative task (r = -.16 
for the indirect effect, p < .001). Better episodic memory still predicted higher 
judgment accuracy, but the standardized regression weight dropped from r = -.43 to r 
= -.27 when the strategy weight in the multiplicative task (called “strategy” in the 
structural model) was added. In contrast, higher working memory capacity did not 
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increase the probability of selecting a rule-based strategy in the linear task and strategy 
selection did not affect judgment performance in the linear task. 
Strategy execution. In the Introduction we argued that memory abilities may 
predict judgment performance because memory abilities improve strategy execution. 
Specifically, high working-memory capacity may help people execute rule-based 
strategies, and in turn, strategy execution may mediate the relationship between 
working memory capacity and judgment accuracy in the linear task. In contrast, 
episodic memory may help people execute exemplar-based strategies, and in turn, 
strategy execution may mediate the relationship between episodic memory and 
judgment accuracy in the multiplicative task. As a further test of these hypotheses, we 
examined how strategy execution contributes to the relationship between memory 
skills and judgment performance. In a first step, we determined an indicator for 
strategy execution in the linear and the multiplicative judgment task based on the 
computational modeling. To derive this measure, we weighted the predictions of the 
exemplar and the linear model by the strategy weights (Equation 8) and calculated the 
RMSD between the weighted predictions and participants’ mean judgments. 
Consequently, the measure determines how consistently people apply the strategy, 
learned in training, to validation items in the test phase. 
To understand how strategy execution is related to memory skills and judgment 
accuracy, we again relied on mediation analyses. Matching the analysis for strategy 
selection, we estimated a null model that assumed strategy execution does not mediate 
the relationship between memory abilities and judgment accuracy. We compared this 
model to different competitors that assumed (a) strategy execution mediates the 
relationship between working memory and performance only in the linear judgment 
task, (b) strategy execution mediates the relationship between episodic memory and 
performance only in the multiplicative judgment task, or (c) strategy execution 
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mediates both the relationship between working memory and judgment performance 
in the linear task and the relationship between episodic memory and judgment 
performance in the multiplicative task. 
The best fitting structural model included a mediation effect of strategy 
execution on the relationship between working memory and judgment accuracy in the 
linear judgment task, χ2(100) = 102.57, SF = 1.05, p = .410, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 
.01, SRMR = .04. According to this model, working memory predicts strategy 
execution in the linear judgment task; hence, the more closely participants followed 
the strategy learned in training, the more accurate were their judgments. A structural 
model assuming that strategy execution additionally mediates the relationship between 
episodic memory and judgment accuracy in the multiplicative judgment task did not 
improve model fit, χ2(98) = 96.75, SF = 1.05, p = .517, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .04, Δχ2(2) = 5.35, p = .069. Discarding the indirect effect of strategy 
execution in the linear task, however, significantly harmed the fit of the structural 
model, χ2(102) = 208.13, SF = 1.05, p < .001, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .10, 
Δχ2(2) = 105.56, p < .001. 
Figure 6 shows the resulting structural model. In this model, working memory 
capacity again directly predicts judgment accuracy in the linear task, but to a smaller 
extent (the standardized regression weight fell from r = -.35 to r = -.24). Strategy 
execution mediates this relationship between working memory and judgment 
accuracy. Higher working memory capacity facilitates executing the learned strategy 
in linear judgment tasks, and strategy execution, in turn, predicts how accurately 
people make judgments in linear tasks (r = -.11 for the indirect effect, p = .019). In the 
multiplicative task, however, episodic memory does not predict how well people 
execute a learned strategy, and strategy execution does not lead to more accurate 
judgments. 
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General Discussion 
Working memory and long-term memory are indispensable for many everyday 
activities. In fact, working memory capacity predicts performance differences for a 
wide range of cognitive tasks ranging from reading (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) to 
reasoning (Kane et al., 2004; Kyllonen & Cristal, 1990) and also predicts everyday 
cognitive failures (Unsworth et al., 2012). Likewise, episodic long-term memory has 
proved useful as an indicator of general intelligence (Jäger et al., 1997). However, 
little attention has been paid to the question of how various memory abilities influence 
judgment and decision making (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Del Missier et al., 2013; 
Tomlinson et al., 2011). Our study aimed to fill this gap by investigating how working 
memory, episodic memory, and implicit memory promote judgment strategies and 
judgment performance in two kinds of judgment tasks: a linear judgment task that can 
best be solved by a rule-based cue abstraction strategy and a multiplicative judgment 
task in which people should rely more often on an exemplar-based strategy. As 
predicted, we found that working memory capacity was linked to judgment accuracy 
in linear judgment tasks in which most people tried to abstract rules. In contrast, 
episodic memory was related to judgment accuracy in multiplicative judgment tasks in 
which most people relied on exemplar-based strategies. Largely in line with theories in 
judgment and decision making — and even more with categorization theories (Ashby 
& O’Brien, 2005; Juslin et al., 2008; Smith et al., 1998) — these results suggest that 
rule-based and exemplar-based judgment strategies tap into different memory abilities.  
The Influence of Memory Abilities on Rule-based Strategies 
 Rule-based judgment strategies have often been understood as serial, capacity-
constrained, hypothesis-testing processes that demand high working memory capacity 
(Ashby & O’Brien, 2005; Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2003, 2008). Supporting the 
idea that working memory capacity is indispensable for making rule-based judgments, 
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we found that working memory was related to judgment accuracy in linear judgment 
tasks in which participants’ judgments were, overall, best described by a rule-based 
cue abstraction strategy. This result resonates well with previous findings showing that 
successfully adopting a rule-based strategy is impeded by cognitive load (Filoteo et 
al., 2010; Hoffmann et al., 2013a). Theoretically, two major components of rule-based 
judgment strategies contribute to the relationship between working memory capacity 
and judgment accuracy. First, abstracting linear rules may require maintaining the 
previous judgment object in working memory and comparing it to the current 
judgment object (Juslin et al., 2008; Pachur & Olsson, 2012). Second, executing a 
rule-based strategy may involve mental updating of the judgment estimate and 
inhibiting irrelevant cue information. In line with the latter idea, we found that 
working memory capacity promoted executing the chosen strategy more consistently 
in linear judgment tasks, and strategy execution, in turn, predicted judgment accuracy. 
This finding matches previous research suggesting that working memory capacity 
influences how accurately people apply decision rules (Del Missier et al., 2013). 
Our results, however, seem to contradict findings by Rolinson, Evans, Walsh, 
and Dennis (2011) suggesting that working memory capacity is required only for 
learning negative, and not positive relationships between the cues and the criterion. In 
contrast, we found that working memory also predicted how successful people were at 
learning positive cue–criterion relationships. One explanation could be that our task 
was more difficult because the criterion had to be predicted with four instead of only 
two cues. Possibly, people with low working memory capacity can still test 
hypotheses about two cues, whereas only high working memory capacity allows 
people to consider more alternative hypotheses (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003). 
Episodic memory, in our study, did not directly predict judgment accuracy in 
linear judgment tasks, suggesting that episodic memory is less important than working 
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memory capacity for making judgments with a cue abstraction strategy. However, 
memory skills are not independent of each other. Replicating findings from memory 
research (Del Missier et al., 2013; Mogle et al., 2008; Unsworth, 2010), we found that 
working memory and episodic memory are moderately correlated, probably reflecting 
that working memory is needed to encode and retrieve information from long-term 
memory. Consequently, episodic memory was indirectly related to accuracy in linear 
judgment tasks through its correlation with working memory (r = -.14). Possibly, this 
indirect relationship suggests that episodic memory is still needed to retrieve cue 
weights when making a judgment. 
One question we did not address is if procedural memory, another type of 
implicit memory, contributes to rule-based judgment strategies. Procedural memory 
underlies the learning of motor skills (Squire & Zola, 1996; Willingham, 1998), 
whereas our measures of implicit memory focused on processing advantages for 
previously encountered perceptual stimuli. Procedural memory is supposed to underlie 
the learning of “structured categories containing many exemplars that could not be 
easily learned via a logical reasoning process” (Ashby & O’Brien, 2005, p. 86). In 
these information-integration tasks, learning requires many repetitions and the optimal 
strategy is difficult to verbalize (Ashby & Maddox, 2005). Structurally, information-
integration tasks in categorization are most similar to linear, additive judgment tasks. 
However, it is unlikely that learning to solve additive judgment tasks builds on 
procedural memory. Not only do people test specific hypothesis when learning to 
solve these tasks (Brehmer, 1994; Juslin et al., 2008), but they also acquire explicit 
knowledge about the importance of the cues (Lagnado et al., 2006). 
The Influence of Memory Abilities on Exemplar-based Strategies 
Surprisingly few studies have empirically investigated how episodic memory is 
linked to strategies and performance in judgments or decision making. Our study 
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emphasizes how important episodic memory is for making exemplar-based judgments. 
We found clear evidence that episodic memory predicts judgment accuracy in 
multiplicative judgment tasks in which participants’ judgments were mostly best 
described by an exemplar-based judgment strategy. This result is in line with previous 
studies suggesting that people engage in a strategic memorization process when 
adopting exemplar-based strategies (Juslin et al., 2008; Olsson et al., 2006) and further 
supports the theoretical link between episodic memory trace models and exemplar 
models (Hintzman, 1984, 1986). 
In our study we did not find any relationship between implicit memory and 
exemplar-based judgments, suggesting that implicit memory does not influence 
judgments. However, it is possible that the lack of a finding was caused by the 
unreliability of implicit memory measures (Buchner & Brandt, 2003; Buchner & 
Wippich, 2000; Meier & Perrig, 2000). Although we used several established tasks 
that should measure implicit memory, correlations between the implicit memory tasks 
were low and two out of three were not different from zero. This lack of reliability 
also restricts possible relations to other constructs, making it difficult to interpret our 
findings. Accordingly, the relation between implicit memory and exemplar-based 
judgments still remains unclear. 
In our study, we found no direct link between working memory capacity and 
exemplar-based judgments. At first glance, this result seems to contradict previous 
studies that found working memory helps in solving different kinds of judgment and 
categorization tasks (Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky, 2011; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Weaver & Stewart, 2012). Indeed, our study differed in 
some respects from previous research in categorization. While our study investigated 
how successfully people generalized their performance to new items, previous studies 
focused mostly on the learning process. In Lewandowsky’s (2011) study, for instance, 
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a learning parameter best captured variations in working memory capacity across six 
different categorization tasks. In addition, we assessed judgment performance — 
because of time restrictions —with only two different tasks, using judgment accuracy 
in the four test blocks as manifest indicators. Accordingly, our measurement focused 
more strongly on variance specific to each judgment task, whereas past research 
concentrated on the variance shared among different judgment or categorization tasks 
(Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; 
Weaver & Stewart, 2012). Hence, it is possible that learning in rule- and exemplar-
based judgment tasks requires working-memory capacity, whereas executing a learned 
judgment strategy depends on working memory capacity only for rule-based 
judgments. However, as mentioned above, working memory capacity was moderately 
correlated with episodic memory in our study. Accordingly, working memory was 
helpful not only for solving linear judgment tasks, but also for solving multiplicative 
judgment tasks: Higher working memory capacity predicted higher judgment accuracy 
in the multiplicative judgment task through its connection to episodic memory (r = -
.17). Apparently, successfully solving judgment tasks relies on the interplay between 
episodic memory and working memory — an interpretation that is generally in line 
with the idea that learning in a huge variety of judgment tasks depends on working 
memory capacity (Weaver & Stewart, 2012). 
Memory Abilities and Strategy Use 
In the past decade, judgment research has focused mostly on task 
characteristics as a determinant of judgment strategies (Juslin et al., 2003, 2008; 
Karlsson et al., 2007; von Helversen et al., 2013; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). 
Consistent with prior research we found that most participants relied on a rule-based 
cue abstraction strategy in a linear judgment task and shifted to exemplar-based 
strategies in multiplicative judgment tasks (Hoffmann et al., 2013a; Juslin et al., 2008; 
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Karlsson et al., 2007). However, individual differences, such as age or intelligence, 
can also drive shifts between different types of strategies (Bröder, 2003; Mata, von 
Helversen et al., 2012). Specifically, we argued that memory abilities may influence 
not only how well people execute a strategy but also which strategies people select 
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Lemaire & Siegler, 1995; Mata, Pachur et al., 2012). 
Whereas neither working memory capacity nor episodic memory influenced strategy 
selection in the linear task, episodic memory fostered the probability of selecting an 
exemplar strategy in the multiplicative task. Furthermore, strategy selection partly 
mediated the relationship between episodic memory and judgment performance. This 
result dovetails with the idea that memory abilities may reduce the costs associated 
with a strategy and, in turn, increase the preference for employing a specific strategy 
(Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 1993; Rieskamp & Otto, 2004). 
Following the strategy selection approach, however, one would have expected 
that working memory capacity predicts as well to what extent people select a rule-
based strategy in the linear task. One reason why we did not find this relationship 
could be that rule-based strategies act as a default (Karlsson et al., 2008; Olsson et al., 
2006). In line with this argumentation, few people chose an exemplar strategy in the 
linear tasks. Consequently, only engaging in exemplar-based memorization processes 
would require an active choice, whereas the success of rule-based strategies may 
depend more on the effort needed to execute the strategy. This explanation is 
supported by the finding that working memory capacity predicted how well the 
learned strategy was executed in the linear task, suggesting that the inability to 
accurately use a strategy does not necessarily lead to a strategy shift. In contrast, how 
well the learned strategy was executed in the multiplicative task was unrelated to 
episodic memory, suggesting that those participants who did not shift to the task-
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appropriate exemplar-based strategy nevertheless applied the rules they learned 
consistently. 
In sum, our results demonstrate that episodic memory plays an important role 
in strategy selection (Mata, von Helversen et al., 2012) but do not provide any 
evidence that working memory capacity — as previously suggested — predicts more 
adaptive strategy selections (Bröder, 2003; Craig & Lewandowsky, 2012; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Mata, Pachur et al., 2012). These results emphasize that 
reducing strategy selection to a question of working memory capacity probably 
oversimplifies the idea of adaptive strategy use. Current research, for instance, 
proposes that people have stable preferences across domains for learning based on 
rules or on exemplars (McDaniel, Cahill, Robbins, & Wiener, 2013). Investigating 
these preferences in conjunction with cognitive abilities hopefully allows researchers 
to form a more comprehensive picture of how task demands and characteristics of the 
decision maker constrain the repertoire of applicable strategies. 
Conclusions 
Twenty years ago, Elke Weber and colleagues (1995) reminded us that we 
should not forget memory processes when thinking about how people make 
judgments. Our results suggest that different judgment strategies take advantage of 
specific memory processes: Whereas rule-based strategies draw on working memory 
capacity, exemplar-based strategies exploit encoding and retrieval processes in 
episodic long-term memory. Thus, knowledge about working memory and long-term 
memory processes may help explain how people successfully solve judgment tasks 
that range from simple daily judgments such as estimating the probability of rainfall to 
professional judgments such as judging the quality of a job candidate. 
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Footnotes 
1. In a pilot study, 12 participants rated 100 German sentences for plausibility. 
Only highly plausible or implausible sentences were included in the final reading span 
test. 
2. In a pilot study, we included a threshold procedure using 40 independent 
nouns. The results showed that participants correctly identified half of the nouns using 
a mask with nine black squares so that 56% of the noun was masked. 
3. To assure that old and new sounds were equally easy to identify among 
distractors, we conducted a pilot study with 24 subjects. In this pilot study, half of the 
participants heard half of the sounds without noise in the study phase; the other half of 
the participants heard the remaining sounds in the study phase. Afterward, old and 
new sounds were presented embedded in noise and participants were asked to identify 
them among two distractors. For the final experiment, old and new sounds were 
matched on performance for old sounds. 
4. We also fitted an exemplar model with four attention parameters to 
participants’ judgments. However, replicating results from previous studies 
(Hoffmann et al., 2013a; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008), this model failed to 
outperform an exemplar model with one parameter in predicting participants’ 
judgments for validation items in either the linear task (RMSD = 5.3) or the 
multiplicative task (RMSD = 5.85). 
5. Judgment accuracy was measured in RMSD with lower RMSD indicating 
more accurate judgments. Accordingly, negative correlations imply that higher 
working memory predicts higher judgment accuracy. 
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Table 1 
Training and Validation Items Used in the Multiplicative and the Linear Judgment 
Task. The Judgment Criterion Was Derived from Equation 1 (Linear) and Equation 2 
(Multiplicative). 
Cue values Judgment criterion 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Multiplicative Linear 
Set 
2 1 0 3 2 14 Training 
1 4 1 4 5 22 Training 
0 3 1 2 2 13 Training 
0 2 3 0 1 12 Training 
5 5 4 0 29 43 Training 
0 4 5 4 12 26 Training 
2 4 3 0 9 26 Training 
1 4 3 5 13 27 Training 
1 0 2 4 1 12 Training 
1 0 0 2 1 6 Training 
5 3 3 5 21 40 Training 
1 1 5 5 7 22 Training 
1 2 0 5 2 15 Training 
5 5 0 1 4 36 Training 
0 4 3 1 4 19 Training 
4 2 1 3 6 27 Training 
0 5 2 3 6 22 Training 
5 5 2 4 22 43 Training 
5 1 3 4 9 33 Training 
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Cue values Judgment criterion 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Multiplicative Linear 
Set 
4 0 2 4 3 24 Training 
1 4 1 5 6 23 Training 
3 0 5 5 3 27 Training 
0 2 5 0 2 16 Training 
1 5 2 4 10 27 Training 
3 4 5 5 30 39 Training 
3 5 1 4 10 33 Validation 
3 4 4 3 21 35 Validation 
5 0 3 4 4 30 Validation 
3 4 2 5 14 33 Validation 
5 0 5 5 4 35 Validation 
3 2 0 2 2 20 Validation 
2 3 4 0 9 25 Validation 
4 5 4 5 36 44 Validation 
5 0 5 3 4 33 Validation 
4 3 0 1 3 26 Validation 
2 1 2 0 3 15 Validation 
2 5 2 3 12 30 Validation 
4 0 0 2 2 18 Validation 
4 1 1 1 4 22 Validation 
3 3 3 5 15 32 Validation 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Memory and the Judgment Tasks 
Task M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Operation span 58.4 11.7 -1.3 2.2 
Reading span 57.6 11.8 -1.2 2.1 
Symmetry span 29.9 7.4 -0.7 0.1 
Recognition (% recalled) 86.5 8.8 -0.7 0.2 
Cued recall (% recalled) 41.4 19.6 0.3 -0.2 
Free recall (% recalled) 44.6 16.5 0.3 -0.1 
Speeded presentation (ms) 55 1023 0.2 5.3 
Degraded presentation (ms) -1293 3471 0.4 3.5 
Identification in noise (ms) -371 788 -0.9 3.1 
Linear judgment     
  Last training block 6.1 2.4 1.4 4.1 
  Test (Mean) 5.4 1.9 0.5 0.6 
Multiplicative judgment     
  Last training block 5.3 1.8 0.6 0.4 
  Test (Mean) 5.1 1.9 0.9 0.5 
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Table 3 
Model Fits in the Linear and the Multiplicative Judgment Task (Standard Deviations in 
Parentheses) 
Note. RMSD: root mean square deviation 
Model fit Baseline model Linear model Exemplar model 
Linear task    
  Training RMSD 9.0 (1.3) 4.5 (1.4) 5.3 (1.6) 
  Test RMSD 7.3 (1.6) 3.8 (1.4) 5.2 (1.5) 
  Classification (N) 17 220 42 
Multiplicative task    
  Training RMSD 7.3 (1.2) 4.7 (0.9) 4.7 (1.1) 
  Test RMSD 6.9 (1.9) 4.6 (1.3) 4.2 (1.1) 
  Classification (N) 4 99 176 
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Table 4 
Zero-order Correlations Between All Memory Tasks and Test Performance in the Judgment Tasks 
 
 
Episodic memory Working memory Implicit memory Additive task Multiplicative task Task 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Episodic memory                  
1 Recognition 1                 
2 Cued recall .228 1                
3 Free recall .205 .126 1               
Working memory                  
4 Operation .027 .123 .074 1              
5 Reading .138 .158 .108 .540 1             
6 Symmetry .168 .145 .111 .398 .306 1            
Implicit memory                  
7 Speeded -.023 .101 .113 -.045 -.065 .000 1           
8 Degraded -.033 -.012 -.133 -.043 -.076 .036 .018 1          
9 Noise -.038 -.031 .067 .073 .021 -.023 .152 -.011 1         
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Episodic memory Working memory Implicit memory Additive task Multiplicative task Task 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Additive task                  
10 Test Block 1 -.032 -.156 -.076 -.193 -.152 -.152 -.001 .063 -.031 1        
11 Test Block 2 -.040 -.194 -.130 -.239 -.230 -.197 -.037 .053 -.044 .734 1       
12 Test Block 3 -.062 -.202 -.112 -.213 -.214 -.185 -.066 .100 -.038 .738 .799 1      
13 Test Block 4 -.055 -.159 -.062 -.227 -.210 -.184 -.015 .047 -.079 .710 .749 .777 1     
Multiplicative task                  
14 Test Block 1 -.157 -.082 -.202 -.082 -.128 -.058 -.060 .147 -.040 .114 .174 .157 .101 1    
15 Test Block 2 -.174 -.169 -.175 -.148 -.171 -.067 -.061 .070 -.034 .229 .205 .234 .179 .675 1   
16 Test Block 3 -.168 -.100 -.149 -.147 -.174 -.070 -.077 .090 .001 .178 .241 .237 .139 .666 .705 1  
17 Test Block 4 -.136 -.117 -.180 -.100 -.120 -.067 -.022 .123 -.001 .177 .149 .180 .107 .635 .734 .717 1 
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Figure 1. Strategy classification of participants in the linear and the multiplicative judgment 
task. 
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Figure 2. Measurement model for memory abilities with a correlation between the latent 
constructs working memory and episodic memory. Circles represent latent constructs and 
squares represent manifest variables. The numbers above the long, single-headed arrows give 
the standardized factor loadings; the numbers next to the short, single-headed arrows are error 
variances of the manifest variables. These error variances cover all task-specific variances, 
including measurement error, material-specific variance, and test-specific variance. Double-
headed arrows indicate correlations between the latent constructs. All loadings and 
correlations are standardized. 
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Figure 3. Measurement model for judgment performance for validation items with a 
correlation between the latent constructs judgment performance in the multiplicative task and 
judgment performance in the additive task (see Figure 2 for a detailed description of the 
graphical representation). All loadings and correlations are standardized.  
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Figure 4. Structural model relating judgment performance in the test phase to memory 
abilities (see Figure 2 for a detailed description of the graphical representation). Judgment 
accuracy was measured in root mean square deviation (RMSD) with lower RMSD indicating 
more accurate judgments. Accordingly, correlations between the memory constructs and 
judgment accuracy are negative. All loadings and correlations are standardized. 
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Figure 5. Structural model relating judgment performance in the test phase through strategy 
selection to memory abilities (see Figure 2 for a detailed description of the graphical 
representation). All loadings and correlations are standardized. Correlation in parentheses 
indicates correlation without indirect effect. 
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Figure 6. Structural model relating judgment performance in the test phase through strategy 
consistency to memory abilities (see Figure 2 for a detailed description of the graphical 
representation). All loadings and correlations are standardized. Correlation in parentheses 
indicates correlation without indirect effect. 
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